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This dissertation in terms of National Security 
Classification will be unclassified. The information collec­
tion process involved telephone conversations, written re­
quests for certain documents, and personal conversations with 
many individuals who have participated or are currently 
involved in these programs. Because of the currency of the 
MX debate and its highly controversial nature, the anonymity 
of these sources has been protected. Statements addressing 
items that may not be common knowledge and are not referenced 
are based on these sources. The referenced information and 
data utilized are obtained from sources which are readily 
available to anyone in most university libraries or designated 
as unrestricted access in case of some government agency docu­
mentation. Weapons system technical characteristics and oper­
ational capabilities are obtained from such sources as Janes 
Weapons Systems, Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, and other recognized commercially available 
scientific-technical publications.
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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF
FACTORS THAT IMPACT ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS 
AND WEAPON SYSTEM SELECTION
CHAPTER I
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Introduction 
Strategic arms limitations are not intermittent 
elements but integral aspects of foreign policy and national 
security. Recognition of the increasing role of arms con­
trol in foreign policy is depicted by the number of arms 
control agreements that have transpired since 1959 (see 
table 1). The majority of these treaties were completed 
during the decade of the seventies and are bilateral agree­
ments between the United States and the Soviet Union.^
Arms control interactions are long term issues 
since nations are reluctant to relinquish strategic arms 
considered necessary for national security. This reluctance 
to limit arms is illustrated by the fact that none of the 
documents listed in table 1 are disarmament treaties but
TABLE 1 
ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
*M/B Signed Effective
Antarctic M 12-01-59 06-23-61
Hot Line Agreement B 06—20—63 06-20-63
Limited Test Ban M 08-05-63 10-10-63
Outer Space M 01-27-67 10-10-67
Prohibit Nuclear Weapons 
in South America M 02—14—67 04-22-68
Nuclear Nonproliferation M 07-01-68 03-05-70
Seabed Arms Control M 02-11-71 05-18-72
Improved Hotline B 09-30-71 09-30-71
Nuclear Accidents B 09-30-71 09-30-71
Biological Weapons Convention M 04-10-72 03-26-75
ABM B 05-26-72 10-03-72
Interim Agreement on Offensive 
Strategic Arms B 05-26-72 10-03-72
Standing Consultative Commission B 12-21-72 12-21-72
Basic Principles of Negotiations 
on Further Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms B 06-21-73 06-21-73
Threshold Test Ban Treaty 
with Protocol B 07-03-74
Protocol to the ABM B 07-03-74 • • •
Limitation of Underground 
Explosions for Peaceful 
Purposes B 05-28-76
Environmental Modification 
Convention M 05-18-77 10-05-78
SALT II B 06-18-79 ♦ • •
SOURCE : ACDA Publication 102 , May 1979 .
*M = Multilateral 
B = Bilateral (U.S. - U.S.S. R.)
NOTE : See appendix I for summary of major
provisions,
address only a specific area of arms control. The strategic 
arms treaties signed to date have only limited specific wea­
pons systems while other categories of strategic weapons
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have continued to increase.
The arms control treaties negotiated to date have 
been only partially successful. While all-out war has been 
avoided, the reduction of expenditures of human or economic 
resources has not occurred. The Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaty (SALT I), completed in May 1972, was essentially in­
tended to be a holding action to constrain the buildup of 
Soviet offensive systems.  ^ The aftermath of SALT I saw an 
increase in the buildup or modernization of offensive missile 
systems. The SALT II discussions were directed toward the 
reduction of these offensive weapons to the point that both 
participants would possess equal aggregate numbers of weapons.
The Soviet Union has continued to increase the num­
bers of strategic nuclear launch vehicles while the U.S. has 
remained at a constant or slightly declining level. See 
figure 1. The greater numbers of nuclear launch vehicles 
possessed by the Soviet Union indicate that they now have 
the capability to launch a first strike against the contin­
ental United States (Lehman, 1978; 3). These increased
quantities, along with the technological improvements in 
the Soviet strategic weapons systems, have made the land- 
based component of the U.S. defensive system highly vulner­
able to incoming attack. These two Soviet factors, numbers
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SOURCE: MICHAEL B. DONLEY, ED., SALT HANDBOOK
(WASHINGTON, D.C.: HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 1979), P. 42.
and accuracy, have directed the current U.S. arms control 
debate to the question about deployment of an additional 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to maintain the 
Triad defensive concept.
The Triad System
The U.S. national defense system is comprised of 
a triad that is composed of long-range bombers, intercontin­
ental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBM's). Independently of the other two, 
each component of the triad is intended to have the capability 
to cause an unacceptable level of damage to an adversary.
There are no iron-clad laws that state that a 
strategic force posture must be comprised of three components 
nor that one of these components consists of an ICBM deploy­
ment (Gray, 1979: 69). There is merit in diversity, and
the existence of an ICBM force complicates the tasks of an 
adversarys planning to attack the United States. Redundancy 
is related to diversity. Diversity is a qualitative hedge 
against failure of any one of the three forces. The redundancy 
factor gives the capability of jnultiple target coverage so 
that in the event a set of weapons fails, there will be sur­
viving weapons capable of accomplishing the deterrent mission 
(Nitze, 1979: 31).
The current strategic triad components are unique 
in terms of military offensive capabilities and various attack 
vulnerabilities. Secretary of Defense Brown, in testimony
before the Senate Appropriations Committee, May 6, 1980, 
stated that this lack of common vulnerability complicates 
the incoming attack planning if the attempt is to destroy 
all retaliation capabilities. Additionally, a technologi­
cal advancement that might reduce or neutralize one leg of 
the triad would leave the remaining forces available for 
defense.
The existence of the triad offers two additional 
advantages: (1) shoring up a weak member in a triad is not
quite so urgent an undertaking as would be the case in a 
dyad; (2) the windows of vulnerability encountered by these 
individual components occur at different times. Exploitation 
of a single leg of the triad by an attacker then becomes more 
difficult (Ulsamer, 1980: 17).
The ICBM force provides the following attributes to the 
triad (Donley, 1979: 50):
- Different preattack survival mode from that which 
aircraft or SLBM's has and a different penetra­
tion to target mode from that which aircraft
has.
- Independence from strategic or tactical warning 
for pre-launch survival.
- Exceptionally reliable command, control, and 
communications.
- Rapid response capability, prompt retargeting 
ability, short flight time to target, hard tar­
get capability, and high alert rate (reliability).
- Low domestic profile but large international 
perception.
- High confidence in nuclear weapon safety and 
security.
Relatively low operating costs and personal 
requirements.
Threat ICBM Strategic Force
In the mid 1980s, the Soviet Union will have the 
capability to target two ICBM warheads (see table 2) against 
each Minutemen silo and still have 4,000 warheads to use on 
other targets.^ The warheads targeted against Minuteman are 
predicted to have sufficient accuracy to destroy them (Brown, 
1980). Figure 2 illustrates the improvement in accuracies 
of weapons possessed by the United States and the Soviet 
Union.^ Incumbent Secretary of Defense Weinberger supported 
the increasing Soviet accuracy capability when he stated 
that the casualty rate to Minuteman could approximate 90 to 
95 percent loss in a Soviet first strike (Aviation Week & 
Space Technology, May 11, 1980: 26).
The United States' estimates of Soviet accuracies 
are to some extent technological extrapolations. These 
accuracy factors are questionable since observed firings 
have beeen from test facilities, not operational silos and 
not over operational trajectories (Gray, 1978A: 53). The
assumption must be made that Soviet modernization programs 
will continue to improve missile accuracies.
Strategic arms limitation agreements have not re­
duced this threat. The United States is in a critical per­
iod in strategic force acquisition to mitigate this area of 
concern. The key will be to select the weapon system that
TABLE 2
POTENTIAL SOVIET STRATEGIC 
THREAT IN 1985
With
SALT
Without
SALT
Soviet strategic missiles 
and bombers 2,250^ 3,000^
Soviet MIRVed strategic 
missiles 1,200^ 1,800^
Soviet MIRVed land-based 
strategic missiles 820^ 1,300^
Soviet silo-killer warheads 6,000^ 10,000-15,000^
Soviet total strategic 
warheads and bombs 9,500^ 13,000-18,000^
SOURCE : Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, September 18 , 1979.
From treaty.
2
Secretary Brown's statement to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, July 23, 1979.
^Determined in Senate Armed Services Committee 
hearing, July 23, 1979, during questioning of Secretary 
Brown and Under Secretary Perry.
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will best maintain national security in the required time 
frame.
Because the ICBM strategic force is the first 
leg of the triad to become vulnerable, this research is 
directed to this component. Special emphasis is placed on 
the mobile (MX) land-based system as an alternative to alle­
viate the threat to the Minuteman. In addition, considera­
tion is given to the deployment of a short range antiballistic 
missile system intended to be a low-altitude, short-range 
air defense system.
Research Purposes 
The focus of this dissertation is twofold: (1) to
evaluate selected factors affecting progress in arms control, 
and (2) to analyze the proposed deployment of the mobile land- 
based ICBM concept in conjunction with a low altitude air 
defense system (LoAD). In this regard, three majors factors 
will be emphasized: theories of deterrence, the concept of
"technology creep," and models of the decision making and nego­
tiation processes.®
The primary purpose of this dissertation is an 
analysis of the problems and issues associated with the de­
ployment of a proposed weapon system in conjunction with 
strategic arms negotiations. The intended users are the 
arms controllers involved in weapon system selections, deci­
sions and negotiations, and other individuals interested in 
the implications of the weapon system selection process.
11
Much of the available literature is written about 
each of these proposed factors separately, but considera­
tion of their impacts collectively on the selection of wea­
pons systems for negotiation and the negotiation process is 
lacking. The contribution of each of these factors to the 
weapon system selection process will be considered in the 
context of applied policy analysis. Previous research on 
this question has not combined these three theoretical per­
spectives to identify potential problem areas in the weapon 
system selection.
Integration of these factors may have a synergistic 
effect on the arms control process. Arms control interactions 
are impacted by perceptions, attitudes, and intentions of the 
decision makers who must have a familiarity of the capabilities 
of the weapons systems to be negotiated and of the technologi­
cal improvements to be considered for these systems. Arms 
control negotiations are intended to persuade the other side 
to give up systems that may weaken or limit response capa­
bility. To accomplish this successfully, the front-line 
negotiator must be cognizant of the weapons systems' capa­
bilities, their perceived impact and the potential impact 
of technological changes in these systems.
Research Methodology 
Applied Policy Analysis
1. Definition
This dissertation uses an applied policy analysis 
format. This technique is applicable to the process of
12
selecting weapons for deployment and negotiation consideration 
because the approach provides the arms control policy makers 
with a range of alternatives predicated on their ability to 
cope with an issue, to solve a problem, or to satisfy multiple 
criteria for inclusion in negotiations.
Policy analysis can be defined in a variety of ways. 
Since there is such a range in terms of definition of the 
technique, one might conclude that there is no one best 
method for approaching the analysis.  ^ Ballard (1979) con­
firms that there is no single approach to policy analysis 
that is always applicable, neither is one approach inher­
ently better than another and the approach can only be ex­
plained in the context of well-defined problems. Wildavsky, 
further supporting this notion, believes that the content is 
defined by the boundaries that appear appropriate at the 
time. The approach to be selected should be influenced by 
the substantive problem area and the needs of the policy makers.
2. Approach to Analysis
The approach to the applied analysis contained in 
this dissertation will be based on a general model derived 
by White et al. (1978). This model has been used for a 
variety of research purposes and it is flexible enough to 
be applied to this research. Of course, several modifica­
tions will be required in order to fit the particular sub­
stantive aspects of arms control. Table 3 contains the break­
down and task description of the approach to policy analysis 
selected for this research.
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TABLE 3 
POLICY ANALYSIS STAGES
Stage Task Description
Problem Definition Identification and definition of 
the problem of arms control ;
1. When did the issue arise?
2. Is problem long- or short-term?
3. Who are the participants?
4. Why were strategic arms limita­
tions initiated?
5. What are the results to date?
Policy Context 
Description
What are the key political and 
technological variables affecting 
the strategic arms limitation 
process?
1. What are the institutional 
arrangements?
2. How are institutions utilized 
in the policy process?
3. What are the factors that im­
pact progress in arms control?
Identification of 
Alternatives
What weapons systems are 
available?
What are their technical character­
istics?
Evaluation and 
Comparison of 
Alternatives
Weigh each against the evaluation 
criteria.
What are the costs, risks, or bene­
fits of these systems of concepts?
What are the barriers or con­
straints to deployment?
Recommendations Weapons systems for deployment.
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3. Problem Definition
The statement of the problem addressed by this 
dissertation, briefly reiterated, is that there are several 
factors influencing weapons systems that must be considered 
together in order to understand adequately the strategic 
arms control and selection process. Unclear problem defi­
nitions can lead the analysis in the wrong direction. The 
problem definition becomes the framework for the analysis, 
and the analyst must have not only a clear understanding of 
the problem but must define the scope and boundaries of the 
problem to be considered (Ballard, 1979).
Policy Context Description
In an applied-policy analysis there are two phases 
of research, technical and policy, which are considered to be 
integral parts of the analysis (White et al. , 1978). The 
technical portion in the issue of arms control is necessary 
to delineate the alternative weapons systems available and 
the characteristics of each. The policy analysis contribu­
tion is the interpretation of the results of the technical 
evaluation in terms of the political system within which it 
will hopefully be utilized.
The policy context stage of the analysis describes 
the existing systems for addressing the issues. The problems 
are related in this step to the political context in which 
they will be resolved (Ballard, 1979) . The policy context 
includes the institutional arrangement for addressing the
15
arms control problems, the implications of strategic arms 
limitation for other policy areas (linkages), the factors 
that impact the process, and the progress in arms control.
Identification of Alternatives
In an applied policy analysis one cannot consider 
all alternatives, but this step provides for filtering 
through those that can be recognized. This filtering pro­
cess allows the elimination of those alternatives that are 
perceived to be high risk, costly, or impossible to imple­
ment (Ballard, 1979). Quade (1979: 117) writes that the
generation of alternatives is a creative act and, except for 
narrow problems that permit closed mathematical formulation, 
one cannot reasonably consider all possibilities. The alter­
natives considered in this dissertation are selected accord­
ing to three factors: existence of the weapon or concept,
technical capabilities of the weapon system, and political 
feasibility of a proposed weapon concept.
Evaluation Criteria
The criteria for evaluation of the alternatives 
are contained in table 4 and measures for these criteria are 
contained in table 5. The criteria are not listed in order 
of importance because of the tendency for each decision­
maker to place more emphasis on one than another. Applied 
policy analysis lends itself to the utilization of both 
quantitative and qualitative measurement. The alternatives
16
TABLE 4
EVALUATION CRITERIA
Criterion
Deterrent 
Potential or 
Stability
-Does it contribute to 
international stability? 
-Does it have long- or 
short-term utility?
See table 5
Qualitative
-Basing
-Reliability
-Accuracy
“Utility
Environmental
Impacts
Disturbance or destruction 
to areas of potential 
deployment
- Does it modify or change 
physical areas or regions 
if deployed?
- Are there sufficient 
environmental resources 
available for system 
support?
Qualitative 
-Environmental 
disturbances 
•Modifications 
required 
•Long or short 
term 
•Repairability 
Quantitative 
-Resources 
required 
•Water
•Electricity
Vulnerability Capability to survive an 
incoming attack
-Do system characteristics 
promote survivability?
Quantitative
-Survivability
•High
•Low
Verifiability Compliance and adherence 
to negotiated treaties
-Does weapon system lend 
itself to verification by 
national technical means?
Qualitative 
-Degree of 
verification 
certainty 
•High 
•Low
Social and
Political
Impacts
Adoptability and 
acceptability
-Is weapon system selection 
politically expedient? 
-Does deployment create 
social concerns?
Qualitative 
-Public opinion 
-Congressional 
opinion
SOURCE: Adapted from White et al., 1978.
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TABLE 5
EVALUATION CRITERIA MEASURES
Criterion Measure
Deterrent Potential/ A. Basing
Stability 1. Level one
2. Level two
3. Level three
B. Reliability
1. Level one
2. Level two
C. Accuracy
1. Inaccurate (CEP)
2. Accurate (CEP)
3. Highly accurate (CEP)
D. Utility
1. Level one
2. Level two
Environmental Impacts A. Additional acres/miles land 
required
1. Low (<5000 acres)
2. High (>5000 acres)
B. Restorability in years
1. Less than life of system
2. Greater than life of 
system
C. Resources required
1. Water required/available 
(gallons or acre feet)
2. Electricity required/ 
available (mega-watts)
Vulnerability A. Low (<50 percent)
B. High (>50 percent)
Verifiability A. Low (<90 percent)
B. High (>90 percent)
Social-Political Aspects A. Public opinion
B. Congressional opinion
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evaluated may lend themselves to one method of measurement
more readily than another. Ballard (1979) writes;
The various uses of quantitiative and qualitative 
analysis in these two stages of policy analysis 
seem relatively straight-forward. However, their 
application and integration in the third step, 
analysis of alternatives, is more problematical. 
This is largely because of the values tradition­
ally assumed by the words "qualitative" and 
"quantitative." As discussed in the introduction, 
if quantitative is defined as explanative or pre­
dictive knowledge, then, of course, quantitative 
analysis is the preferable approach to evaluate 
policy alternatives. However, if these terms are 
used to denote different ways or organizing and 
assessing knowledge, then neither is inherently 
superior. The value of this approach for applied 
policy is that it allows for a broader assessment 
of policy alternatives, since both qualitative 
and quantitative knowledge are viewed as legiti­
mate and necessary.
The deterrent criteria are measured qualitatively 
according to a weapon system's impact on the stability of
p
the international environment. The deterrent measure is 
dependent upon the way the weapon system is perceived by 
an adversary and is directly related to basing modes, relia­
bility, and weapon system accuracy.
These attributes of deterrence that contribute to 
stability are measured on an objectively derived scale.
The measures for the basing factor are based on three levels 
of perception. At level three stability is uncertain because 
expert opinion is divided about system contribution to 
deterrence. Level two contributes to stable conditions 
because the basing concept is fixed and has been deployed 
ten years or longer. At level one the weapon system causes
19
almost no concern in the international environment because 
it is a fixed base system that has been deployed for fifteen 
years or longer. These measures are based on perceptions 
of the weapons systems and expert opinion.
System reliability is a technically derived factor 
that is based on whether or not the weapon will perform when 
it is needed. Two degrees of reliability are considered with 
one being an uncertain degree of confidence because of limited 
logistics support and the absence of a periodic flight test 
program. The higher, more reliable category two exists when 
the system has periodic flight testing and is logistically 
supported. The measures are based on data derived from 
unclassified military or associated publications and personal 
interviews with knowledgeable technical personnel.
The accuracy factor is related to the certainty 
that a weapon system has the technological capability to hit 
specific targets. The measure is the Circular Error Probable 
(CEP) data contained in unclassified publications. Three 
factors are considered. First, a system is considered to be 
inaccurate when compared to 1980 technological capabilities. 
Second, a system is considered to be accurate when compared 
to 1980 technological capabilities. Third, a system is con­
sidered to have latest state-of-the-art capabilities.
The length of time the system can be expected to 
be a credible system is labeled utility. Short term utility 
(level one) exists when less than twenty years remain in the
20
life cycle of the weapon and long term (level two) is 
considered to be greater than twenty years.
The data for measurement of the environment's 
criterion will be obtained from the U.S. Air Force Environ­
mental Impact Studies and from other credible sources such 
as university research centers. These systems require 
acquisition of both publicly and privately owned land. When 
the measure of the additional land requirements are greater 
than 5,000 acres, the impact will be considered high, but 
when the measure is fewer then 5,000, the impact will be 
considered low. These deployments damage the natural sur­
roundings during site construction and system deployment.
The measure for this damage will be in terms of years required 
to restore the surroundings. Restorability with the life 
cycle of the system is considered the most desirable.
Land-based deployments place an additional burden 
on natural resources such as water and electricity. The mea­
sure of this criterion is the projected requirements versus 
projected amounts available in terms of gallons or acre feet 
and mega-watts respectively.
The vulnerability criterion is qualitative and is 
evaluated to the degree (high or low) of vulnerability appli­
cable to a particular system. Similar to the deterrent cri­
terion, vulnerability measures are impacted by the basing 
mode and operational characteristics. The measure for this 
criterion is in terms of low and high vulnerability. Low
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vulnerability has less than a 50 percent kill factor during 
an attack. A high degree of vulnerability has a kill fac­
tor of greater than 50 percent during an attack. The data 
for this criterion are based on published statements of Secre­
taries of Defense Brown and Weinberger concerning vulnera­
bility of the fixed-based ICBMs.
Verification is probably one of the most difficult 
issues to negotiate in arms control. To have a reliable and 
accurate verification process, an onsite open inspection by 
each side would be required. Since this onsite inspection 
is unacceptable, verification is left to national technical 
means (NTM) which, roughly translated, means finding out the 
best way one can.^ Some of the verification techniques 
include satellite and aerial photography, radar surveillance, 
and intelligence gathering networks. The measure of this 
criterion is in terms of the degree of certainty with which 
verification can be accomplished by NTM. A high degree of 
certainty would be with 90 percent confidence that verifi­
cation can be made by aerial photography capabilities. A 
low degree of certainty would be less than a 90 percent 
degree of confidence that verification can be accomplished 
by this means. The measures are based on technical or mili­
tary publications and unclassified personal interviews with 
knowledgeable personnel.
Social and political criteria are indicators of 
weapon system acceptability to the general public. Political
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impacts should not be a consideration in weapon system 
selection, but they are. Congressman Aspin (1980), chair­
man of the Oversight Subcommittee of the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, contends that political 
influence enters the picture in the intelligence estimating 
stage where the requirements for new weapons systems may 
originate. He says that the estimates are often highly 
responsive to political needs of the moment.
The political impacts of the proposed MX deploy­
ment are twofold: (1) the impact of the decision to manu­
facture and deploy the missile and (2) the highly controver­
sial subject of how and where the missle should be deployed. 
The measure for these impacts is the result of public opinion 
polls conducted by recognized polling organizations. High 
levels of opposition occur when large scale missile deployments 
are not considered to be politically expedient because of lack 
of public acceptance of the requirement. Low levels of oppo­
sition occur from small interest groups on almost every large 
scale deployment.
Segments of the land-based ICBM component of the 
triad are presently deployed and operational. The proposed 
MX deployment is in the committee review cycle in Congress 
and congressional voting positions have not been established. 
Congressional positions on the MX are extracted from avail­
able committee reports, congressional research reports, and 
personal interviews with personnel who are involved in this 
aspect of the proposed deployment.
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Evaluation/Comparison/
Implementability of 
Alternatives
As in the basic model utilized for constructing 
this analysis, the fourth stage evaluates the proposed alterna­
tives against the established criteria. Feasibility of the 
implementation of each alternative is included in this stage 
of the analysis.
Despite the policy maker's needs for a firm "bottom 
line" recommendation, there are no single measures or evalua­
tion criteria that can adequately summarize the risks and 
benefits of alternative policies and implementation strategies. 
The results of this analysis do not eliminate the uncertain­
ties the policymakers face in making deployment decisions.
This analysis will be useful to the extent that it will be 
completed systematically using specified criteria and quali­
tative or quantitative measures (White et al., 1978: 36-38).
Recommendations
Stages one through four of this analysis define the 
problem and establish a framework for considering the alterna­
tive solutions within the institutional setting for making 
weapons system selection decisions. The researcher has made 
a concerted effort to eliminate and minimize personal bias 
or preferences in the information supplied for the decision­
makers. Stage five contains the researcher's conclusions 
and interpretations of the information contained in the 
analysis.
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Summary
This chapter addresses the issue of strategic arms 
limitation from the aspect that the previously negotiated 
treaties only limited the systems or categories of weapons 
that were specifically negotiated. Continued development 
in non-negotiated areas is not illegal but it increases the 
requirement for development of systems to counter the resul­
tant threats. Because of past emphasis on defensive systems, 
the land-based offensive component of the U.S. defensive 
triad will be vulnerable to attack during the mid-1980 period. 
The existing and proposed land-based ICBM defense system will 
be examined as a means of countering the increased threat 
utilizing applied policy analysis. The next chapter intro­
duces the institutional arrangements for making arms control 
decisions. The chapter includes a discussion of the national 
security council (NSC), the way in which the president utilizes 
the NSC, and the decision models that may be utilized in 
weapons system decisions.
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Chapter I Endnotes
?"The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are the primary 
participants because of their superpower status and because 
of their negotiations of missile systems that have inter­
continental capability (the range to reach the interior of 
the other's country). Although the Western European allies 
have been kept apprised of these negotiations, they have not 
had an active role since these systems will not be based on 
their soil.
2
There are several variations of the reasoning 
behind the two superpowers' decision to enter the SALT pro­
cess. One is that the overall political and military power 
of both nations had evolved into such positions that some type 
of accommodation of both political interest and strategic 
necessity must be reached. The SALT process could have come 
into being to instrument this readjustment and to ease the 
transition from a period of cold war to one of detente (Wolfe, 
1979: 3). An important factor that led to these arms limita­
tions talks was the launching of the first orbital satellite 
by the Soviet Union. Technological advanced in satellite 
technology, i.e., photographic capability for verification 
purposes, the capability to place an object in a fixed orbit, 
and later the ability to maneuver the satellite once it was 
in orbit, gave the Russians a basis to negotiate. An addi­
tional factor that contributed to the start of the arms con­
trol negotiations was that the Soviet Union had recovered from 
the effects of World War II and felt that recognition before 
the world as a power equivalent to the United States was 
required for their foreign policy purposes.
^Interview with Tom Graham, Chief Council,ACDA, 
October 1980. Also see Gerard Smith, Doubletalk (New York: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1980, pp. 446-452.
^The effectiveness of allocating multiple warheads 
to a single target simultaneously is controversial because of 
the fratricide problem. Fratricide is the term used to indi­
cate the destruction of one incoming warhead by the detona­
tion of another warhead. For lethality purposes simultaneous 
detonation must occur and timing is the problem.
^The accuracies are shown in terms of circular 
error of probability (CEP). The CEP is the radius of a circle 
within which half of any number of missiles is expected to 
fall. Lethality is a function of the warhead yield and CEP.
It is directly proportional to the square of the CEP. For 
example, multiplying yield by a factor of eight only increases 
lethality by a factor of four, but reducing CEP by a factor 
of eight will increase lethality by a factor of sixty-four.
A one megaton warhead delivered with a CEP of one nautical
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mile has the same lethality as a one kiloton warhead 
delivered with a CEP of 0.1 nautical mile (Conflict Studies, 
April 1980, no. 117, p. 14).
®"Technology creep" is a term coined by Deborah 
Shapley, Science magazine, that refers to the process of 
small improvements in guidance and control systems or com­
ponent microminiaturization of components that when brought 
together may form a breakthrough in technology or weapons 
systems.
^Policy analysis by definition is an elusive term. 
Wildavsky (1979: 14) states that it is a descriptive, pre­
scriptive, selective, objective, argumentative, and retro­
spective subfield whose content is not defined by disciplinary 
boundaries but by whatever appears appropriate at the time.
E. S. Quade (1979: 4) defines policy analysis as any type
of analysis that generates and presents information in such 
a way as to improve the basis for decisionmakers to exercise 
best judgment. Ballard (1979) adds that applied policy 
analysis asks the question, "What do I need to know in order 
to do domething?" MacRae and Wilde (1979: 5) define the
term as the use of reason and evidence to choose the best 
policy among a number of alternatives.
P
Ballard (197 9) points out that applied policy 
analysis is intended to improve the information base rather 
than to specify a decision. Treating the criteria in an 
equal manner provides the user experience. Quade (1979) 
supports this notion further by indicating that a numerical 
scale to measure a criterion such as deterrence, which exists 
only in the mind, could not be applied even if it existed.
^National technical means, as defined by article XV 
of the SALT II Treaty, is any method available consistent 
with recognized principles of international law.
CHAPTER II 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Introduction
This chapter considers the institutional arrangements 
for addressing arms control issues and provides part of the 
policy context description, stage two of the analysis.
Strategic weapons selection decisions are made by the presi­
dent with advice from the National Security Council (NSC) 
and from advisors who may occupy various positions in what 
can be referred to as circles of power (figure 3). This 
chapter discusses the National Security Council, the circles 
of power that may influence the arms control process, and the 
decision-making models utilized in strategic arms control 
decisions.
Central Role of the President 
The president has the central role in the formula­
tion, direction, and execution of the national security 
policy. This role is derived from the constitutional grant 
of executive power as chief of state and the designation of 
commander in chief of the Armed Forces. The presidency, in
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FIGURE 3
THE CONCENTRIC CIRCLES OF POWER 
IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING
LOWER-LEVEL
BUREAUCRATS
PRESIDENT AND  
KEY ADVISERS
THE ARMED SERVICES 
V  SCIENTISTS >
PARTIES,
PUBLIC OPINION, 
THE MEDIA
SOURCE: SPANIER & USLANER, HOW AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE (NEW YORK: HOLT,
RINEHART & WINSTON/PRAEGER, 1978) P. 50.
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the face of increasing complexity of national defense 
programs and issues, is predominant in national security 
affairs. The chief executive's authority in the national 
security field is subject to the limitations that Congress 
can impose on defense budgets and on the size and composi­
tion of the Armed Forces. The president's authority is fur­
ther restrained by treaty-making powers of the Senate (Falk 
and Bauer, 1972; 7-10).
National Security Council
The National Security Act of 1947 created a council 
to assist the president in integrating and implementing 
national security policy. The council was chartered to 
examine American national security goals in relation to 
national power, to study policies on areas of common inter­
est to those departments and agencies concerned with national 
security, and to suggest guidelines and courses of action to 
the president.
Membership on the council consists of the president; 
the secretaries of state, defense, and the services; and other 
officials whom the president might designate with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. To insure the availability of 
an adequate intelligence base, the 1947 act also created a 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA operates under 
NSC direction, coordinates all intelligence activities con­
cerned with national security, correlates and evaluates
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national security intelligence, and advises and reports 
to the council on all matters within this field (Falk, 1967: 
33-35; Newhouse, 1973: 143-45).
The NSC lacks executive authority or any power 
other than offering advice as an extension to the presidency. 
The president makes the final choice and the council members 
as department heads are in position to see that these deci­
sions are executed. The personality and individual desires 
of each president determines the role and the scope of the NSC 
(Nitze, 1978: 195; Falk, 1967: 34).
NSC Department Roles
1. Department of State
The secretary of state is the president's principal 
advisor in foreign policy and head of the Department of State. 
The terms "foreign policy" and "National Security Policy" have 
become identical in many ways, giving added weight to the role 
of the secretary as principal advisor to the president (Falk, 
1967: 59; Nash, 1973: 66).
In recent years the influence and responsibility of 
the secretary and the department have diminished. Some 
observers have blamed this decline on inadequate organization 
and poor management practices in the department. Others 
attribute the role to the attitude of the president who may 
or may not be willing to use the secretary and the department 
(Falk and Bauer, 1972: 59-61).
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The role and responsibility of the secretary 
himself is dependent on his relationship with the president. 
This relationship varies by administration and Falk writes 
(1967: 76) that there is nothing in the constitution or law
that requires the president to do otherwise.
The State Department also has a role in the formula­
tion of national policy on arms control and disarmament through 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). ACDA was 
established in 1961 to manage and coordinate research and 
development for arms control and disarmament policy formula­
tion, to prepare and manage U.S. participation in internation­
al negotiations in arms control, and disarmament activities 
(U.S. ACDA Publication 102) . The director of the ACDA is 
the principal advisor to the president and the secretary of
state on arms control and disarmament.
2. Department of Defense
The secretary of defense is the principal advisor 
to the president on defense matters and is the civilian head 
of the department. The secretary is a statutory member of 
the NSC and his operational military authority flows through 
the joint chiefs of staff to the commanders of the unified 
and specified military commands. The secretary of defense 
is responsible for relating defense policy of national 
objectives, for determining military requirements to achieve 
these objectives, and for procuring and maintaining this 
strength.
32
Civilian control requires a clear distinction 
between political and military responsibilities and the 
institutional subordination of the latter to the former 
(Falk and Bauer, 1972: 97). Recommendation of the civilian
secretary involves military matters for which military advice 
is required. The joint chiefs of staff and the individual 
secretaries of the services suffer a dual-hat dilemma of 
being the secretary of defense's representatives in their 
departments as well as heads of their departments (Winnacker, 
1978: 36).
In addition to being the manager of the national 
military establishment, the secretary of defense has an 
equally important role as presidential advisor on defense 
matters. The performance of the advisor role, unlike that 
of defense manager, varies not according to the man himself, 
but his relationship to the style and personality of the 
president (Falk and Bauer, 1972: 106).
3. Central Intelligence Agency
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was created 
by the National Security Act of 1947 for the purpose of pro­
viding information, advice, and independent assessment in 
matters related to national security; and, it reports directly 
to the National Security Council. The CIA is only one of 
several intelligence agencies that provide information on 
the armed services and other agencies of the federal govern­
ment. Allen Dulles (Nash, 1973: 131-32) justified the
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existence of an independent agency through its ability to 
collect, analyze, and present facts without being biased by 
individuals who have an ax to grind. Barnet (1973; 123)
supports this need for independent assessment by stating 
that there is so much rivalry within the Pentagon that occa­
sionally "treaties" are drawn up between the services reflect­
ing compromise agreements on intelligence estimates on the 
numbers of Soviet weapon systems in existence.
Nixon (1980: 260-64) considers the "Black Arts"
of intelligence data gathering as being essential to success 
or failure of the president in his role as a world leader.
He further states that there were failures in the CIA esti­
mates (during previous presidential administrations) in the 
numbers of missiles the Soviet Union would deploy. These 
estimates were part of the data used to formulate the numbers 
of weapons that would be required by the United States.
Congressman Les Alpin indicates that the mixed re­
cord was caused in part by inherent uncertainties in forecast­
ing. Table 6 is a summary of the accuracy of the U.S. intel­
ligence forecast. Most of the mistakes are attributed to 
errors in judgment rather than collection procedures. The 
principal sources of misjudgment are Soviet strategic prior­
ities, political and bureaucratic pressures, and inabilities 
to learn from past mistakes. The implication of basing nego­
tiations on these forecasts is that their acceptance can 
cause errors in both "too much and too little" in providing
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TABLE 6
U.S. INTELLIGENCE: FORECASTS VS REALITY
OVER:
PREDICTION PREDICTED UNDER:
EVENT MADE YEAR ACTUAL RIGHT: 0
DATE OF SOVIET 1945 (GROVES) 1965 1949
A-BOMB 1945 (SCIENTISTS) 1949 0
1949 (INTELLIGENCE) 1952 -
DATE OF SOVIET 1950 1954 1953 0
H-BOMB
NUMBER OF SOVIET 1955 (AIR FORCE) 600-700 190
LONG-RANGE 1955 (NIE) 500
BOMBERS BY 1960
("BOMBER GAP")
NUMBER OF SOVIET 1957 (AIR FORCE) 1,000 10
ICBMS BY 1961 1957 (CIA) 500
("MISSILE GAP")
NUMBER OF SOVIET EARLY 196 OS 10,000 64
ASMS
DATE OF SOVIET 1965 1970 1975
MIRV DEPLOYMENT 1968 1978
1969 1971 OR 1974
NUMBER OF
SOVIET ICBMS*
BY 1967 1964 325-525 570
1965 330-395
BY 1970 1965 410-700 1,299
1966 505-795
BY 1971 1967 805-1.080 1,513
BY 1972 1968 1.020-1^51 1,527
1968 1.158-1,276
ICBM ACCURACY
AND YIELD
FOR SS-9 1969 ,25 CEP ,5 CEP
ACCURACY
FOR NEW MISSILE 1973 .5 CEP .25 CEP
ACCURACY
FOR S S -18 /-19 1978 1.5 MEGATONS 600 KILOTONS
YIELD
•SOURCE: ALBERT WOHLSTETTER, LEGENDS OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS 
RACE. USSI FTEPORT 75-1 (WASHINGTON, B.C.: UNITED STATES STRATEGIC 
INSTITUTE, 19751, P. 24.
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the required missile systems. Interestingly, a forecast 
has not been close to actuality since the H-bomb prediction 
in 1950.
4. Role of Congress
Congress monitors, reviews, counsels, criticizes, 
approves or disapproves, and provides or withholds the means 
for executive action. The congressional contribution to 
national security affairs is necessarily fragmented, focus­
ing primarily on military and foreign policy.
The national security area is broad and the House 
and Senate have individual and joint committees that con­
sider the subject. The most obvious are the House and Senate 
Armed Services committees. Additional important committees 
are the House Appropriation Committee where the money bills 
originate, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee.
The chairman and ranking members of these committees 
are among the most powerful individuals in Congress. Their 
support or opposition frequently means the difference between 
adoption or defeat of administration proposals (Falk and 
Bauer, 1972: 78-81).
The federal constitution does not address national 
security as a separate matter. It designated power to both 
Congress and the president to provide for the common defense. 
The president has clearer authority over foreign and military 
policy than he has over internal matters. He shares his
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authority over the military with Congress, which makes rules, 
appropriates money, and declares war; but, it is he who exer­
cises initiative, authority, and leadership in military and 
foreign affairs. The next paragraphs describe the sources 
of advice available to the president in his decision process.
Presidential Advisors
Ultimate responsibility for decision making in arms 
control remains with the president. Decisions are made with 
the assistance of advisors who may be selected from anywhere 
in the circles of power illustrated in figure 3.
The president and his key advisors are at the 
nucleus of the circles of power. The kind of advice a presi­
dent receives is subject to a degree of predictability because 
of backgrounds and values of the inner circle advisors. The 
advisors become screeners of information passed on to the 
president. They tend to pass only information that is favor­
able to them and data to support alternatives that are suppor­
tive of their own interests (Downs, 1967: 77-78; Goodpaster,
1978: 111).
The second ring of influence is occupied by the 
armed services' chiefs of staff, scientific advisors, and 
lower-level bureaucrats. The function of the second group 
is to provide ideas and alternatives for the inner circle's 
consideration. In the realm of arms control policy, the 
joint chiefs of staff provide recommendations for the deploy­
ment of strategic weapons systems and those systems to be
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included in negotiations. The position of the joint chiefs 
may be considered as advisory to the secretary of defense 
however, they usually occupy a position in the inner circle 
(Spanier and Uslaner, 1978: 61-62; Allison, 1969: 709).
Spanier and Uslaner further believe that the position of the 
joint chiefs is enhanced by the identification of the mili­
tary with national pride or patriotism. The role of the 
scientist is that of advisor. His importance depends pri- 
marily on how much the president values scientific advice.
The third circle consists of Congress, political 
parties, and interest groups. The degree of their involve­
ment frequently depends on the seriousness of the situation. 
For example, foreign crises usually do not lend themselves to 
consultation with large groups like the Congress or political 
parties. In crisis situations the leadership is typically 
informed and consulted.
Decisions made by the inner circle regarding arms 
control treaties are subject to review and ratification by 
Congress. This review cycle does not produce an automatic 
concurrence with decisions made by the president. Thirty 
percent of the 1,600 treaties submitted for ratification 
have not been ratified (Nacht, 78/79: 127-29).
Interest group participation in the strategic arms 
policy has been high and, to some degree, effective. The 
proposed Safeguard ABM deployment is similar to the proposed 
MX deployment in that it was to be dispersed over a broad
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area of the United States. Public interest groups in the 
metropolitan areas of Chicago and Boston were successful in 
having proposed deployment sites removed from their areas.
The fourth or outer ring of power in the foreign 
policy decision-making process is comprised of public opin­
ion and the communications media. Countless volumes have 
been written relative to the impacts of this circle of power 
on the decision-making processes. Public opinion tends to 
be supportive of presidential decisions on foreign policy, 
particularly in crisis situations (Spanier and Uslaner, 1978: 
91). The media, particularly television through significant 
improvements in video communication, make almost instantaneous 
information available on any issue.
The greatest impact of the video coverage is caused 
by the importance placed on the commentators by the public 
(Nixon, 1980: 242). Nixon refers to these commentators as
"Trendies" who are ready with an opinion at the drop of a 
microphone— their minds are impervious to argument and their 
arguments impervious to facts.
The president may draw advisors from any place in 
the bureaucracy to participate in the decision process when 
a particular expertise or background may be required. Dr. 
Rufus Hall has stated, "Where you stand in a particular deci­
sion making circumstance has no relation to where you sit in 
the Government bureaucracy" (Hall, 1980). This is true in 
crisis situations; however, Allison (1969: 711) writes that in
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decisions where long term issues and large numbers of people 
are involved where one stands does depend on where he sits. 
The following section discusses decision models that have 
been used in arms control issues.
Decision Models 
Two conceptual models, rational actor and bureau­
cratic, have been selected as being demonstrative of the 
framework used in foreign policy decisions. Although the 
rational actor model has normally been applied only to crisis 
situations and the bureaucratic to continuing issues, both 
have been applied to arms control and weapon system decision 
processes.
1. Rational Actor
The rational actor model assumes that the decision­
maker will select the objectives and values that a given 
policy is supposed to achieve and maximize, consider the var­
ious alternatives to achieve the purpose, and calculate the 
consequences and choose the course most likely to attain the 
objectives originally selected (Allison, 1969: 694). In
this model the government is viewed as a unitary actor, with 
the participants in the decision-making arena limited in 
numbers.
A characteristic of this decision-making process 
is that the decision making takes place at the top of the 
hierarchy in conjunction with the presidential advisors
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(Spanier, 1978: 464-70). The participants selected for a
particular situation are not restricted to those within the 
inner circle of advisors. Individuals may be selected for 
their expertise in a given area, and the fact that they do 
participate may not be indicative of their positions held 
within the government. The remaining characteristics of the 
model are the central role of the president, who interprets 
the events and evaluates the stakes in the crisis; the sub­
ordination of bureaucratic interests to the needs for deci­
sions to safeguard the national interest; and lastly, the 
].ack of congressional involvement.
These crisis issues are time sensitive and simply 
do not lend themselves to large numbers of people or the in­
clusion of Congress, who must be advised after the fact. There 
is less search for information and alternatives, with more 
bias toward preconceptions, especially where these decisions 
reflect the core values of the participants (Wilenski, 1967: 
75). These small "tiger teams" are subjected to the same 
pressures that have been observed in groups of ordinary people
(Janis, 1972: 8). Janis thinks that these groups have a
tendency to form a unity or cohesiveness that may alter 
the effectiveness of decisions. He describes the "group 
think" phenomenon (p. 9) as:
. . . a quick and easy way to refer to a mode of
thinking that people engage in when they are
deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the 
members' strivings for unanimity override their 
motivation to realistically appraise alternative 
courses of actions.
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2. Bureaucratie Model
The bureaucratic model sees the government as 
composed of many actors encompassing all four circles of 
power. The conceptual model focuses on internal politics 
of government where emphasis is placed on outcome of over­
lapping bargaining games (Allison, 1969; 690). The leader
who sits at the top of the organization is a player in the 
central competitive game. In contrast with the rational 
actor model there is no single unitary player, but there 
are many participants with no consistent set of objectives. 
Each proceeds according to a conception of national, organi­
zational, and personal goals. Emphasis is placed on the 
pluralistic nature of decision making and is characterized 
by the long term issues involved. The hallmark of the model 
is compromise.
The bureaucratic model applies best to planning 
program policies such as preparation for arms control nego­
tiations or foreign aid. Spanier (1978: 470-78) character­
ized this model as follows:
-Group interest in foreign policy issues may be 
high in a specialized area such as trade tariffs 
but low in issues such as arms control.
-Conflict will occur because of the multiple 
actors involved.
-The policy process becomes a problem of building 
consensus of reconciling conflict.
-Policy moves ahead, as a result of bargaining 
and compromise, and in increments.
-The incremental characteristics make the process 
time consuming.
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-Competition among advocates may result in 
exaggerated sales pitches.
-Foreign policy made through this model is 
usually public in nature.
Summary
This chapter has addressed the institutional 
arrangements that exist for strategic arms decisions. The 
president is depicted as residing at the nucleus of a deci­
sion structure with the assistance of a national security 
council, mandated by law, to provide advice or assistance 
as required. Dependent upon the situation, the president 
may draw a particular individual for a specific situation 
or rely on the bureaucratic process for advice on long term 
issues. The next chapter will address the utilization of 
the NSC in the strategic arms limitation process and the con­
ceptual decision models applied by the presidents who have 
been involved in strategic arms limitations.
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Chapter II Endnote
^Skolnikoff (1967: 224-27) writes that there
were three formal organizations primarily concerned with 
foreign policy in the Kennedy Administration, one of which 
was the Office of Science and Technology. Johnson retained 
the office but did not rely on it as much. Lambright (1978: 
22-24) attributes the decline in the use of science advisors 
in the Nixon era to the shift in public opinion. In 1973,
Nixon demolished the entire White House science policy 
advisory apparatus. Carter, having an engineering degree 
and proclaiming himself to be a nuclear physicist, reestab­
lished the science advisors in his circles of power. Reagan's 
transition team recommended the disbanding of the group, but 
Reagan retained a science advisor (Washington Post, February 8, 
1981).
CHAPTER III
NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE UTILIZATION 
AND DECISION MODELS APPLIED
Introduction
The previous chapter addressed the institutional 
arrangements that exist for providing presidential assis­
tance in arms control and national security matters. Two 
conceptual decision models were described that have been 
applied in strategic weapons system selection for arms con­
trol negotiations. This chapter discusses the utilization 
of the National Security Council (NSC) system by the four 
presidential administrations that have been involved or are 
presently engaged in strategic arms issues. A discussion 
of the application of the conceptual decision models is in­
cluded in this portion of the policy analysis that is part 
of the stage two institutional arrangements.
NSC Utilization and Decision 
Model Applied
The purpose of the National Security Council is 
to coordinate policy initiatives of governmental agencies 
and to provide the president with advice on national security
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issues. Presidents typically regard the NSC in their own 
way and the NSC role in the formulation of security policy 
changes to meet the criteria imposed by the chief executive. 
The presidential administrations that have been involved in 
the strategic arms control process have utilized the NSC sys­
tem differently and have provided different applications of 
the decision models.
Johnson Administration
Johnson inherited the NSC established by the 
Kennedy administration, but with time diminished its role 
in security functions (Falk and Bauer, 1972: 46-48).
Johnson's meetings were more often informal sessions and 
deliberation was less likely to concern current problems 
than those of his predecessor. Johnson preferred to dis­
cuss national security issues outside the NSC framework.
Falk and Bauer (1972: 49) write that the most important
deliberations took place at the "Tuesday Lunch" with the 
secretaries of state and defense.
The arms control policy decisions reached outside 
the NSC were made in the context of the bureaucratic model. 
Arms control activities in the 1964-68 period were character­
ized by the numbers of agencies and people involved, the 
controversy and the compromise involved because of the 
multiple views of the inner circle participants. Johnson 
demanded recommendations that represented a consensus of 
views between the military and civilian actors (Frye, 1974:
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74; also Newhouse, 1973: 108). President Johnson
acknowledged this decision-making philosophy in 1968 when 
he said, "Sometimes I have been called a seeker of 'consensus' 
— more often in criticism than in praise, and I have never 
denied it. . . ." (Burns, 1968: 1).
Johnson's lack of interest in the NSC was probably 
due to the prominence of the Vietnam issue (Nitze, 1978: 108;
Taylor, 1978: 20). The lack of usage of the NSC did not
alleviate the demand for consensus. This lack did mean that 
agreement on the weapon systems selected for negotiation would 
have to be reached individually with the Pentagon, ACDA, State 
Department, and the CIA (Newhouse, 1973: 108).
Progress in reaching the required consensus was ham­
pered by lack of program definition or direction, and further 
constrained by the fact that the agencies did not know how to 
go about preparing for arms control negotiations. While the 
competition for power and position was going on in the inner 
circle, a lower level bureaucrat, Morton Halperin, had a 
memorandum signed by Secretary of Defense Clifford that 
named himself (Halperin) as the person in charge of the 
Pentagon's strategic arms limitation proceedings (Newhouse, 
1973: 111-13).
The military establishment and Congress on one 
side were pushing for the initiation of an aggressive ABM 
deployment, while the advisors in the inner circle and the 
Science Advisory Committee were arguing the futility and
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danger of matching the Soviet program (Willrich and 
Rhinelander, 1974; 72-73). Both sides were presenting
stability of international security from their respective 
views.
After the Soviet Union announcement to deploy an 
antiballistic missile system (ABM), the Halperin group pre­
sented its package of proposals to Johnson. The package con­
sisted of limiting ABM, freezing long-range missiles, banning 
mobile missiles, excluding qualitative limitations, and includ­
ing freedom to mix aggregates of different weapons (Newhouse, 
1973: 127). Agreement was reached (June 1968) with the
Soviet Union and details were finalized to start the exchange 
of opinions in October 1968. Johnson writes that the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia halted the process; however, the 
Soviets kept pushing to start the talks (1971: 487-91).
After the presidential election in November 1968, Johnson 
made the determination that the talks should not be held up 
by Soviet behavior elsewhere but should commence immediately 
for the benefit of the world. President-elect Nixon was 
given a personal invitation to participate or send a personal 
representative for purposes of continuity. Johnson states 
that Nixon named retired diplomat Robert D. Murphy to attend 
on his behalf (Johnson, 1971: 490). The Soviets declined
the invitation to hold preliminary discussions. Johnson's 
opinion on this declination was: "I had a strong feeling
that the Soviets had been persuaded to deal with the incoming 
administration."
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The Nixon administration did not intend to pick 
up the strategic arms limitation gauntlet without having 
had the opportunity to evaluate its own options. Nixon 
(1978: 245) did not want to be boxed in by any decisions
made by a previous administration. Johnson's intuition that 
Nixon had discouraged a Soviet meeting on SALT prior to 
Inauguration Day 1969 was correct. Kissinger wrote (1978:
50) that Nixon advisor Robert Ellsworth was instructed to 
inform the Soviet charge d'affaires that the president-elect 
would not be pleased with such a meeting with the lame duck 
administration.
Nixon Administration
During the 1968 presidential campaign Nixon had 
blamed lack of progress and the state of the American interna­
tional security interests on the lack of Johnson's use of the 
NSC system. Nixon's stated goal was to restore the NSC to 
its proper role in national security planning (Nixon, 1968:
10). Nixon further stated, in a 1968 speech, that he desired 
an open government and advocated the appointment of cabinet 
members who could do their jobs. He would then disperse power 
among these able people in order that they might function 
effectively (Barber, 1977: 420).
Nixon started devising a structure and process 
aimed at meeting this goal soon after the November 1968 
elections. The structure would be designed to suit his own 
style of leadership. The NSC was to be the principal forum
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for the consideration of policy issues. It would meet 
regularly and on January 20, 1969 the supporting structures 
of the NSC were already at work on comprehensive studies 
covering the principal national security issues that would 
confront the president (Falk and Bauer, 1972: 52-53).
Nixon appointed Henry Kissinger as an assistant 
to the president for national security affairs.^ The pur­
pose of this appointment was to place emphasis on planning, 
discussion of alternatives and their implications, systematic 
treatment of issues at the highest levels, and effective 
implementation of decisions.
President Nixon considered the appointment of the 
national security advisor equally as important as the secre­
tary of state because he intended to direct all foreign policy 
from the White House. The selection of Henry Kissinger as 
his national security advisor would produce the most power­
ful member of the inner circle of power this country has 
ever known.
In terms of the decision-making models, the rational 
actor model most nearly describes the decision-making process 
utilized by Nixon. Nixon made the most of his decisions, 
particularly those concerning arms control issues with small 
numbers of people involved. Nixon (1978: 337-38) believes
that the key to a successful presidency is the decision­
making process wherein he is protected from intrusion by his 
staff, with options being concisely written because more
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material could be absorbed by reading rather than by talking 
about it.
In the foreign policy arena, Nixon considered him­
self capable of designing and conducting his own policy 
(Newhouse, 1973: 143-45). Newhouse adds (p. 7) that Nixon
concealed not only from the public but also from the bureau­
cracy since the bureaucracy was often sent off on wild goose 
chases to keep them out of Kissinger's hair. Nixon attributed 
the necessity for this small number of participants in foreign 
policy to governmental security leaks. The consequence of 
these leaks led to operating the government in more confined 
and secret ways (Nixon, 1978: 39). Kissinger writes (1979:
38) that Nixon skillfully manipulated his advisors while he 
undertook his solitary journey with a system of policy making 
that centralized power at the White House.
Nixon's and Kissinger's views on the necessity for 
secrecy and control in the strategic arms issues were com­
patible. They believed that successful foreign policy evolved
from being formulated in secret and withheld until they were
2
ready to unveil the results. Kissinger (1978: 47) further
supports this notion in that the reorganization of the National 
Security Council and the downgrading of the role of the sec­
retary of state made it possible for him to use the bureau­
cracy for producing planning papers that would appear only 
hypothetical. He would take these position papers and formu­
late the basis for his Nixon-directed secret negotiations.
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Kissinger at one time referred to the entire network of 
subordinate echelons including the secretaries of state and 
defense and joint chiefs of staff as the seventh echelon 
(Nitze, 1978: 109).
Where the Johnson administration had lacked a 
central figure to coordinate a timely pre-negotiation posi­
tion for the pending arms control talks, the Nixon era was 
clearly dominated by Kissinger. The decision-making tech­
nique applied by Nixon and Kissinger was a hybrid approach 
of the rational actor model and might be considered as an 
acute restrictive rational actor model where the decisions 
were made by these two individuals. See appendix 2 for a 
discussion of the organization assembled for strategic arms 
limitation issues. The acute restrictive rational actor 
technique, as applied in the SALT process, consisted of a 
widely distributed network for the input of data from the 
many agencies or organizations that could provide requested 
input only.
Correlation of data was essentially directed by 
one individual who prepared a series of alternatives for the 
chief executive, who weighed all options and made final 
decisions. Kissinger writes (1978: 148) that Nixon left
the selection of options to be presented for decisions to 
Kissinger's discretion: "I therefore scheduled NSC meetings
where options were presented to a glassy-eyed, irritable 
President so that any directives issued would have some 
plausibility of authority."
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The decision processes used were restrictive in 
that information outputs were carefully controlled. The 
organizational setup in the NSC was utilized only to the 
extent that it appeared to have legal basis and legitimate 
authority to act as directed. The decision-making technique 
was acute from the standpoint that the writer perceive the 
authority resided in two men. Thus the term "acute restric­
tive rational actor model" is applied to the 1968 to 1974 
SALT process.
Output of information from the inner circle of 
power in the acute restrictive model was limited only to that 
essential to get or gain a needed concurrence at that point 
in time. Contacts to gain information to make a decision or 
to advance stalled negotiations were, on numerous occasions, 
made through secret communications or almost clandestine- 
style meetings. Requests for information from the Congress 
were answered with vague generalities such as "I am not as 
familiar with that issue as you are," or "In the best inter­
ests of negotiations' progress," or "In the bast interests 
of national security, that data cannot be released at this 
time" (Platt, 1978: 45).
The initiation of the SALT I negotiations was 
evident in November 1968; however, the formal talks did not 
begin until the fall of 1969. The Nixon administration, 
through its intense review of all options and alternatives, 
the restricted authority for decisionmaking, and its desire
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for secrecy, entered the process with essentially the same 
ongoing negotiation position as the Johnson administration 
had recommended (see Smith, 1980: 477-78). The SALT I 
negotiations were completed during Nixon's first term in 
office and the SALT II talks were started. See appendix 3 
for a summary of the SALT I provisions.
Carter Administration
President Carter, like his predecessor, inherited 
one of the most complicated ongoing arms control issues in 
history. Negotiations had been in process since 1972, the 
principal positions of each of the superpowers had been 
established, and President Carter making wholesale changes 
in the process and product would not have been expedient.
The operational concepts of the organization put together 
by former President Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry 
Kissinger, were unacceptable to the Carter administration. 
The secretary of defense and former secretary of state had 
been excluded to the maximum extent, and, yet,,they were con­
sidered within the legal realm of the national security 
process. Reports given to Congress up until 1974 were 
vague and testimony presented to congressional committees 
was terse and clouded with exclusions under the concept of 
executive privilege. Carter, like Nixon in the previous 
campaign, had stated many times during the primaries that 
he would reinstitute open government. Congress would be 
brought into the foreign policy arena, information would
54
be supplied, and reports would be issued at regular intervals. 
Not only was the previous administration's management philos­
ophy unacceptable to the new president, but also Henry Kiss­
inger was personally unacceptable. Carter did not like his 
flamboyant diplomatic style (Stoesinger, 1979: 250-54).
Carter's campaign rhetoric ("I will never lie to 
you") and desire for openness in government brought about 
an increase in the size of the inner circle of advisors. He 
included his Secretary of State Vance, NSC Advisor Brzezinski, 
UN Ambassador Young, and CIA Director Turner. Carter was 
often charged with implementing the "Georgia Mafia" or the 
"Redneck Crowd" in his cabinet. Spanier and Uslaner (1978: 
54-5 9) write that no president has relied as heavily upon 
advisors who had served previous administrations. The new 
faces introduced by Carter were primarily domestic policy 
advisors such as Bert Lance.
The NSC was brought back into the decision process 
with the president's National Security Advisor, Brzezinski, 
playing a coordination role. Brzezinski was not the dominant 
framer of arms control policy. The Director of ACDA, Paul 
Warnke, instigated the establishment of a committee of 
twelve House members and twenty-five Senators to act as 
congressional advisors to the SALT delegation (Wolfe, 1979: 
36-39).
Carter turned the bureaucracy loose on SALT while 
he tended to other matters. The direction given was to use
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the Vladivostok Accords as a basis for SALT II and then 
pursue deep reductions in SALT III (Talbot, 1979: 43).
The enlargement of the inner circle numbers is indicative 
that the bureaucratic model was used in the decision-making 
process. Accordingly, Carter made changes in the strategic 
arms limitations organization. He disbanded the verification 
panel, the key deliberation body dealing with SALT within 
the NSC system. This panel, established by Nixon and chaired 
by Kissinger, was replaced by a special coordinating committee, 
whose function was essentially the same as the verification 
panel.
The organization for the remainder of the negotia­
tion of SALT II is shown in appendix 2. The Carter admin­
istration used the bureaucracy for forming independent posi­
tions with final critique being performed by the NSC staff 
prior to being presented to the president (White, 1981) .
President Carter sent Secretary of State Vance 
to Moscow in March 1977 for the purpose of reducing the num­
bers of offensive weapons systems that had been tentatively 
agreed upon at the Vladivostok meeting in 1974.^ The Soviets 
had not overlooked President Carter's criticism of the Soviet 
philosophy on human rights in his campaign and promptly 
rejected the offer (Stoesinger, 1979: 253; also see
Talbot, 1979: 79).
Secretary Vance's assessment of the first meeting 
with the Soviets convinced him that the open forum for arms
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control issues was not the way to go. He advised Carter 
that the secret diplomacy or back channel approach was the 
only way to get the Soviets to "open up" and discuss the 
issues freely (Talbot, 1979; 79). According to Talbot,
the open policy was reversed within one week of Vance's 
recommendations.
SALT II was finalized during Carter's term in office 
after almost seven years of negotiation. See appendix 4 for 
a summary of the SALT II provisions. The treaty as signed 
by President Carter and Brezhnev in 1979 had not been rati­
fied by the U.S. Senate. Three issues— perceived inequality 
in numbers of missiles, backfire, and verifiability— contrib­
uted to the treaty's not being ratified.
The SALT II treaty contained a provision that would 
allow the U.S. to deploy a mobile ICBM after 1982. The pur­
pose of the new system was to augment the capabilities and 
survivability of the presently deployed ICBM force. On 
June 7, 1979, President Carter announced his decision to 
proceed with full-scale engineering development of the MX 
to include 200 missiles, 200 race tracks, and 4,600 shelters. 
These numbers were chosen to make use of the SALT II cap on 
numbers of Soviet reentry vehicles (RVs) (Medalia, 81: 8;
also see Congressional Digest, November 1980: 261).
Consequently, should the Soviets deploy more RVs 
than SALT II permits, something will have to be done to im­
prove MX survivability. One solution to the enhanced
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survivability of MX is to deploy a low altitude air 
defense system (LoADs) in conjunction with the mobile ICBMs.
In September 1979 President Carter announced his 
decision to base the MX in a road-mobile mode to be located 
in the western deserts. The recommendation did not reach 
the congressional approval stage because of a series of 
House and Senate amendments to the defense authorization 
and appropriations bill (Congressional Digest, November 1980; 
261) .
President Carter stated his intent during his 
inaugural address in 1977 to work toward the elimination of 
nuclear weapons. During his tenure, he cancelled the B-1 
bomber program and the enhanced radiation warhead (Brauch, 
1979; 133; Lehman, 1978: 1-14). He left his successor
with a controversial strategic arms limitation treaty that 
lacks Senate approval and an ICBM developmental program 
that is equally as controversial as the treaty.
Reagan Administration
Reagan's presidential campaign was in part based 
on the premise that America's national security can best 
be guaranteed by a strong defense capability second to none. 
The intent is to have a credible capability to deter Soviet 
attack by having forces that will survive a first strike and 
ultimately retaliate against military targets. He also sup­
ported the earliest possible deployment of the MX missile 
in a prudent survivable configuration (Christian Science 
Monitor, October 28, 1980).
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President Reagan has taken a tough line approach 
toward the Soviet Union. He did not oppose a SALT II treaty 
but insists that it would be better if negotiated from a 
position of strength (Strout, 1980: 4). Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Percy visited the Soviet Union 
on November 26, 1980 to explain the new administration's 
position on SALT II. The Soviet response to this meeting 
was that constructive steps would be met with positive 
Soviet response (Willis, November 28, 1980).
The Reagan administration is described as having 
the most new faces since the Kennedy-Johnson era. For 
example, of the thirteen cabinet members selected by Reagan, 
seven had been in private industry most of their working 
lives; however, out of the 213 additional appointments at 
the decision-making level, 121 have had previous experience 
with the federal govenrment (Havemann, 1980: 275).
The notable exceptions to the cabinet appointments 
are Alexander Haig as Secretary of State and Caspar Weinberger 
as Secretary of Defense. Haig was chief of staff to Presi­
dents Nixon and Ford, while Weinberger held two cabinet- 
level posts in the Nixon and Ford years (Havemann, 1980:
675) .
President Reagan's utilization of the NSC and his 
decision processes relative to the MX program are not known.^ 
The assumption is made that the NSC structure is being util­
ized to some degree, but anticipation is that the role will
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be one with low profile. Allen, Reagan's National Security 
Advisor, confirmed this on the day of his appointment when 
he stated, "You're seeing a disappearing act right now" 
(Gordon, 1981: 688; also see Christian Science Monitor,
July 10, 1981: 4). Reagan had stated in his presidential 
campaign that he would end the conflict between the NSC and 
state department by downgrading the council's role. The 
NSC, dependent upon the president, has functioned as a com­
peting policy-making organization. The role as a filter of 
memoranda from the state department and other agencies has 
enabled national security advisors to gain the upper hand 
in policy issues. Secretary Haig, who served as an assistant 
to Kissinger, is well aware of this fact.
President Reagan has made two additional changes 
that reflect the administrtion's thinking on arms control 
organization and policy. A major reorganization has been 
planned for the Arms Control Disarmament Agency which is in 
charge of arms limitation negotiation and has appointed a 
new chief arms control negotiator.
The new ACDA organization under Walter Rostow will 
include an upgraded verification and intelligence office.
The primary function will be holding the Soviets to more 
stringent verification standards. Lt. Gen. Edward Rowney 
(R), a hard-liner from the negotiate-from-strength/hang-tough 
with-the-Soviets school, has been appointed as the new chief 
negotiator (Schear, 1981: 26).
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Advice is being sought from many sources about 
the MX basing decision. Secretary of State Haig is an advo­
cate of the ground-based concept and Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger proposed the air launched system (Harsch, 1981:
1). The Office of Technology Assessment has completed a 
study (copy not available) concerning the deployment. The 
Townes Committee, established by President Reagan, is cur­
rently reassessing the basing and deployment modes. A cen­
tral point of contact for questions related to MX, called 
MX Associates, has been established in Washington, D.C.
The office is staffed by the many prime contractors involved 
in the program.
President Reagan did not accept the basing-mode 
decision recommended by the Carter administration. Gray 
(1980: 4) writes that MX/MPS program inherited by President
Reagan suffers politically from the perception that it is 
a Carter program. Carter delayed the deployment by three 
years and it may be unfortunate if the Reagan decision is 
delayed for this reason.
Summary
This chapter has addressed the utilization of the 
National Security Council on its advisory role to the presi­
dent and the conceptual decision model applied by each in 
strategic arms control issues. Since strategic arms limi­
tation is a continuing and integral part of foreign policy, 
it is best analyzed from a chronological review by presi­
dential administration.
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Initiation of the strategic arms limitation was 
delayed during the Johnson administration in part because 
the process was new and no one knew how to approach it. 
Further delays were caused by lack of positive direction by 
the president relative to what systems should be included. 
Johnson's requirement for consensus, rather than options 
from which he could select, allowed the derivation of which 
systems should be negotiated to flounder until 1968.
While the inner circle of advisors were pondering 
the problem, a group consisting of members from the second 
and third circles prepared and obtained concurrences for the 
contents of the initial negotiating package. This action 
must be considered an accomplishment because the group had 
no conference rooms of its own in which to hold meetings and 
to obtain a needed concurrence; yet, the group wrote as many 
as seventeen position papers in a twenty-four hour period 
(Newhouse, 1973: 127).
President Nixon further delayed the initiation of 
SALT I while his advisors reviewed the options and alterna­
tives available. The ingoing negotiation position for SALT I 
was almost identical to that recommended by Johnson regard­
less of the difference in styles of decision making. The 
SALT I document was finalized during Nixon's first term and 
preparation for the follow-on talks were started.
The Carter administration inherited an on-going 
negotiation and very early found out that the invocation of
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secrecy in negotiation, as practiced by Nixon, with the 
Soviets was necessary. The SALT II document was finalized 
during the Carter administration after a seven year nego­
tiation. The total numbers contained in the treaty were not 
substantially different from the figures derived at the 1974 
Vladivostok Accords.
The Reagan administration inherited the non-ratified 
strategic arms limitation treaty and an on-going ICBM develop­
mental program that is almost as controversial as the treaty. 
Reagan did not accept the recommendation of the Carter admin­
istration on his deployment, just as Nixon would not initiate 
negotiation after SALT I based on Johnson's recommendation.
The next chapter completes the policy context 
stage of this analysis with a discussion of the factors 
considered in this research to impact progress in arms 
control. The factors to be discussed are technological 
advancement, deterrent concepts, and the negotiation process.
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Chapter III Endnotes
^Nixon's recollection of the selection and 
notification of Kissinger that he had been selected as 
national security advisor (NSA) does not correspond with 
Kissinger's recollection. Nixon recalls that Kissinger was 
selected in an "impulsive way," and said, "Being a Rocke­
feller associate, he had been critical of me but I chalked 
that up to politics. After the second meeting with Kissinger, 
I asked if he would accept the position of NSA and he replied 
that he would be honored!' (Nixon, 1978) . Kissinger describes 
the selection process quite differently. In the initial dis­
cussion, Nixon stated that he nad no confidence in the state 
department, that he would run foreign policy from the White 
House, and that he thought the Johnson administration's 
decision-making procedures gave the president no real options 
from which to choose. During the second meeting, Kissinger 
writes that Nixon offered the job on the basis of a strong 
security advisor, "But I asked for a week to consult with 
friends." Two days after the offer was made, Kissinger 
accepted. After the press conference announced a program 
substantially different from what we had discussed" (1979: 
10-16). Nixon had said that he was going to appoint a strong 
secretary of state and the NSA would not come between him 
and that office.
2
Gerald Smith (Doubletalk) quotes an article written 
by Kissinger in 1968 that depicts Kissinger's decision-making 
processes as coinciding with Nixon's. The article concludes 
that changing courses of action within the bureaucracy is 
difficult and time consuming; consequently, important deci­
sions should be made by extra-bureaucratic means. Some key 
decisions are kept to small circles due to bureaucratic morale 
problems and leaks to the media; thus, secrecy is essential 
to decisionmaking. Kissinger (1979: 546) writes that he
was determined to keep a tight rein on Smith. Also see 
Clark, 1979: 173; and Szulc, 1978; 465).
^This decision to propose the reduced numbers 
originated with Secretary of Defense Brown in a March 12,
1977 meeting of The Special Coordinating Committeee. Carter 
listened to Brown's proposal and responded, "Good, let's do 
that." The proposal was written, but at the same time, a 
fall-back position was prepared and attached to the proposal 
(Talbot, 1979; 60-63). Carter stated in a press conference,
". . . We're not abandoning the Vladivostok Agreement . . . 
if we're disappointed . . . then we will modify our stance 
(Talbot, 1979: 67).
'^ In a telephone conversation with a Pentagon 
official that is associated with the MX, the statement was 
made that as of 1 August 1981 Reagan had not met with the
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NSC. His decision process for MX was not available. A 
written request was directed to one of the president's 
assistants for political affairs that questioned these 
procedures. A response was received that stated that the 
inquiry would be directed to the proper office with the 
hope that it would be answered.
CHAPTER IV
FACTORS THAT IMPACT PROGRESS 
IN ARMS CONTROL
Introduction
Chapters two and three address the institutional 
arrangements existing for strategic weapons decisionmaking 
and suggest ways these institutions are utilized. This chap­
ter completes the policy context description, stage two of 
the analysis, with a discussion of the impact or influence 
of technology creep, deterrent concepts, and the negotiation 
process on progress in arms control.
The appearance of a technical innovation that adds 
to a weapon system's capability or alters its performance 
in some way impacts the environment of deterrence. One tech­
nological innovation that evolved is the Multiple Indepen­
dently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV). The MIRV concept is 
the result of a series of technological improvements in guid­
ance and control systems, metallurgical improvements, and 
electronic components that were individually insignificant. 
Collectively, they made it technologically possible to place
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a number of nuclear warheads on a long-range missle rather 
than a single warhead.
The deterrent strategy of a nation's strategic 
defense policy may have an influence on the selection of 
weapon systems to be deployed: for example, the essence of
the U.S. doctrine is to retain a second strike or retaliatory 
capability. When this capability becomes vulnerable, new 
weapons are required to enhance the existing capability or 
protect it. Any new system must be a credible deterrent in 
order to increase stability.
Once decisions are reached, they are implemented 
by arms control negotiators through the negotiation process.
The outcome of these negotiations is influenced by the rela­
tionship of the president and his advisors to the negotiating 
team. This relationship and the negotiation process will be 
discussed from the aspect of past experience in arms control 
in order to provide a better understanding of the problems 
that may be anticipated with the deployment of a new ICBM 
system.
Technology Creep 
Technological advances in the states-of-the-art 
do not occur in clearly defined steps, but in increments, 
frequently at low cost, and with very little attention.
Because of the separation of scientific and political commu­
nities, these low profile developments are overlooked by 
arms control negotiations that focus on the big, sophisticated.
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total weapon systems (Shapely, 1978: 1102-05). There are
some weapons technologies with obviously destabilizing 
effects which will nevertheless appear desirable or even 
necessary for national security reasons (Reppy, 1979: 91).
The destabilizing aspect is caused by the appearance of a 
technology in which the adversary may not have capability 
to defend nor offensive techniques against which to counter. 
The Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) 
is a good example of technological innovation and the cause 
of one of the most destabilizing, controversial arms control 
issues in the last decade.
MIRV
MIRV is a small missile system with no guidance 
and control system of its own and a warhead. The MIRV is 
placed around the periphery of a carrier vehicle called a 
bus. The bus contains the primary guidance and control sys­
tem, and at predetermined times ejects a MIRV, which in turn 
boosts itself towards an independent target. The number of 
MIRVs per bus may vary from ten on ICBMs to fourteen on SLBMs, 
per the pending SALT II Treaty.
The development was encouraged by the arms control 
bureaucracy, because of its capability to accomplish a wide 
variety of missions. MIRV development caused little atten­
tion due to the lack of technical problems encountered and 
because of its relatively low budget profile. DOD estimated 
cost over a period of five to eight years was $24.2 billion
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(Greenwood, 1975; xi-i). The political uncertainties of 
continued funding and final approval for deployment that 
accompany developmental programs— i.e., Sentinel or Safe­
guard— were virtually absent. There were no drawn-out 
budget and funding hearings, and the opponents of the devel­
opment were few. MIRV's full strategic and political impact 
did not appear until it was virtually ready to be deployed 
in August 1968 (Roberts, 1974: 22). Final approval to de­
ploy MIRV would have been as easy to obtain a decade later 
because of its low development profile.
Deborah Shapley (1978: 279) has attributed tech­
nological advancement of weapons systems to five factors; 
electronics, guidance and control, the geophysical capability 
of determining location and position, sensors, and advances 
in materials. All of these factors were utilized in the 
MIRV system. The technology to stop and restart the bus's 
main engine (electronics) in order to place each reentry 
vehicle on a different trajectory was required; and, vernier 
rockets to precisely adjust the bus trajectory just prior 
to expulsion of MIRV were developed— i.e., guidance and 
control. Equally as important was the evolution of the 
physical profile of MIRV itself which required construction 
materials that permitted rapid reentry into the atmosphere 
and sufficient strength to permit overall reduction in 
missile size.
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Development
Developmental programs, particularly those that 
evolve as quietly as MIRV, seldom attrack much public atten­
tion. Public indifference and scholarly neglect have been 
compounded by the tendency of DOD officials either to obscure 
the real forces propelling these technological issues to 
national controversy or to treat them as purely specialized 
problems requiring only technical solutions (Yanarella, 1977s
2) .
Secretary of Defense McNamara was opposed (1964-65) 
to increasing the number of larger ICBMs. He utilized the 
MIRV technology as a means of increasing the number of 
deliverable warheads as a rationale for retaining the same 
number of large delivery systems. The bureaucratic maneuver­
ing to use a technological advance as a means of pacifying 
the political opposition to increased numbers of large delivery 
systems was later to have a profound effect on the SALT pro­
cess (Wolfe, 1979; 6-9). The effect was that it prompted
the Soviets to preempt MIRV from SALT I until their develop­
mental program was completed.
One of the functions of ACDA is management and 
coordination of research and development for arms control 
and policy formulation. The ACDA apparently first learned 
of MIRV in 1964, but it shared McNamara's views on the tech­
nology and reached a conclusion in 1968-1969 that MIRV had 
implications for arms control (Clarke, 1979: 98-99). At
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this point, the ACDA felt that MIRV was gaining momentum 
and the process could not be reversed. ACDA, in a House 
of Representatives subcommittee hearing, defended their lack 
of involvement in weapons system development during the 1961- 
1969 period with such factors as: lack of sufficient per­
sonnel, omission from the mainstream flow of classified 
information, and utilization for projects other than those 
they were chartered to do (Subcommittee Hearings, 1974). 
During the 1969 to 1974 period, the close policy control 
by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger deterred the ACDA 
from advocating their views on arms control issues before 
Congress. By this time Nixon's appointing of Kissinger as 
Secretary of State placed ACDA under the direction of the 
state department.
The government response to MIRV technology was an 
excellent example of the ways new weapons systems evolve 
through technology creep. The program received funding with 
minimal congressional questioning. The institution chartered 
to screen weapons-system development had been overextended 
and diverted to other issues; and, once MIRV appeared, there 
was indecision on the best methods to handle it. In hind­
sight, Dr. Kissinger stated, "I would say in retrospect that 
I wish I had thought through the implications of a MIRVed 
world more thoughtfully in 1969 and 1970 than I did" (Clarke, 
1979: 98). He meant that if he had been more aware of the
capability the technology possessed, he would have directed 
more attention to its development.
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David Edwards (1969; 28-29), University of Texas
political scientist, has criticized the scientific and
technical communities for responding to such technological
needs as the MIRV. He said:
Developments have created both the threat and 
possibility of total destruction . . . the scien­
tific and technical knowledge underlying military 
capabilities have always been permanent in that 
it could not be eliminated unless frontal lobot­
omies were performed on all knowledgeable men.
The criticism is the immediacy with which the scientific- 
technical community concentrated on offensive systems, such 
as MIRV, and concentrated very little of defensive systems. 
The defensive effort has been directed to hardening silos to 
protect missiles and fallout shelters to protect command and 
control centers. This defensive effort, in turn, decreases 
weapon system vulnerability which, in turn, assures that 
retaliatory action can be initiated. Professor Edwards 
concludes that the technology of construction and defense 
can never hope to deal effectively with the technology of 
destruction. Technological advances which create a first- 
strike capability are destabilizing; thus, controlling a 
technology is important to international stability (Brooks, 
1979: 76-80). The progress of science and technology is
so swift that if control measures are not taken, the develop­
ment of new weapons systems may not only open the door to 
the development of less costly weapons, but could also aid 
the circumvention of existing restrictions and limitations 
(Milstein, 1981: 55).
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Colonel Donald J. Stukel believes that technological 
developments may produce such stabilizing capabilities as 
renewed safeguards against accidental launch, increased re­
liability of warning systems, and improved intelligence col­
lection and verification (1978: 22-23). Further results may
be destabilizing effects such as systems whose numbers and 
characteristics may not be verifiable, and capabilities that 
enhance surveillance systems. Colonel Stukel concludes that 
to control testing is the most adequate way to control tech­
nology.
An in-depth discussion of the direction and con­
trol of science and technology is beyond the scope of this 
research. Stukel's suggestion that controlling testing is 
the most adequate method in controlling technology may not 
be valid since computer simulation techniques involving com­
ponents and subassemblies are not observable. Myrdal's sug­
gestion that resources for development should be turned off 
and the personnel should be diverted to other problems is 
not possible (1978: 10-13). Profit motive in the military-
industrial complex precludes that solution. Panofsky sug­
gests that technological and military factors alone have not 
caused the buildup of arms (1981: 48). He attributes the
escalation to political factors and the inability to deal 
with problems politically.
The fact that effective measures have not emerged 
to control offensive weapon proliferation only increases the
73
importance of understanding the impact of technology creep 
in the arms control process. One must recognize that tech­
nological advancement can impact progress by making the veri­
fication process more difficult and by contributing to dis­
ruption in the international environment.
Concept of Deterrence 
The concept of deterrence is subjective since no 
certainty exists that permits specific definition. Deter­
rence may be active when it involves the manipulation of 
someone's behavior by threatening to do him harm. It may 
be reactive when it involves the threat to use force as a 
way of preventing someone else's first use of force (Morgan, 
1977: 9). The term "deterrence" is normally applied to con­
flict prevention between nation states and will be used as 
such in this research.
Deterrence is not necessarily restricted to mili­
tary force. It may be considered as the negative aspect of 
political power. The explicit threat of an economic sanction 
or a reward of economic aid may be used to manipulate behavior. 
The definition to be utilized in this paper is as follows 
(Art and Waltz, 1977: 20):
In a simple two-party situation, state A's deter­
rent force accomplishes it purpose by frightening
state B out of making the military strike that it 
would have made had the deterrent threat been 
ineffective.
As noted by Patrick Morgan, this definition indicates that 
it is a matter between two states in which areas the threat
of force is to prevent military action.
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The DOD perception of deterrence, as described by 
Secretary Brown, is a product of several conditions. There 
must be a communication to the opposition about the price it 
will have to pay for attempting an objective that is unaccept­
able to the United States. The state must possess military 
capability to exact the payment either by denying the objec­
tive or by making it too costly. The U.S. defensive systems 
must not be eliminated in the process and the message must 
have credibility. Both the U.S. and the adversary must be­
lieve in a real probability that the promised action will be 
executed (Brown, 1979: 61). Secretary Brown's definition
adds the ideas that the threat presented can only be carried 
out at a high cost to the adversary, the defensive capability 
exists that will survive the initial attack, and the power 
is present to respond to the threat.
U.S.-Soviet Strategy
The United States' strategy has been to favor a 
concept of mutual deterrence. This strategy involves the 
maintenance of a capability to inflict massive retaliatory 
punishment upon the society of an adversary and to concede 
that the other side has the capability to do the same (Wolfe, 
1979: 108-10). The underlying concept of mutual deterrence
is called the Mutually Assured Destruction Theory.
The Soviet strategy has been directed to the notion 
that the better prepared their forces are to fight and win 
a nuclear war, the better their society is prepared to
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survive its effects; and, the more clearly the adversary 
understands, the more effectively he will be deterred. This 
approach is labeled "deterrence through denial" (Wolfe, 1979: 
108-10). Talbot writes that the Soviets reinforced their 
notion that a nuclear war is winnable with the deployment of 
the SS-9 with its 25 megaton warhead (1979: 26; also see
Nitze, 197 9: xii). It also served to delineate the point
that they are more interested in a war-winning strategy than 
in deterrence.
The SALT process emphasis on offensive systems indi­
cates the importance of second-strike capability. Paramount 
to this retaliatory capability is survivability of the heavy 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. John Spanier (1978:
187) says that invulnerable strategic forces contribute 
to the stability of mutual deterrence. K. J. Holsti (1977:
32 9-35) indicates acceptance of this notion, but adds that 
for stability purposes it must be a mutual second-strike 
capability.
Credibility
Credibility is an indispensable tenet of any nation's 
foreign policy, particularly if that nation aspires to func­
tion effectively as a world power (Collins, 1978: 8-9).
Communications is an essential part of the credibility con­
tribution to the theory of deterrence. Communication of 
military credibility is carried out by visible display in 
public festivities such as the Paris Air Show, Armed Forces
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Day in the U.S., and the annual May Day Parade in Moscow 
(Holsti, 1977: 315-18).
To be credible and efficient, a deterrent capa­
bility cannot be kept a secret (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 
1971: 258-60). There is a very fine line between the amount
of information to be communicated to the adversary and which 
aspects of information are to be held back. Too much infor­
mation about a weapon system might arouse the recipient to 
the point that he might launch an attack because of this new 
system.
Credibility depends upon the challenger's beliefs 
and perceptions. A crucial problem is communicating intent 
(Holsti, 1977: 315-18). The process of visibly impressing
the adversary of existing capabilities through military 
parades is a much easier matter than communicating intent.
At the state level this communication may be made through 
treaties (a form of declaratory policy) or through general 
declaratory policies such as the offer of assistance to any 
state desiring to avoid takeover by another state. The chal­
lenger will construct the image of credibility of the state's 
intent from the entire range of information available to 
him (Snyder, 1961: 240-41).
In a symposium conducted at the National War College 
in 1975, the notion was presented that deterrent threats need 
not be in kind to be effective, but they do need to be close 
enough to scale to be credible. For example, one could not
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credibly respond to a threatened guerilla attack with a 
threat of nuclear retaliation. In the contemporary strategic 
lexicon, nuclear deterrence credibility is only applicable 
when national survival is threatened.
Stability
An effective deterrent must be sufficiently credible 
to prevent an adversary from launching an attack; and yet, 
it must present an adequate measure of stability that will 
reduce the incentive to launch a preemptive strike out of 
fear (Holsti, 1977: 319). The U.S. pursues strategic sta­
bility through the SALT process, in which the aim is essen­
tial equivalence. Under the assumption that essential equiva­
lence is a prerequisite to stability, there is a conflict 
of goals between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in arms con­
trol. The U.S. arms controllers find their Soviet counter­
parts reluctant to settle for essentially equal aggregates 
(Collins, 1978: 8). To have a perceived equivalence may
be contrary to the Soviet goal of world communism in prefer­
ence to capitalism.
Missile invulnerability takes away the initiative 
to initiate a first strike. When the advantage to initiate 
the first strike is taken away, the possibility of war is 
diminished. Invulnerable missiles thus stabilize the environ­
ment of deterrence (Spanier, 1978: 186-87).
78
Deterrence Theory Framework
The mutual deterrence theory espoused by Spanier 
(1978: 182-83) is applicable to the proposed MX deployment.
This framework contains four propositions that have impacted 
the MX system and these propositions are discussed in the 
following paragraphs.
There are four propositions contained in Spanier's 
(1978: 182-83) mutual deterrence theory.
(1) THE,BALANCE OF CAPABILITY DOES NOT NECESSARILY 
REQUIRE AN EQUALITY IN NUMBERS OF BOMBERS AND 
MISSILES.
The acceptance of this tenet of the mutual deter­
rence theory may be demonstrated in the whole of the SALT II 
treaty. While both sides agreed, as contained in the treaty 
in June 1979, to have a maximum number of total delivery 
systems (2,250) in the inventory by 1981, there are sub­
limits that allow mix and match to this total. This mix 
and match permits both participants to stress the systems 
(ICBM, SLEM, or bombers) that they prefer or require for the 
defense of their country.
The second strike capability is inferred in this 
notion since both participants go to great detail to increase 
the invulnerability of the systems. This inference is done 
through missile site hardening, improvement in mobility con­
cepts for both ICBM and SLBM, and the emphasis currently 
being placed on the delivery systems for the ICBM.
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(2) MOST SIGNIFICANT FOR A STRATEGIC BALANCE 
IS THE RIGHT KIND OF WEAPONS
The selection of a weapon system for inclusion 
in an inventory is, in part, a function of whether it will 
contribute to stability or detract from it. The heavy mis­
sile systems (Minute-man II or the SS-18) are not in them­
selves particularly destabilizing, but when the multiple 
warhead (MIRV) capability is added to these systems, the 
picture changes drastically. The pending MARV system, that 
will have terminal guidance and control systems, will prove 
to be an even greater threat to stability. The SLBM concept 
has always been a contributer to stability because of the 
problem of detection, range of the missile, and its range 
of operation.
Having a wide range of capabilities from which to 
select is not considered to be an end in itself. The possi­
bility always exists that the wrong choice could be made.
Holsti (1977: 335) says that the value of these flexible
choices ultimately is no better than the wisdom with which 
they are deployed.
Concurrent to proposition 1 above and with propo­
sition 2, the SALT II weapons systems base lines as reported
by the U.S. and the Soviet Union are shown on page 80. The 
U.S. defense strategists have maintained the concept of a 
balanced, diversified force in the defense triad of land, 
sea, and air systems. Within the framework of the second 
strike strategy, each leg of the triad must independently
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U.S. Warhead Type Soviets
Land ICBM 504 single 790
550 MIRV 608
SLBM 496 MIRV 144
160 MRV 806
Bombers 573 156
Totals 2283 2504
survive a first strike and retain assured destruction 
capability.
The Soviets rely primarily on a dyad of the large 
landbased weapons systems coupled with the SLBM. Histori­
cally, they have played down the role of the manned bomber; 
however, the Backfire bomber included in SALT II by a side 
letter has augmentation capabilities that make it a potential 
long-range bomber.
(3) ADVERSARIES INFORM EACH OTHER OF THEIR DEFENSE 
POSTURE BY A SUCCESSION OF SIGNALS
The communication factor reappears in the spectrum 
of attributes required for a deterrent to be successful. The 
communications must be from both directions to be effective.
A one-sided communication is about as effective as a kid­
napper who has no means or method of contacting anyone to 
demand a ransom. Spanier (1978: 192) cites an instance
in the U.S.-Soviet relationship in which a non-communication 
took place that left the U.S. with the perception that the 
Soviets are intent upon obtaining a first strike capability. 
This non-communication occurred because the Soviets could
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not present an adequate argument for deployment of the SS-9 
through SS-18. These missiles were the heavies of the Soviet 
arsenal.
(4) THE BALANCE OF RESOLVE MAY WELL BE MORE 
IMPORTANT THAN THE BALANCE OF CAPABILITY 
IN PRECIPITATING A CRISIS. THE NUCLEAR 
AGE HAS DISPLACED WAR AS THE ULTIMATE TEST 
OF STRENGTH IN DETERMINING THE SETTLEMENT 
OF SUPERPOWER CONFLICTS AND TERMS OF 
COEXISTENCE.
The balance of resolve notion stated by Spanier 
deals with the "how much is enough" question. The critical 
relationship is not the number required for a nuclear war, 
but the number needed to maintain a tolerable position in 
the maintenance of peaceful coexistence.
The selection of numbers and kinds is an intricate, 
complex procedure. Consideration is given to the demographic 
characteristics of an adversary as well as to a series of 
static indicators. These static indicators include numbers 
of missiles, bombers, warheads, throwweight, and megatonnage. 
The military inherently uses "worst case analysis" for quan­
titative planning purposes. Holsti's "para bellum doctrine" 
supports this worst case analysis (1977; 329). He states,
"If you want peace, prepare for war."
Impacts of Arms Control
Holsti indicates that there are several built-in 
factors that will not permit arms control to make a substan­
tial contribution to stability (1977: 351-52). He contends
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that domestic political considerations about defense policies 
are given more consideration than the state of international 
politics. Defense policy is further agitated by interservice 
rivalries. Fear of surprise attack and technological advance­
ment by an adversary are blockades to arms control.
John Polyani (1966: 179-80) supports the notion
that arms control is not a significant contributor to deter­
rence. He said that mutual assurance against the dangers 
of cheating (verification) will be extraordinarily diffi­
cult to achieve in a world of intensive struggle and mili­
tary conflict. Technological changes occur too rapidly to 
permit arms control measures to remain stable.
Phillip Green adds to this nonacceptance of arms 
control as a continuing contributor to deterrence (196 6:
181). His thought is that the doctrine of arms control, of 
which deterrence theory is one aspect, and the traditional 
balance of power theory, of which deterrence theory is also 
an aspect, have been transformed in Western thought. This 
transformation has combined to form a general theory of com­
petitive equilibrium. Competitive equilibrium conditions 
can exist in human affairs only for short periods of time.
Green further attributes the decision-making processes of 
deterrence theorists themselves to creating unstable arms 
control notions. "They have the shortest time horizons 
of any group in the arms debate. . . . They will almost 
always opt for short-run stability, for next year's fulfill­
ment of their major goal of keeping the peace." (1966 : 170)
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Negotiations 
The arms control negotiation process is the 
attempt to implement the policies directed by the president 
or his selected advisors. The process is complicated by 
differences in language, perceptions, customs, and values 
of the nations involved.
Beyond these basic difficulties, the process is 
impacted by relationships of the negotiating team with the 
decision makers, communciations between each nation's leaders, 
and the complexity of the issues involved. Each of these is 
considered in the following sections.
Negotiation Problems
Adversaries find difficulty in negotiating interna­
tional problems of the magnitude of strategic arms limitations 
because of "mirror imaging." One form of mirror image re­
sponse aims to silence the implied threat that would give 
political advantage and leverage unless a system was deployed 
with either equal or greater capability (Panofsky, 1981: 49).
An example of this image is the MIRV. The Soviets would not 
negotiate until they possessed the capability.
Imaging also occurs with the perceptions that the 
negotiators have of each other. The participants bring to 
the table a distrust, fear, and suspicion of their opponents. 
Each side believes it represents justice, virtue, and wisdom 
while the other side simply represents evil. Smith (1980:
72) recognizes the prospect of such a problem occurring and
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indicates that friendliness between contracting parties is 
damaging to persuasion in international relations. He 
believes (p. 38) that the imaging did not occur and the per­
sonal relationships that developed during the sessions did 
not impact the outcome but lay the foundation or basis for 
further arms control talks.
Lt. Gen. Edward Rowney, a U.S. military represen­
tative to SALT II, agrees with Spanier's "mirror imaging" 
notion. Gen. Rowney indicates that the U.S. delegates mis­
applied the concept (Day, 1979: 52-53). They did not
research Russian heritage or culture and thus inadvertently 
concluded that the Russians think and act in the same ways 
as Americans. Rowney contends that the Soviets resort to 
crude tricks to gain advantage, delay action as long as pos­
sible knowing that the Americans want progress, and will 
suggest alternatives and reverse position at any time for 
no apparent reason.
In U.S. Senate Hearings (August 1, 1979) Gen. Rowney 
states that the Soviets regarded the negotiations as a com­
petition while the U.S. looked on them as problem-solving 
exercises. The Soviets, through their negotiating strategy, 
exploited the American's tendency toward impatience by select­
ing an extreme position on any subject and waiting. Rowney 
concludes that untrained participants should never be per­
mitted to participate in proceedings that are as important 
as arms control.
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International negotiations should take place with 
clarity, firmness, and consistency in negotiating objectives. 
Garthoff (1977: 10-13) indicates that these attributes are
especially applicable to arms control negotiations with the 
Soviets. The typical American approach to negotiations is 
to enter the process with three positions: an extremely high
starting point, an immediate fall-back position, and a bottom 
line. This bottom line is acceptable, but is a point which 
cannot be exceeded. Garthoff (1977: 23) writes that initial
negotiating positions should provide sufficient bargaining 
room but not to the point that they are misleading. Consis­
tency of these tactics is essential in attaining the desired 
negotiation goals.
Linkage
Linkage exists through the diplomatic connection 
of two objectives during negotiation: using leverage of one
to gain another through reality of actions of major powers 
being related and having consequences beyond the issue or 
region concerned (Kissinger, 1979: 129; see U.S. Senate
Hearings, 1979: 862). Kissinger concludes that to ignore
the interconnection of events is paramount to the U.S. ignor­
ing its responsibility as a world power and results in the 
undermining of all policy.
Kissinger (1961; 196) writes that the post-war
period was characterized by whether or not the Soviets should 
be negotiated with, more than the issues that should be
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negotiated. The intent was to connect negotiation with 
transformation of the Soviet government's actions to those 
that are more acceptable to the Western world.
Nixon (1980: 267-69; also 1978: 346) writes that
linkage is a just concept and states that he and Kissinger 
developed it in 1969 and after two years sold the Soviet 
Union on the concept. According to Nixon, the notion works 
because the Soviets want economic cooperation but will not 
accept it solely on the basis of a benevolent ideal for world 
peace.
The effectiveness and necessity for linkage in 
SALT I and II is debatable. Contrary to Nixon's belief that 
the Soviets accepted linkage. Smith (1980: 26) writes that
the Soviets never accepted the notion and reminded him cf 
the fact several times during SALT I, referring at one point 
to a "no linkage" agreement. Kissinger (1979: 138-44) also
refutes the effectiveness of the notion, stating that an 
announcement by Smith that the talks would soon begin caused 
the media and Congress to apply such pressures to begin that 
the administration's attempt to link SALT with other issues—
i.e., Vietnam— had to be abandoned. Carter's attempt to link 
the human rights issue to arms control was a failure also 
(Stoesinger, 1979: 253).
The point that the Soviets did not accept the link­
age notion in arms control is demonstrated by their placement 
and subsequent refusal to remove troops from Cuba (October 1979)
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and their December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. These 
events both impacted the U.S. Senate ratification hearings 
that were in process at the time. The notion is that the 
Soviets did not need to be concerned with linkage because 
of the numbers of nuclear weapons possessed and because the 
United States had recognized them as an equal power when the 
administration initiated strategic arms talks with them.
The Soviets possessed the necessary power and command of 
resources to insulate themselves against adverse pressure in 
an international relationship (Thorndike, 1979: 87).
The extensive SALT II Senate ratification discus­
sions were directed primarily toward two issues, numbers of 
weapons and verification. Panofsky writes that linking arms 
control negotiations to the political process— i.e., ratifi­
cation— places undue political importance on the detailed 
numbers of military systems (1981: 50). No, one can reliably
predict a specific outcome of military conflict based on the 
precise number of weapons deployed.
The Reagan administration is approaching future 
arms control negotiation with the Soviets from the standpoint 
that the U.S. negotiates better from strength than weakness 
(Southerland, 1981: 1). The approach to negotiations is
being linked to Soviet good behavior. Secretary Haig, in 
a speech to the American Bar Association, reiterated that 
no more is expected of the Soviet Union than any other 
country. Restraint in the use of force, respect for
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independence of other countries, and adherence to reciprocal 
obligations are three expected behaviors (Christian Science 
Monitor, August 13, 1981: 24).
Back Channel Communication
Progress in arms negotiations is impacted by the 
relationship of the chief negotiator and the key decision 
maker. The strategic arms negotiations are not conducted in 
a manner like other forms of international negotiations.
Smith describes the process as being very formal with fixed 
procedures and very little bargaining in the sense that there 
are no immediate offers and counter offers (1980: 54-71).
The positions presented are read from carefully worded texts 
that have been transmitted by the decision makers. Smith 
(1980 interview) stated that he had absolutely no latitude 
in negotiations and with this direction would retain a posi­
tion until otherwise directed. New positions would be re­
ceived that would be acceptable to the Soviets with minimal 
discussion. He was later advised that these agreements were 
reached through back-channel means.
Back-channel communications are secret contacts 
or communications between individual officials that detour 
the regular communications channels either within or between 
governments. The technique was first introduced in the SALT 
process in 1970 and was frequently used during the January 
to May 1971 period by Kissinger. The back channel was used 
at least fourteen times during the SALT II negotiations (Wolfe,
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1979; 81). According to Wolfe, these contacts by Kissinger
continued through the Ford era. Carter utilized the 
techniques; however, he included Secretary of State and 
Chief of Negotiations and ACDA Director Warnke.
Arguments can be made in support of the technique 
in that it puts heads of state in direct contact, leaving 
room for more give and take in discussions. The heads of 
state can directly settle the issues that are beyond the 
authority of the individuals involved in the details.
The Reagan administration has advised the Soviets 
that they are not interested in the utilization of the back 
channel for informal talks on arms control. They will use 
the process only in substantive negotiations (Temko, 1981:
20) .
Verification
The inability of the United States and Soviet Russia 
to agree on the processes of verification has been the single 
greatest stumbling block to proposed treaty negotiations. 
Neither nation has been willing to concede to on-site 
inspection. The "open sky" concept proposed by Eisenhower 
was countered by a Soviet proposal to station troops at the 
major highway intersections and railway terminals in each 
other's country.
Progress is being made in the direction of on-site 
inspection. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty may contain 
provisions for placing equipment on each other's soil for
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monitoring purposes. The Soviets published an outer space 
treaty draft on August 12, 1981 that stated that "partici­
pating states will, in the event it is necessary, consult 
with each other, make inquiries and furnish information 
related to such inquiries" (Temko, August 13, 1981A). This 
has been interpreted as a softening in attitude toward 
verification; however, the Standing Consultative Commission 
established with SALT I currently provides this capability.
Treaty Ambiguities 
Verification articles have been included in the 
SALT I Treaty (article XII), the Interim Agreement (article V) , 
and SALT II (article XV). These articles are worded almost 
identically. Article XV of the SALT II Treaty reads as 
follows :
(1) For the purpose of providing assurance of com­
pliance with the provisions of this Treaty, 
each Party shall use National technical means 
of verification at its disposal in a manner 
consistent with generally recognized prin­
ciples of international law.
(2) Each Party undertakes not to interfere with 
the National technical means of verification 
of the other Party operating in accordance 
with paragraph one of this article.
(3) Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate 
concealment measures which impede verifica­
tion by National technical means of compliance 
with the provisions of this Treaty. This 
obligation shall not require changes in cur­
rent construction, assembly, conversion, or 
overhaul practices.
National technical means (NTM) are not defined in
these treaties, but are those information-collection systems
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utilized in the verification process. Article XV.1 of the 
SALT II Treaty provides for the application of NTM at the 
nation's disposal in a manner consistent with international 
law. These NTM's include photographic reconnaissance satel­
lites and aircraft based systems such as radars and antennas 
for collecting telemetry data (State Department publication 
12A, 1979; also see Katz, 1979; 308). The estimated 100,000
intelligence agents in the Soviet Union and 70,000 in the 
United States who play an important part in the process are 
not accounted for in this delineation of NTM (Christian 
Science Monitor, September 22, 1980).
The term "deliberate concealment" is ambiguous in 
that it could be measures that were intentional or an action 
that had that result even though it was intended for other 
purposes (Rhinelander, 1974: 140). The First Common Under­
standing wording in the SALT II Treaty is no better. The 
clarification reads in part: "In this connection, the obli­
gation not to use deliberate concealment measures includes 
the obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures 
associated with testing. . . . "  Soviets endorse a "spirit" 
of SALT only when it suits the occasion. The Soviets view 
verification on the part of the United States to be a self- 
perpetuating policy because of the open policy in which it 
functions. The Soviets can run closer to the edge of legal­
ity because secretiveness is a strategic asset to them.
The United States and the Soviet Union agreed that the
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proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) 
would remain secret with publication of agenda items to be 
made only by mutual agreement.
Reliability of Verification
The fact that both the superpowers possess highly 
sophisticated means of information collection is not in 
question. The technical capabilities and how these vast 
quantities of data are collated and analyzed are beyond the 
scope of this research, but their implications are critical 
to arms control treaties (Katz, 1979: 310). Each of these
techniques has inherent weaknesses. Satellite technology may 
be blinded by laser beams, destroyed by killer satellites, 
or restricted by cloud coverage. Electronic surveillance 
can be partially overcome by utilizing on-board flight test 
tape recorders that are parachuted back to earth which will 
prevent telemetry data from being collected.
The existence of shortcomings in detection tech­
niques and the very loosely written, ambiguously worded 
verification articles, plus the Soviet penchant for doing all 
that is not specifically prohibited, raises the questions: 
"Can violations be detected" and "Are the treaties 
verifiable?" State Department arms controllers (Special 
Report No. 55, 1979) write that it is important to consider 
the totality of the treaty, not just specific provisions.
The point stressed is that the Soviets could not exploit 
monitoring uncertainties of individual provisions of the
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treaty in such a way that it would affect the national 
security interests of the United States. The Soviets can­
not be sure of the overall capability of the U.S. to moni­
tor a treaty. With all of the monitoring means available, 
any cheating on a scale large enough to alter strategic 
balance could be discovered in time to make appropriate 
responses.
The SALT Hearings before the Committee on Armed 
Services of the U.S. Senate, 1979, contain a number of sup­
porting verification arguments. Secretary of Defense Brown 
indicated that there are hedges against violations such as 
raising the alert status of existing forces, expanding 
deployments, or terminating the treaty. General Allen, Air 
Force Chief of Staff, stated that verification is possible 
but we must support vigorous intelligence programs. He con­
cludes that verification can be made with high confidence 
but not total confidence.
General Seignious' testimony in these hearings 
was also positive on verification. He identified factors 
that contribute to verification, such as lead times to pro­
duce and field large missile systems, the U.S. capability, 
and logistics support required to field and deploy larger 
systems. His concerns are relative to the difficulty of 
tracking small systems that can be totally concealed in 
manufacture and testing, such as cruise or other totally 
new concepts.
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One of the opponents of verification. General 
Rowney, contended in these hearings that the wording of the 
treaty will enable the Soviets to bend system counting rules 
to fit their own purposes and to encrypt test data. Paul 
Nitze's testimony related the fact that three years were 
required to find out about flight tests the Soviets were 
conducting wherein one system was utilized to obtain data 
for other purposes.
In consideration of the verification process and 
the implications of cheating, all provisions of the proposed 
treaty are not verifiable; however, the impact of cheating 
is not as severe as it appears because lead times required 
to develop and deploy new systems make detection more 
plausible.
Summary
The policy context stage of the analysis has in­
cluded the national security council organization, mandated 
by law, that exists for providing assistance to the presi­
dent in strategic arms control decisions. Chapter two 
also included a discussion of two conceptual decision models 
that have been applied in strategic arms decisions. Chapter 
three depicted the utilization of the NSC and the applica­
tion of these conceptual models. Chapter four considered 
the external influence of technology creep and deterrence 
on the arms control process. Strategic arms negotiations 
were considered as implementation processes considering the
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relationship of chief negotiator with the key decision 
makers and the problem of verification.
The remainder of this research considers the ICBM 
systems available that might be utilized to counter the 
vulnerability threat and an evaluation of these alternatives. 
Some conclusions may be derived from the policy context stage 
that will enhance the understanding of the implication of 
the selection process.
The decision-making processes are unstructured with 
no set rules that may be applied from one instance to the 
next. The NSC has been provided by law to assist the presi­
dent in arriving at national security decisions, but there 
is no requirement that it be utilized. The Johnson adminis­
tration held formal meetings with the NSC, but specific 
security subjects were discussed with the secretaries of 
state and defense outside the aegis of the NSC. Nixon pre­
sented a strong stand for the NSC, but allowed Kissinger to 
virtually control the strategic arms decision process. The 
NSC framework was utilized to give the appearance of partici­
pation in the process. Carter expanded the role of the NSC 
by limiting his security advisors' responsibility to a 
coordinator's function. The Reagan administration has de­
clared the NSC role as being very low profile to reduce the 
tendency of the agency's becoming a power base for personal 
prominence.
Presidential advisors may be drawn from anywhere 
in the circles of power. The prominence of position in
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these circles does not seem to impact the outcome of the 
decisions. The lack of direction or guidance by Johnson 
and the attempt to use the concensus approval rather than 
to present options or alternatives from which to select 
caused an unnecessary delay in the initiation of the SALT I 
negotiations. The official ingoing negotiation position 
was solved by a member from the outer circles, who seized 
the opportunity to push his recommendations through the 
bureaucracy. Nixon refused to accept the Johnson proposals 
and further delayed the negotiation in order to select his 
own negotiating positions. These turned out to be almost 
identical to the recommendations that had been passed on.
The Reagan approach to an ICBM deployment is similar because 
he would not accept Carter's recommended program.
The utilization of additional time to study these 
issues is questionable. The similar results may be due to 
the origins of the sources of advice since the preparation 
of SALT I. Nixon would have been surprised to know the num­
ber of the principles involved during the Johnson administra­
tion that were working in SALT I (Smith, 1980: 39). Many
of the Nixon people were working in the strategic arms con­
trol environment during the Carter administration (Spanier 
and Uslaner, 1978: 4). Reagan selected 121 decision makers
out of a total of 213 appointments, who had previous govern­
ment experience.
Predicated upon past performance in the strategic 
arms selection decision process, the decision for the MX
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deployment will be an extensive process. With many of the 
arms control advisors and decision makers remaining in the 
international security environment, the precedent for the 
extended deliberation process has been established. The 
situation is not likely to improve. Individuals may change, 
political leadership may change, different factions may vary 
according to intellectual fashion; but, those groups to which 
the nation looks for leadership will remain very much the 
same throughout the next two decades (Nixon, 1980; 8).
Technology creep has the greatest potential for 
impacting the strategic arms limitation process. Often tech­
nological advancement in non-related developments produces 
minute improvements that collectively produce a new weapon 
system concept. These advancements occur at a more rapid 
pace than do political solutions to the problems they create.
The concept of deterrence does not impact the 
weapon system selection process. Factors or components of 
the deterrent umbrella— i.e., stability, credibility, and 
vulnerability— are impacted by a weapon system selection, 
but in the final analysis do not prevent a weapon system 
deployment. Had deterrence been a primary factor in weapon 
system selection, then MIRV would not have been deployed and 
the MARV developmental program would have been stopped.
The negotiation process is an extension of the key 
decision makers and progress in negotiation is impacted by 
that relationship. The chief negotiator must be kept apprised
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of all communications concerning the in-process negotiation.
Lt. Gen. Rowney's (R) appointment in August 1981 as Chief 
Strategic Arms Negotiator is a step in the right direction 
to improving the process. He, as a military advisor to SALT II, 
observed that the U.S. tendency to impatience during negotia­
tion and pressure to produce are factors that must be alle­
viated in order to produce stronger negotiated treaties 
(Day, 1979: 52-53).
The next chapter addresses the ICBM systems and 
concepts that are available to the land-based defensive com­
ponent of the triad. It includes their operational charac­
teristics and a description of the warhead capabilities.
CHAPTER V
WEAPON SYSTEM ALTERNATIVES FOR THE 
STRATEGIC ICBM FORCE
Introduction 
The U.S. ICBM leg of the‘defensive triad is 
being upgraded to protect its survivability during an in­
coming attack because of technological improvements in 
Soviet ICBM accuracy and the capability to place multiple 
renetry vehicles on one ICBM. The preceding chapters have 
discussed the need for retaining the triad and the strategic 
weapon system selection process that exists for making these 
selections. The environment surrounding weapon system selec­
tion was found to be an unstructured framework wherein neither 
the source of the advice nor the conceptual decision model 
utilized for making the selection impacted the outcome of 
the final selection.
This chapter addresses the policy alternatives stage 
three of the analysis. Land-based systems that comprise the 
existing strategic ICBM force and the proposed mobile con­
cept as an addition to this force are discussed. A potential
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ABM system that could be deployed with the land-based 
systems is also discussed. A concluding section describes 
the warhead destructive capabilities.
The missiles included are the Titan II, Minuteman, 
Missile Experimental (MX), and the low altitude air defense 
(LoAD) system. Table 7 contains a summary of these ICBM 
system characteristics. Figure 4 identifies the existing 
deployment sites. Two general areas in Nevada and Utah and 
Texas and New Mexico have been selected for the proposed MX 
deployment (see figure 5).
Fixed-Base ICBMs
Titan II
Titan II is the elder statesman of the ICBM family 
and it carries the largest of all the U.S. ICBM payloads.
In operation since 1963, the system is deployed in three 
wings of eighteen missiles each at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona; 
McConnell AFB, Kansas; and Little Rock AFB, Arkansas (Collins, 
1978; 89). The fifty-four Titans account for 486 megatons
or approximately one-third of the U.S. nuclear warhead inven­
tory. In early 1980 an improved guidance system, which will 
increase the missile's accuracy, was being retrofitted in 
these ICBMs (Janes, 1980: 14).^
Titan II is a liquid fuel system that is fueled 
by toxic aerozinc-50 and nitrogen tetroxide. The advantages 
of using liquid fueled boosters are that they can modulate
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TABLE 7
SUMMARY OF U.S. ICBM SPECIFICATIONS
Titan
II
Minuteman
II
Minuteman
III MX
Range (miles) 7,000 6,500 6,500 7,500
Payload 9 MT(1) 1+MT 3X170 KT 10X170 KT
Throwweight 
(1,000 lb) 7.5 1.0 to 1.5 2.3 8.0
Height(ft) 103.0 59.8 60.0 72
Diameter (ft) 10.0 5.5 5.5 7.7
Propellent liquid solid solid solid
CEP 0.7 0.20 0.12 0.05
Date deployed 1962 1966 1970 — — —
Number
deployed 54 450 550 0
Inventory ? 50 200 0
SOURCE: Janes Weapons Systems (London: Paulton
House, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1979, 1980) (Titan and Minuteman).
Multiple sources (MX).
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thrust to produce greater mission flexibility, they have high 
payload/launch weight rates, and they are lighter to transport 
without fuel/oxidizer. The disadvantages of the liquid fuel 
are that individually these substances are highly corrosive 
and ignite on contact with each other. The gaskets and seals 
with the system are damaged by the corrosive properties.
Most missiles in the U.S. inventory are test fired 
on an annual basis. Test data are accumulated for the pri­
mary purpose of determining system degradation. Titan has 
not been flight tested since 1976, but they have been sub- 
jbected to subsystems tests on statis firing stands. These 
test firings had to be stopped because all production facil­
ities have been shut down and there are no spare parts remain­
ing for such purposes (Huntsville Times, November 22, 1979).
Minuteman II and III
There are two versions of the Minuteman deployed 
in the U.S. These sites and quantities are shown in figure 4. 
Two of the sites contain Minuteman II, three have Minuteman III, 
and one site contains both systems (Collins, 1980; 135). The
malmstron site in Montana is spread over an area of 18,000 
square miles. Missiles are stored in individual hardened 
silos, eaching having a surface area of two or three acres.
Each silo is approximately eighty-two feet deep and thirteen 
feet in diameter with two underground equipment rooms around 
the silo casing that extend to twenty-six feet below ground 
level (Janes, 1978: 14).
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Minuteman III is currently the most potent weapon 
in the U.S. ICBM inventory because of its accuracy and 
multiple warhead capability. It evolved from technological 
improvements to the Minuteman II. The initial modifications 
in the system were concentrated in the final stage and the 
reentry system. The significant change was the introduction 
of the MIRV system of three warheads.
The fourth stage of Minuteman III is a carrier of 
the MIRVed warheads. This carrier or bus has independent 
propulsion and guidance and control systems. The bus posi­
tions itself in the trajectory in accordance with a pre­
determined targeting mode and ejects a reentry vehicle (RV) 
when required. The MIRV does not have its own propulsion 
system and its flight is essentially a ballistic trajectory 
without a maneuverability capability. Each of these MIRVs 
may be of a different configuration. The bus may contain 
hot warheads, warhead decoys, mylar balloons, chaff (metallic 
or radar reflective material), or any combination of these 
items.
Modernization programs are in progress to upgrade 
the guidance and control systems and a replacement of the 
warheads (Janes, 1980: 15). General Jones (1980: 27) con­
firms the modernization program but indicates that it is 
directed to improvements in command authority communication 
links and the missiles' internal power systems. Production 
facilities for Minuteman III were phased out in 1978 
(Robinson, 1979B: 180).
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Mobile ICBM - MX
Developmental efforts in mobile ICBM concepts
2
were accelerated in the mid 1970s. Secretary of Defense 
Brown pointed out in his report to Congress on January 29, 
1980, that the decision to proceed with full scale develop­
ment of the MX reflected the current thinking that there are 
persuasive military and perceptual reasons for increasing 
the deterrent value of the ICBM component of the strategic 
force. He concluded that the protection of the ICBM is the 
best hedge against unexpected breakthroughs in Soviet anti­
submarine warfare and air defense capabilities.
The MX program is the only significant U.S. land- 
based system being considered to counter the increased threat. 
When combined with Multiple Protective Shelters (MPS) basing, 
the MX provides a valuable counterweight to Soviet strategic 
momentum and future uncertainties in the strategic environ­
ment (Jones, 1980: 27). The MPS basing provides the pre­
servation of location uncertainty concept through concealment 
of a missile in one of several shelters in a given area.
The proposed MX missile will be larger than Minute- 
man III and carry ten MIRVed warheads of higher yield. While 
its accuracy is classified, published data indicates accuracy 
to be within 300 feet of the intended target (Gray, 1978B: 
105). Physically,athe missile will be 70 feet long, 92 inches 
in diameter, and^weigh approximaately 190,000 pounds (Air 
Force EIS, December 1980, vol. I: 1-14). The proposed
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system has three primary components consisting of the missile, 
transporter launcher equipment, and the concrete shelters.
The MX designation means "missile experimental." This defi­
nition is somewhat of a misnomer in that it is a straightfor­
ward evolution of the Minuteman III. Consequently, the MX 
concept has no significant technical or high-risk problem 
areas forecast in the deployment.
The proposed MX program consists of 200 missiles 
being placed in 4,600 shelters in such a way that the Soviet 
Union will not be able to tell which shelter contains the hot 
missiles and which contain decoys. The number of MPS is 
based on the perceived threat for the mid-1980s. From a 
targeting point of view, the Soviets are then confronted 
with 4,600 targets rather than 200. To eliminate the MX 
would require the Soviets to launch at least 9,200 one- 
megaton warheads (Kemp, 1980: 11-17). Because of the accuracy
and reliability factors of the Soviet ICBMs, the incoming 
ratio to kill on MX shelter may be as high as 2.3:1 (Perry, 
1980: 8).
The MX has a four stage propulsion system with three 
stages being solid propellant and the fourth or reentry stage 
being liquid. The first and second stages will use the same 
propellant as Minuteman II and the third stage will use the 
same propellant as the Trident SLBM (Janes, 1980: 15).
The missile is encased in a canister that provides a con­
trolled working environment and also serves as the launcher.
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Secretary of Defense Brown (1980: 128) announced
that MX would be equipped with an advanced design inertial 
reference sphere guidance system. This guidance system was 
developed for utilization with the mobile concept, and it 
permits the movement of missiles from one location to another 
without requiring a new location determination each time. 
Effectively, the system continues to navigate during 
movement.
Suitable Basing Areas
The operational concept of the MX requires dis­
persion over areas of land that are large enough to provide 
mobility for preservation of location uncertainty (see 
figure 5). The Air Force (Environmental Impact Statement, 
December 1980, volume II: 2-5) selected Nevada and Utah as
the preferred deployment area according to the following 
criteria:
1. The distance from the coast to the deployment 
area generally reduces the effectiveness of 
threatening sea-based forces. For physical 
threats, such as aircraft or missiles, added 
distance directly increases the time needed
to reach that target, increases probable warn­
ing time, and allows more time for defensive 
reactions. For electromagnetic threats which 
are often limited to "line of sight" and 
"ground-wave" distances, the power require­
ments increase in proportion to distance.
2. The distance from international borders to 
deployment areas that are farther from bor­
ders reduces an enemy's capability to locate 
missiles in shelters through the use of sen­
sors. The land surrounding the MX deployment 
area should be U.S. territory to avoid inter­
national complications in any investigation
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of suspicious activities and to inhibit 
meaningful intelligence collections.
3. The distance from coasts and international 
borders reduces the effects of radio jam­
ming against the MX communications sytem.
4. The existing land use activities must be 
compatible with MX deployment.
Basing Modes
The Air Force has studied thirty-five alternative 
basing modes during a twenty-year period. Alternatives con­
sidered included railroads, barges, wide-body jets, cargo- 
type aircraft, submarines, lighter-than-air-vehicles, ships, 
air-cushion vehicles, and trucks. The definition period 
also included basing in trenches, tunnels, pools, silos, 
canals, hardened capsules, excavated mountains, and various 
shelter configurations (Environmental Impact Study, December 
1980: Program Overview, 1-5 to 1-8; also see ICBM Basing
Options, 1980). Some of these high potential alternatives 
were feasible, but were eliminated after a period of time 
for various reasons. The trench, shallow underwater missile 
(SUM), and truck modes are in this category.
The hybrid trench concept is a covered trench hardened 
at specific aim points along the tunnel which extends for 
approximately twenty miles. Spurs lead off the main tunnel 
at angles with blast doors to protect the missile as it 
shuttles along the trench. The missile would be fired after 
breaking through the roof of the trench. Tests conducted by 
the U.S. Air Force in the Arizona desert revealed that the
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trench concept is vulnerable to large warheads because of 
the possibility of warpage and cracking during attack 
(Robinson, 1977A: 47; also see Gray, 1978B: 111). The
trench concept is confronted with technical and construc­
tional uncertainties because of lack of experience in the 
techniques.
Shallow underwater mobile (SUM) missiles were an 
option under consideration that involves fifty or so small 
diesel-powered submarines, each carrying two MX missiles. 
These submarines would cruise within 200 miles of the Atlantic 
and Pacific coasts (Cooley, 1979: 6). Each submarine would
be patterned after a West German built submarine of the same 
weight (approximately 500 tons) and would be manned by a 
crew of twelve men. Senator Mark Hatfield, a supporter of 
this concept, contends that the cost of the SUM missile would 
be about $12 billion and would be less likely to draw enemy 
fire on the continental U.S. He maintains that the system 
could be deployed by 1984 (Cooley, 1980A: 10).
Opponents of the SUM concept claim that the great­
est threat to MX is not the Soviets, but a small vocal group 
of scientists on the fringe of strategic weapons design who 
are promoting pet schemes of dubious merit (Ulsamer, 1980:
35). Uslamer writes that the SUM missile would not be avail­
able until after 1990 and would be highly vulnerable to tidal 
waves (caused by nuclear explosions) in the relatively 
shallow waters. Alleviating the tidal wave problem would
Ill
require that the concept be switched to a Deep Underwater 
Missile (BUM), but this would be a competitor to the Navy's 
Trident submarine.
Adding an additional deployment to the submarine 
force does not present any additional problems to the Soviet 
diverse targeting problem, but making the ICBM strategic 
force less vulnerable does. The SLBM is not as accurate as 
ICBMs because the speed of the moving submarine with refer­
ence to a ground point is not accurate. Water currents, 
densities, and the depths from which they are fired attribute 
to the lesser accuracies. In comparison, the MX has pub­
lished accuracy of 0.05 CEP, while the Poseidon has a factor 
of 0.3 CEP (Collins, 1978: 101). This problem could be
overcome by assigning guidance and control function and capa­
bility to either ground control centers or satellite control 
stations.
The truck transport concept places a given number 
of missiles on the nation's highway system. Acquisition cost 
of this option would be minimal because no real estate is 
required. The transporter would be quite large and require 
supporting escort vehicles. This alternative was eliminated 
because of security of the system while in transit, the com­
plex command and control system required to track the vehicles, 
the fact that large amounts of nuclear material would be on 
public highways, and the prohibitive weight factor (combined 
weight of missile, launcher, and transporter is 1,600,000 
pounds).
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The U.S. Air Force and Missile Systems 
Organization (SAMSO) selected the preferred basing mode 
after filtering through the following alternatives 
(Lenorovitz, 1978: 175):
-Construction of vertical shelters in the west 
and middle U.S. to hold Minuteman III but later 
to be filled with MX.
-Multiple aim point dispersal in vertical shelters 
in location same as the above.
-Multiple aim point dispersal in horizontal shel­
ters in location same as the above.
-Construction of a number of buried concrete 
tunnels, each holding one missile. Uncertainty 
of missile location would require the entire 
tunnel length to be targeted.
-Development of either the horizontal or vertical 
launch concept or the tunnel concept and then 
use one of the other two as an alternate.
The following paragraphs describe the recommended basing modes 
and support hardware (Department of the Air Force, Environ­
mental Impact Statement, Program Overview, dated December 1, 
1980).
Horizontal Basing Mode
The horizontal shelter mode, in clusters of twenty- 
three with a hexagonal pattern and an average spacing of 5,200 
feet between shelters, is preferred (see figure 6). Each 
cluster contains one missile/launcher and one transporter. 
Interconnecting roads are to be constructed to interconnect 
the hexagonal clusters, but in the case where existing roads 
may be utilized, an alternate grid pattern, depicted in
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figure 6, will be used. Secretary of Defense Brown, 
in testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services 
(June 5, 1980), stated that this linear basing concept makes 
more efficient use of the valleys in which the MX is to be 
deployed. Fewer valleys and less road construction would 
be required.
The protective shelter construction is a reinforced 
concrete, steel-lined cylinder buried under five feet of 
earth. The entrance door is made of concrete and steel.
The electrical power command and control, and environmental 
control equipment, are buried adjacent to the shelter. The 
shelters are each located on a 2.5 acre site, unmanned, and 
remotely protected by monitoring devices. The main access 
to each cluster is blockaded with an earth barrier to prevent 
movement of the launcher transporter from one cluster to 
another. Smaller access roads circumvent the barrier for 
otherwise unrestricted access to the cluster. Shelter dimen­
sions are 180 feet in length and 15 feet in diameter.
The launcher/canister is 155 feet in length,
110 inches in diameter, and 500,000 pounds in weight. Fir­
ing is accomplished after the canister partially emerges from 
the shelter or upon the open road. The canisterized portion 
erects to a near vertical position and the missile fires.
The transporter can be detached from the launcher 
canister. One transporter will be located in each cluster. 
Separation: of the transporter makes possible provision for
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a smaller tow vehicle than that required under the Transporter 
Erector Launcher (TEL) concept. The separation also elimi­
nates the need of an additional vehicle shield since the 
transporter will provide the shielding during movement. The 
transporter moves the missiles about ten miles per hour, and 
is 201 feet long, 16 feet wide over the tires, 31.5 feet high, 
and weighs 1,600,000 pounds loaded.
The positioning of the shelter has been more con­
troversial than the missile itself. The central issue in 
the question is the horizontal versus vertical launcher 
technique. Most members of the U.S. Senate seem to favor 
the mobility concept but express a concern about which shelter 
would meet the intent of the proposed SALT II Treaty. The 
debate relates to the point that the MX shelter is not a 
launcher and one MX per loop or cluster would be counted, not 
twenty-three; however, the vertical shelter concept resembles 
silos, silos resemble launchers, and launchers are surrogates 
for missiles under SALT (Robinson, 1979B; 17).
Nitze contends that legality of the mobility concept 
was settled during the SALT II negotiations (1979; 34 and 86).
He writes that the Soviets stated that a vertical deployment 
would involve additional launchers which are prohibited by 
treaty; however, the transporter required for horizontal 
shelters might be considered a mobile system with each trans­
porter being counted under the ceilings placed on launchers 
after the expiration of the Treaty Protocol. The Protocol,
116
article I, states that neither side shall deploy mobile 
launchers nor flight test mobile launchers, and article V 
stipulates that the Protocol shall remain in effect until 
December 31, 1981 or until it is replaced.
Antiballistic Missile Systems
The debate about which role to deploy an antiballistic 
missile (ABM) designed to protect cities or other U.S. mis­
siles from nuclear attack was never settled. The debate was 
not settled on its technical or strategic merit so much as 
it was ended by the SALT process and by the anti-military 
sentiments generated in the Congress and the country at 
large during the Vietnam War (Lord, 1980: 31),
The ABM Treaty (SALT I), with the passage of time, 
has become such a fixture in American policy that it is 
assumed to be absolutely essential. The Soviet Union de­
ployed one site (but only sixty-four of the one hundred 
were allowed) allocated to them by the treaty, while the 
U.S., after attaining operational status, disassembled its 
ABM site except for the radar. Research and development in 
ABM technology are permitted by the treaty and both the 
superpowers have been engaged in developmental programs 
(Flax, 1979: 41; also see Conine, 1981).
Emphasis has been focused on strategic offensive 
systems in the past few years ; however, due to the increased 
threat to the U.S. ICBM strategic forces, the emphasis may
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s h i f t  t o  in c lu d e  d e fe n s e  a s  an  e q u a l  p a r t n e r .  The e n v ir o n m e n t  
f o r  s u r v i v a l  o f  t h e  s e c o n d  s t r i k e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  an d  t h e  c l o s e l y  
a s s o c ia t e d  n e e d  f o r  t h e  s u r v i v a l  o f  command an d  c o n t r o l  fu n c ­
t i o n s  a s s o c ia t e d  w i t h  th e s e  s y s te m s  a r e  s u p p o r t in g  t h i s  
t h r u s t .
The ballistic missile defense (BMD) strategic 
force modernization has begun to enter the strategic dia­
logue in the United States- The focus this time is directed 
toward BMD as a hedge against the rapid buildup of Soviet 
offensive weapons (Kemp, 1980: 11-17). The prestigious
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory has made studies of the 
developments in BMD and has determined that it now could 
be a feasible, cheap, and safe way to knock out incoming 
Soviet ballistic missiles (Cooley, 1980A: 10). The task
is to apply emerging technologies that lead to economically 
feasible solutions and to defend against large numbers of 
incoming missiles. The goal is gaining a favorable cost- 
exchange ratio of making defense cost less in dollars than 
the cost of the offensive threat being defended against 
(Davis, 1979: 55-63).
The U.S. BMD approach is essentially a terminal 
defense system since it operates at the terminal or reentry 
leg of the ballistic missile trajectory. This concentration 
on the terminal period of the flight path is associated 
largely with the filtering effect of the atmosphere on ballis­
tic missile reentry. The atmosphere slows the reentry
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vehicles, and filters out many lightweight objects (Davis, 
1970: 57).
The low altitude defense system (LoADS) is the 
front-running candidate for deployment as an ABM system.
It is designed to be compatible with MX defense (Medalia, 
1981B: 5). Because of its small size, the missile can be
deceptively based in conjunction with any of the modes being 
considered for the MX.^
The Lo a d missile is a single stage missile that 
has an outward appearance similar to that of the Sprint sys­
tem that was dismantled as a result of SALT I. It is approx­
imately half the size of the Sprint and is a solid propel­
lant missile. Clusters of three interceptor missiles are 
bonded into a launcher canister, with each canister having 
is own small phased array radar that is approximately 1/40th 
the size of the phased array radar located at Grand Forks.
The radar system is dormant until it is activated by early 
warning networks. The radar is assisted by optical sensors 
located in satellites, high altitude aircraft, or sounding 
rockets. The radar system utilized is electronically steered 
so time is not lost with a rotating disk antenna (The Hunts­
ville Times, March 8, 1981).
Once a target is spotted and the decoys and gar­
bage are sorted out, computers determine where the hot in­
coming warhead is going, and through an on-board modular 
missile-borne computer, the interceptor is directed toward
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the target and a small nuclear warhead is detonated when 
it reaches the closest point to the incoming warhead. This 
entire engagement takes place in less than ten seconds and 
under ten miles altitude (The Huntsville Times, February 18, 
1981; also see Medalia, 1981B: 5).
The Lo a d s concept has been developed with off-the- 
shelf technology and the components are derivatives of tech­
nology utilized in the Sentinel and Safeguard programs during 
the 1970s. The only exception to this off-the-shelf availa­
bility is the need to harden the components to nuclear effects 
to a greater degree than presently covered by experience 
scenarios. Because of its use of available technology, de­
ployment of the missile system can be made compatible with 
that of the MX. Developmental test data are available that 
will permit the technological development of this hardening 
requirement.
MX Warhead Destructive 
Capabilities
Considerably less than half the present population 
of the world remembers the non-nuclear world. The first 
nuclear device exploded in 1945 produced an explosion of 
19 kilotons (19,000 tons of TNT). Shortly thereafter, two 
bombs, one having a 12.5 KT warhead and the other a 22.0 KT, 
were dropped (Barnaby and Huisken, 1975: 119). By modern
standards of nuclear weapons, those weapons would now be 
considered as tactical rather than strategic.
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The warhead under consideration for the MX is 
security classified but assumed to be in the 300 to 400 
kiloton range (Janes, 1981; 14). The reentry vehicle will 
contain up to ten of these MIRVs. This warhead, identical 
to the Minuteman III, is pre-positioned by the fourth stage 
reentry vehicle and ejected at a predetermined point. This 
process provides the capability to disperse these warheads 
over a "footprint" of approximately 1,000 miles long and 
300 miles wide (Huntsville News, April 29, 1981).
Figure 7 illustrates the direct effects of a one 
megaton and a 25 megaton surface blast (DOD Bulletin CPG 2-lAl, 
June 1973). The range of moderate damage and initial fires 
increases from five to fourteen miles. The figure illustrates 
surface blasts; however, an "air burst" at the appropriate 
altitudes would expand the diameter of the damage area by 
about 50 percent.
The areas of moderate damage and fire ignitions 
are large in either case, ranging from 80 square miles for 
a one megaton surface burst to about 625 square miles for 
a 25 megaton surface burst. The DOD Bulletin states that 
the average city of 100,000 population has an area of about 
25 square miles. This figure indicates that only a few of 
the larger metropolitan areas would require multiple air- 
bursts for widespread damage.
Radiation fallout would occur, assuming 15 mile 
per hour winds, over an approximate area of 60 miles wide
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and 200 miles long. In the event that overlapping fallout 
from several weapons occurred, these fallout hazards would 
extend much further.
Summary
This chapter has described the ICBMs that are 
available to counter the threat to the land-based component 
of the U.S. defensive triad. Two long-range systems are in 
use that have become questionable in terms of the ability to 
survive an incoming attack because of improved Soviet accura­
cies and increased numbers of offensive systems.
The Titan system has been degraded by its corro­
sive liquid fuel system and, in part, by its fixed base de­
ployment mode. Improvements are still being incorporated 
into its guidance and control systems. ,
Minuteman II and Minuteman III are the current 
mainstays in the ICBM defense system. These are solid fuel 
systems that have been deployed since the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. The production programs of both these systems 
are complete and their numbers limited by the pending arms 
limitation agreement.
The purpose of the proposed MX is to alleviate 
the survivability question with its deceptive mobile basing 
concept. The MX will incorporate the latest technologies 
that will make it the most accurate system in the U.S. ICBM 
inventory. The basing mode is controversial and has not 
been selected. An ABM system may be deployed with MX that is 
intended to enhance MX survivability.
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The next chapter is an evaluation and comparison 
of these weapons as an ICBM defensive system. The analysis 
will indicate the deployment problems to be anticipated if 
the MX system is deployed.
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-- - Chapter V Endnotes
^General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs (1980: 27) confirms the new guidance system for
Titan in his report to Congress. He did not mention what 
the improvement was.
2
MX technology was generated by an advance ICBM 
technology program originally proposed to extend the life of 
and increase Minuteman capabilities. In 1971, the Strategic 
Air Command documented the requirement for an advance ICBM. 
The design specification called for a large throw-weight to 
partially correct the asymmetry in throw-weight when com­
pared to the Soviets’ high survivability, increased accuracy, 
and more MIRVs than Minuteman (Medalia, 1981: 1-2). A
review of back issues of Aviation Week and Space Technology 
show that MX site location study contracts were awarded in 
early 1976 and definition studies of the MX flight computer 
and guidance and control systems were awarded in late 1977. 
The full-scale developmental contract for MX was awarded 
in September 1979 (Janes Weapons Systems, 1980).
^LoAD is most effective when considered with the 
mobile basing concept because of the leverage factor. For 
example, if one hot MX is located in one of twenty-three 
horizontal shelters, then theoretically two incoming rounds 
would be required to eliminate each silo. Eliminating the 
properly targeted incoming round with a LoAD would require 
the launching of the third incoming round to destroy the MX. 
Because of the uncertainty of location of the hot MX, there 
is still a question about whether or not the round was 
destroyed.
CHAPTER VI
EVALUATION AND COMPARISON 
OF ALTERNATIVES
Introduction
The preceding chapter described the technical and 
operational characteristics of the U.S. land-based ICBMs.
Two of these. Titan II and Minuteman, are fixed-based and 
have been deployed for a number of years. The proposed 
addition to the land-based system is a mobile concept that 
is dependent upon preservation of location uncertainty of 
the missile in order to enhance survivability. The low 
altitude air defense system that may be deployed in conjunc­
tion with the mobile concept is included. (Table 7, p. 101, 
summarizes these ICBM speficiations).
This chapter evaluates and compares these alterna­
tives in order to identify the trade-offs of various choices 
for retaining the integrity of the defensive triad system. 
The evaluation criteria selected represent the most serious 
concerns about the land-based component of the U.S. defen­
sive triad. These include deterrent potential,
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environmental impacts, vulnerability, verifiability, and 
soical and political impacts. Table 8 identifies specific 
measures of each of these criteria.
The purpose of the large land-based systems is to 
contribute to the overall prevention of attack on the U.S. 
Since the level of deterrence created by a particular wea­
pon system cannot be measured exactly, the factors that con­
tribute to international stability are evaluated. The basing- 
mode contribution is dependent upon the site's being in a 
fixed location or a multiple protective (mobile) shelter 
configuration. Reliability is measured by the ability of 
the system to perform when it is needed. Accuracy is mea­
sured by the circular error probable (CEP) factor. A weapon 
system is considered accurate if the CEP is 0.4 or less. 
Utility is measured according to how long the weapon is 
expected to have a useful life. Normally the expected life 
of a weapon system is fifteen to twenty years.
Environmental costs and risks are measured by the 
land and water resource requirements. Environmental impacts 
are measured by the additional amount of land required for 
a deployment, the length of time to restore or repair environ­
mental damage caused by site construction, and the amounts 
of additional water and electricity required.
Vulnerability of the fixed-based ICBM is the issue 
that brings up the necessity of deploying additional weapons. 
Weapon system vulnerability is greater when it is fixed or 
in a permanent position than when it has a mobile capability.
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TABLE 8 
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
Criteria Measures
Deterrent Potential
1. Does it contribute 
to international 
stability?
2. Is it reliable?
Is it accurate?
4. Does the weapon 
have long-term 
utility?
Environmental Cost- 
Risk
5. What will be the 
land requirements?
6. What will be the 
extent of land 
modification?
a. A weapon system is stable if it 
does not present a first-strike 
threat, measured by its age, 
degree of technological sophisti­
cation (e.g., MIRV capacity), and 
whether it is detectable (i.e., 
its flight time and trajectory).
b. A weapon system is unstable if it 
is not susceptible to a first 
strike, measured by its mobility 
and silo hardening.
a. A weapon system is reliable if it 
has been tested within three years 
and it has current logistics 
support.
a. A weapon system is accurate if it 
has a CEP of 0.4 or less.
a. A weapon system has long-term 
utility if it has at least 15 
years of active service remaining.
a. A weapon system has high land re­
quirements if more than 5,000 
acres are required.
b. A weapon system has low land re­
quirements if less than 5,000 
acres are required.
a. A weapon system has a high degree 
of land modificatio if the dis­
turbed land cannot be restored 
during the lifetime of the system.
b. A weapon system has low land modi­
fication if the land can be re­
stored within the lifetime of the 
system.
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TABLE 8— Continued
Criteria Measures
Environmental Costs/ 
Risks (continued)
7. How much water 
will be required?
Vulnerability
8. Can the system 
survive an enemy 
attack?
10.
a.
b.
b.
Verifiability
9. Can the weapn sys­
tem be verified by 
existing technol­
ogies (national 
technological 
verification)?
Social and Political 
Costs/Risks
Is the weapon 
system politically 
acceptable?
11. Is the weapon 
system socially 
acceptable?
A weapon system his high water re­
quirements if the demands are a 
large percentage of remaining 
supplies.
A weapon system has low water re­
quirements if its demand are a 
small percentage of remaining 
supplies.
Survivability of a weapons system 
increases with hardened silos 
(3,000 psi or more)
Survivability decreases if the 
weapon system is perceived to be 
a significant threat to the enemy.
Survivability increases if the 
weapons system is mobile.
A weapon system can be verified 
if it is fixed based.
A weapon system can be verified 
if it is observable at an assembly 
or cluster area, or if observation 
points are used.
A weapon system is politically 
acceptable depending on the degree 
of opposition from major politicians 
— e.g., governors in affected 
areas, key congressional committee 
chairmen, and executive office 
officials.
a. A weapons system is socially accept­
able if it is supported by public 
opinion both regionally and 
nationally.
a.
b.
a.
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The verification criterion has been the most 
difficult issue to negotiate in strategic arms limitation. 
Verification is measured by whether the site is known. 
Fixed-based systems are verifiable.
Social and political acceptability are measured 
by the support of the system by public opinion and by congres­
sional opinion. This criterion is measured by the results of 
available survey data.
In explanation of the terms appearing in this evalu­
ation, stability and vulnerability are not synonymous terms. 
Stability of a weapon system is the perception of the threat 
of the system to an adversary. Vulnerability of the system 
is the susceptibility of the system to attack. For example, 
the SLBM would be considered unstable and invulnerable because 
of the difficulty in locating the submarine (launcher). Sur­
vivability and stability are at odds. Survivable systems 
create unstable perceptions to an adversary. Survivable sys­
tems enhance retaliatory strikes. Credibility is a percep­
tion of the system that is related to reliability, accuracy, 
and the general belief that the system will perform as it should.
Evaluation of Alternatives
Common Fixed-Based Criteria
The fixed-based ICBM systems have certain evaluation 
criteria that may be evaluated concurrently. These common 
characteristics, in this evaluation, are enviornmental impacts, 
vulnerability, and verifiability.
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Environmental Impacts
The environmental impacts are not considered to 
be applicable to the Titan II and Minuteman. These systems 
have been deployed for so long that environmental modifica­
tions to retain, modernize, or replace them with an equivalent 
system would not be required. In the event that a replacement 
program were initiated in the same deployment areas, the de­
mand for additional natural resources would be negligible 
(Air Force Environmental Final Impact Analysis, December 1980; 
vol. IV— 110-17).
Vulnerability
Minuteman is more highly vulnerable than Titan because 
of its reliability as a system and because of its fixed-basing 
mode. These characteristics would cause war planners to place 
priority on Minuteman targets rather than Titan II.
Improved Soviet missile accuracy is a threat even 
though the Minuteman system is in a hardened underground 
launch complex. Intelligence estimates of the survivability 
of this system vary. The Strategic Air Command estimates 
vulnerability for the Minuteman (due to the threat) to be 
approximately 40 percent (Daily Oklahoman, August 21, 1980); 
former Secretary of Defense Brown estimates it to be 90 per­
cent (FY 81 Report to Congress); and incumbent Defense Secre­
tary Weinberger contends that it is 90 to 95 percent (Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, May 11, 1981; also see Nitze, 1979: 
24-25).!
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The Minuteman vulnerability issue has been in 
question for the last ten years.^ Questions concerning 
accuracy, reliability, timing, and fratricide effects are 
the primary issues raised in the debate. Fratricide is the 
destruction of one or more incoming warheads by the prema­
ture detonation of another.
Those who question the vulnerability argument do 
so from the basis that accuracy and reliability cannot be 
known because the ICBMs have not been fired from tactical 
silos and flow over actual trajectories. Because these ICBMs 
have not been fired over the North Pole, the effects of the 
magnetic fields on the missile trajectory and bias factors 
cannot be known. The timing of the warhead detonation can­
not be accomplished with the precision required to prevent 
fratricide from occurring (Gold, 1981: 7-9).
The U.S. technical community recognizes that these 
problems exist but believes that the technology exists to 
place two warheads on a single target and make them work 
(Gray, 1981: 856). Gray contends that the Soviets can or
have already solved these problems. The Soviets developed 
the MIRV technology and achieved an accuracy factor of 0.1 CEP 
or less. The timing, fratricide, and bias problems can pos­
sibly be solved also. Vulnerability can be reduced by har­
dening of the silo that consists of sheltering with reinforced 
concrete and other protective measures for electronic cabling 
and components. For example, standard reinforced concrete
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construction or corrugated steel construction is adequate 
to build shelters at selected overpressures from 50 psi to 
3,000 psi. The technology, design, and construction exper­
ience exist to build special shock-isolated shelters up to 
about 3,000 psi or one and one-half crater radii (Donley,
1979: 149; also see Medalia, 1981: 15). Some sources agree
that the existing silos are hardened to 2,000 psi (Gold,
1981: 94). Gray also indicates that a 2,000 psi overblast
capability is built into existing silos (1981: 856).
Although additional protective measures can be 
incorporated, Minuteman is considered to have a high degree 
of vulnerability. This assessment is based on Minuteman's 
basing mode and the accuracies of the Soviet threat.
Verifiability
Fixed-based launch sites are verifiable by satellite 
and intelligence networks with a high degree of certainty. 
Doubts relative to photographic verification capabilities 
were dispelled in 1981 by the television media showing how 
NASA examined the missing heat-shield tiles on the belly of
the space shuttle Columbia. This examination was accomplished 
while the shuttle was in orbit (over 100 miles high) and on 
tiles less than one foot square in area.
The number of fixed-base silos, according to the 
SALT II treaty, is equal to the number of launchers counted 
for purposes of verification. The number is directly and con­
tinuously countable by national technical means (Fiscal Year
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1981 Arms Control Impact Statements, February 1981: 63).
Fixed-based systems have a high degree of confidence that 
verification can be accomplished.
Titan II
Deterrent Potential 
Stability
Stability of a weapon system depends on how threaten­
ing it is to the other side. There is an inherent stability 
factor that accompanies the long-range ICBM. This stability 
factor is attributed to the fact that these missiles are 
fired deep from within the enemy territory. They have a high 
trajectory and relatively long flight time (up to thirty 
minutes) that make detection more probable. The flight time 
decreases the possibilities of a surprise attack. Thus, the 
ICBM stability would rank higher than that of an SLBM which 
could be fired from relatively short distances, and higher 
than the cruise missile, which could fly at tree-top levels 
and thus not be detectable.
Titan II is considered to be a stable system be­
cause its permanent location makes verification easier. Also, 
it is vulnerable due to Soviet missile accuracy. The Titan 
system causes almost no concern in the international environ­
ment because of the Soviet perception of the deployed system. 
The Soviets demonstrated this lack of concern when they re­
fused during the SALT II negotiations to consider heavy ICBM
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systems. The attempt was made to use Titan II as a bargaining 
chip during the SALT I negotiations. The proposed trade-off 
was to dismantle the Titan class of ICBMS as additional SLBM 
launchers were constructed. The U.S. strategy was to freeze 
SLBMs but the Soviets rejected the proposal. The Soviet 
intent was to defer scrapping older ICBM launchers while 
its submarine construction program continued. The Soviets 
did not want the older Titan replaced (Smith, 1980: 381-97).
The Titan basing-mode contribution is very low because of 
the basing mode and the Soviet perception of the system.
The Titan II system has not been flight tested 
since 1976 (Huntsville Times, November 2, 1979). Subsystem's 
testing was conducted for a short period of time but was 
halted because production facilities were closed down in the 
early 1970s and adequate logistics support does not exist 
for such purposes (Daily Oklahoman, September 20, 1980).
Flight tests demonstrate weapon systems' present capabilities 
and reflect operational degradation due to component aging. 
Because of the lack of flight test data and limited logis­
tics support, the reliability of the system is assessed to 
be low level compared to systems which have been recently 
tested.
The Titan II, deployed in December 1963, is not 
considered to be an accurate system when related to 1981 
capabilities. The published circular error probable (CEP) 
value is 0.5 (see figure 2, page 9). This 0.5 number
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indicates that half of any given number of warheads will be 
delivered within a one-half nautical mile radius. Modifi­
cations to the guidance and control system were incorporated 
to improve the accuracy factor in 1980 (Janes, 1980: 14).
Improvements to the CEP cannot be accurately assessed in the 
absence of actual flight test data. The Titan II is con­
sidered to be inaccurate.
Classes of weapons do not retain their utility for 
all time. Utilities change as strategic weapons’ emphases 
change (Gray, 1980: 2), Utility of the system is the ex­
pected remaining useful life of the system. The life expec­
tancy of a weapon system is normally fifteen to twenty years. 
The Titan system had already been in the field eighteen years. 
Titan utility is also assessed to be a low value.
Social and Political 
Impacts
The Titan system has aroused both social and politi­
cal concerns because of the increasing number of accidents.
The liquid fuels utilized in the system, toxic aerozine-50 
and nitrogen tetroxide, are highly corrosive and ignite on 
contact with each other (Janes, 1980: 14). These corrosive
properties deteriorate the gaskets and seals that cause leaks 
and subsequent fires. There were five major accidents and 
125 minor incidents between 1970 and 1980 (Christian Science 
Monitor, January 9, 1981). These occurrences have happened 
at all of the sites. The latest accident occurred near Little
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Rock, Arkansas in August 1980. This accident was caused by 
carelessness when an airman dropped a socket wrench that rup­
tured the fuel tanks. The subsequent explosion blew off a 
750 ton sliding door, and the nuclear warhead was thrown 
several hundred feet away. The accident caused the evacua­
tion of 14,00 residents (Christian Science Monitor, September 22, 
1980.
Air Force Secretary Mark issued a statement follow­
ing the accident that concluded that the weapon system was 
safe, supportable, and reliable. As a result, the Air Force 
was instructed to keep the missiles on alert and operational 
indefinitely (Huntsville Times, November 22, 1979).
On a deployed system, localized public opinion 
usually runs high against the weapon when accidents occur. 
Following the Little Rock incident, public interest groups 
organized a campaign in Tucson, Arizona to have Titan removed 
from Davis-Monthan AFB. These groups further stimulated con­
gressional debate over the safety and effectiveness of the 
system. These interest groups have included the notion in 
their argument that because of the location of the missile 
site, Tucson is a sponge for incoming missiles. County gov­
ernment officials countered this argument with the idea that 
they also do not like having the missiles located there, but 
they really are not capable of determining the national 
defense needs (Daily Oklahoman, September 25, 1980).
Public and congressional opinions are considered 
to be low in opposition to the system. The opposition
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appears to stem from the areas where the system is deployed 
as opposed to a national concern. Political opposition fol­
lowing these accidents seems to be elevated only to the degree 
necessary to satisfy the constituency; then it goes away.
The impact of these groups on removal of these systems was 
negative because the missiles are still deployed (Panofsky,
1982: 50).
Minuteman
Deterrent Potential 
Stability
There are two configurations of the Minuteman de­
ployed in the early 1970s that form the backbone of the cur­
rent defensive triad. Minuteman II, the older of the two, 
contains a single warhead delivery capability, and Minuteman III 
has a MIRV capability. Since the systems are similar except 
for the warhead, they will be considered collectively.
Minuteman II, like Titan, is considered to be a 
stable system because of its fixed basing. Minuteman III has 
the stability characteristics of the other fixed-based sys­
tems , but the MIRV warhead capability causes it to be viewed 
as an unstable system. The fundamental characteristic of 
MIRV is its ability to deliver different trajectories (Green­
wood, 1975: 1). Maximum separation of these deployed war­
heads is approximately 300 to 400 miles in down-range separa­
tion. The instability is generated by the potential
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destructiveness of a single target and its potential to 
exhaust a missile defense system because of numbers of RVs. 
Thus, although Minuteman is fixed-based, it is considered 
unstable because of the MIRV capability.
Minuteman is considered to be a reliable weapon 
system. There is a higher probability that it will perform 
when required than there is with the Titan. Approximately 
90 percent of the Minuteman ICBM force is on constant daily 
alert as compared with 55 percent of the SLBMs and 30 percent 
of the bombers (Sunday Oklahoman, September 21, 1980). Relia- 
bility is further increased by annual test firings. Even 
though production facilities for Minuteman were phased out 
in 1978, logistics support is maintained for the system 
(Robinson, 1979: 180). The continuation of the flight
tests and maintaining a current logistics support program 
suggest that the weapon is reliable.
Minuteman is considered to be an accurate system 
because the published CEP is 0.1 for Minuteman III and 0.30 
for Minuteman II. Modernization programs are in progress to 
upgrade the guidance and control systems (Janes, 1980: 15).
General David Jones confirms the modernization program but 
indicates that it is directed to improvements in internal 
power and the command and control communication links (1980: 
27) .
In terms of utility, Minuteman is considered to 
have at least ten years of remaining useful life. Dependent
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upon a number of variables, such as basic system design, 
propulsion system, perceived threat, and operational 
characteristics, this useful life can be either extended or 
cut short. Gray indicates that technical solutions to de­
fense problems occur in twenty-year cycles (1981: 856).
Utilizing these parameters, Minuteman could be expected to 
remain a credible system until the late 1980s.
Social and Political 
Impacts
Review of literature and personal interviews have 
not indicated a social impact similar to that experienced 
by Titan. This observation may be attributed to the low pro­
file maintained by the Minuteman deployment. The solid pro­
pellant rocket motors are more stable in nature, and the 
published accident rates are virtually zero. The Air Force 
stated in its December 1980 Environmental Impact Statement 
(volume 1: 1-48-1-4 9) that there have been no ignitions or
liquid fuel leaks in the history of M i n u t e m a n . 4 There is 
very little opposition to the missile located in the Great 
Plains area. Dr. Colin Gray (Director of National Security 
Studies, Hudson Institute) writes that the Air Force has an 
almost embarrassing degree of support around existing Minute- 
man fields from the local farming population that act as un­
paid security forces (Christian Science Monitor, August 8, 
1980). Some of the silos are located in wheat fields, and 
the farmers have questioned people being in the immediate 
area.
140
Politically, the vulnerability of Minuteman has 
created an increased interest in the system. In June 1980 
the Senate Armed Services Committee considered authorizing 
100 multiple warhead missiles in addition to the 550 Minute- 
man Ills that are already deployed (Sunday Oklahoman, June 15, 
1980). Senators Gordon Humphrey and Harrison Schmidt, in 
a joint news release (June 13, 1980), contend that this extra 
deployment would signal the Soviets that the U.S. is begin­
ning to reverse its strategic decline. This proposal v;as 
opposed in the hearings by Secretary of Defense Brown and 
Air Force Chief of Staff Allen on the basis that Minuteman 
will be 90 percent vulnerable during the 1982 to 1983 period 
(Committee on Armed Services Hearings, June 5, 1980; 2649).
The resultant benefit would be 10 percent more warheads at 
a cost of $45 million.
Thus, Minuteman is considered socially acceptable 
based on the fact that there is virtually no public opposi­
tion to Minuteman. Political impact is also low. This low 
impact is based on the point that Minuteman is presently 
deployed, it is a low profile system, and it is not politi­
cally controversial.
MX
Deterrent Potential 
Stability
The threat raised by the accuracy and numbers of 
new Soviet weapons is that anything in a known fixed position
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could be destroyed. This fact suggests that providing a 
survivable ICBM force would require a combination of mobil­
ity and concealment. The MX has evolved as a land-based 
mobile system whose position is concealed among multiple, 
widely dispersed, and horizontal protective shelters, most 
of which are empty at one time (MX Education Bureau, November
1980) : 3). The basing-mode contribution of MX to stability
is a divided issue and there are valid arguments for both 
sides.
The rationale for the support of MX and the design 
of the system are such that an attack against the United 
States would be more unlikely once MX is deployed. By keep­
ing the location of any one missile secret, the MX will make 
the cost of launching an attack against the U.S. extraordi­
narily high with little chance of success. Consequently, 
the mobile system will be an effective deterrent to attack 
(MX Education Bureau, March 1981: 4; also see Gray, 1981:
756).
Gray (1979: 67-68) writes that the time is long
past when consideration should be given to decisions that 
halt or delay weapon programs on the allegation that they 
would be provocative in Soviet eyes. The Soviets have con­
tinued with the development and deployment of counter-silo 
capability weapons, and Gray contends that there is no evi­
dence to suggest that there has been any change in their 
belief that nuclear wars can occur and are winnable. Gray
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concludes that the MX is essential to the U.S. if it is to 
maintain an adequate strategic force.
As an advocate for MX deployment. Gray contends 
that MX will be a stabilizing factor that will deter the 
Soviets from pressing further down the counterforce path. 
Suitably deployed with a possible preferential terminal bal­
listic missile defense, the Soviets could not profitably 
target MX. Since the MX cannot be effectively defeated, it 
may give them an incentive to negotiate a draw-down in 
offensive systems.
The decision to proceed with the MX will advise 
the Soviets that no gain will be realized in the pursuit of 
strategic advantage (Ulsamer, 1979: 39). Senator John
Stennis, chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services 
(June 5, 1980), stated that the decision to proceed with MX 
is very important in that the Soviets must understand where 
the U.S. is going with the MX. This understanding of the 
importance of communication to deterrence supports proposi­
tion four (chapter III, p. 81) that states the need for 
adversaries to inform each other of their defensive posture 
through a succession of signals.
Under-Secretary of Defense for Research and Engi­
neering Perry (1979: 1285) notes that MX is a stabilizing
factor in that it is advantageous to the U.S. to have the 
same counter-silo capability as the Soviets. If the Soviets 
perceive their ICBMs being made vulnerable by MX they may
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be motivated to revert to smaller mobile ICBMs simialr to 
the MX. The smaller Soviet missiles would be less threaten­
ing to the U.S.; thus, stability for both the superpowers 
would be enhanced. Ulsamer, editor of Aviation Week and 
Space Technology (April 1979: 62-63), supports Perry's idea
that a smaller Soviet mobile deployment would contribute 
to stability (also see Fiscal Year 1982 Arms Control Impact 
Statements, February 1981: vii).
Melvin Price, chairman of the Committee on Armed 
Services, U.S. House of Representatives, advised President 
Carter by letter (April 24, 1980) that he considered that 
an MX deployment would negate the destabilizing impact of 
Soviet ICBMs. The system's characteristics of survivability 
and durability make a Soviet preemptive strike a doubtful 
tactic.
Those who oppose the MX deployment contend that it 
will cause instability in the international environment.
Any deployment of MX that requires thousands of Soviet nuclear 
explosions to overcome it would obviously increase damage to 
the U.S. in case of war. MX concepts emphasize the exhaustion 
of the opponent's forces through large-scale attacks against 
the U.S. The U.S. would become a "warhead sponge" and an 
incentive for the Soviet Union to acquire enough missiles 
to destroy every site where a mobile missile might be located 
(Defense Monitor, August 1977: 7; Collins, 1980).
The MX concept presents a new element in strategic 
thinking according to the editors of the Christian Science
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Monitor (August 11, 1980). Nixon had formerly said that 
the U.S. would never acquire a capability that the Soviets 
could misconstrue; however, the MX because of its range, 
accuracy, and number of warheads appears to the Soviets to 
be capable of carrying out a first strike against the Soviets 
(Defense Monitor, August 1977: 7). This perception by the
Soviets will create an unstable atmosphere under which they 
will then deploy their own mobile missiles.
The deterrent provided by the current U.S. stra­
tegic triad is credible to the Soviets according to Charles 
Yost (1980: 23).^ The first strike capability that is now 
perceived as being so destabilizing to the U.S. will be more 
destabilizing to the Soviets if an equal number of MXs are 
deployed. Yost thinks that U.S. deployment will be more de­
stabilizing because the Soviets have more than two-thirds 
of their strategic arsenal concentrated in land-based systems.
The deployment of the MX will not contribute to 
the stability of the U.S. deterrent, but will encourage a 
preemptive Soviet strike according to Kistiakowsky and 
Scoville (Christian Science MOnitor, September 11, 1980).
In their view the MX will be perceived as an intention of 
a U.S. preemptive strike, regardless of which presidential 
administration claims it is for retaliatory purposes only.
The stability factor may have best been summarized 
by Admiral Henry Eccles (R) when he wrote that the nature 
and degree to which the MX system would influence Soviet
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action is purely conjecture (Christian Science Monitor,
April 3, 1980). He opposes the MX deployment on the basis 
that the present strategic inventories of both sides are 
complex and present enough danger without a deployment whose 
accomplishments are questionable.
The arguments on both sides of the mobile-basing 
issue contain valid points. Those who support MX as a 
stabilizing factor contend that Soviet perception of the 
proposed deployment should not be a consideration in the de­
ployment decision. An additional advantage to the proposed 
deployment is portrayed as being a communication to the Soviet 
Union that no gain will be realized from the pursuit of addi­
tional strategic advantage. A final point for support of 
the stability of MX is that its deployment will force the 
Soviets to deploy warheads with smaller megatonnage capacity 
to launch a successful first strike.
The opponents of MX are of the opinion that MX may 
be perceived as having a preemptive strike capability which 
may trigger a first strike on the U.S. The proposed MX de­
ployment could cause the Soviets to deploy a mobile system 
of their own that would increase the instability that pre­
sently exists.
There is validity to both sides of this debate.
It is impossible to say with certainty that the MX will have 
a stabilizing or destabilizing impact. Based on the arguments 
just summarized, MX will be classified as unstable because it 
can be perceived as being a first strike system.
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Although reliability data on the MX missile are 
not available, the missile is generally considered reliable 
because the design is based on proven concept (Air Force 
Environmental Impact Statement), December 1980, volume I; 
1-46). MX, like Minuteman III, uses three solid-propellant 
booster stages and a small liquid-propellant post-boost rocket 
engine that have proven themselves with time. The system will 
be logistically supported and will have an active flight test 
program. Flight tests are scheduled to start in late 1982 
(MX Education Bureau, November 1980: 10). Thus, the MX is
considered to be reliable.
Accuracy
The MX will be the most accurate ICBM deployed by 
the U.S. to date as exemplified in table 7, page 101. The 
accuracy factor is based on the fact that it will contain the 
very latest technological capability. The guidance system 
contains an inertial reference sphere that provides a steady 
stream of information on the missile's movements during 
flight. The 0.05 CEP factor represents a target miss dis­
tance of approximately 200 to 300 feet for half of a given 
quantity of missiles from a distance of about 7,500 miles.
The MX will be deployed for at least the next 
thirty years. This time is not unreasonable, particularly 
when compared with Titan that has been in the field for 
eighteen years and Minuteman that has been deployed for 
ten years. Credibility of the system will increase with
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time as flight test data are collected. The Soviets will 
no doubt monitor the test firings from Vandenberg to 
Kwajalien when they begin in late 1982. The Soviet moni­
toring program will improve the credibility of the system.
Utility of the system may be extended through 
application of technological modification. An advance 
development of a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MARV) or a 
precision guided reentry vehicle (PGRV) is in process. The 
intent of both programs is to provide, as a long-term hedge, 
timely options to respond to Soviet developments which may 
threaten viability of U.S. ballistic missiles (Fiscal Year 
1982, Arms Control Impact Statements, February 1981: 51).
ACDA indicates that there are no current plans to incorporate 
these capabilities into the MX. The utility of MX is assessed 
at a high level.
Environmental Impacts
Construction of the proposed MX shelter system and 
its connecting road system is one of the largest programs 
ever contemplated for national defense. The preferred 
Nevada-Utah deployment will be dispersed over 8,500 square 
miles with approximately 25 miles being fenced and excluded 
from public access. The area will contain approximately 
miles of new roads of which 1,400 will be paved and all will 
be open for public access (Department of Air Force EIS, 
December 1980: Summary, 3). The land to be withdrawn from 
public use in Nevada and Utah approximates 2.5 acres per
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shelter. The total land withdrawn from public use in the 
Nevada-Utah area amounts to that required for the grazing 
of ten to twenty-five head of cattle or sheep per year.
The federal government owns more than 90 percent of the land 
considered in the Nevada and Utah basing area (Rycroft and 
Monaghan, 1981: 40).
In terms of additional land required for the MX 
deployment has a high impact. The land includes more than
5,000 acres and is largely publicly owned. No additional 
land would need to be acquired for other existing ICBM-basing 
modifications.
The Air Force recognizes that the tentative deploy­
ment area in Nevada-Utah will be physically changed. Second­
ary effects to the natural environment will result from 
accelerated wind and water erosion, sedimentation, soil com­
paction, and altered surface water flow patterns. The natural 
recovery to the vegetation is not anticipated within the life­
time of the MX project (Air Force Environmental Impact Statement, 
December 1980, Summary: 17). The Air Force plans to initiate
programs to accelerate the revegetation process in the affected 
areas by seeding, mulching, irrigating-minimizing repeated 
disturbance, and reapplying top soil.
Restorability
Restorability is a long-term, high impact issue 
because of the length of time required. The highways to be 
constructed will be available for public use except during
missile movement. A salient factor not contained in the 
Air Force EIS is that the highways to be constructed are 
permanent. These permanent roads will make many areas that 
are now somewhat secluded grazing lands accessible to more 
hunters and sightseers with their four-wheel-drive vehicles. 
The counterargument to this point is that there will only 
be a relatively small number of valleys (twenty-five to 
thirty) involved.
Resources Required
Almost every major decision in the West has been 
predicated on water availability (Boslough, 1981: 28).
There are two public work efforts scheduled to be launched 
in the western United States during the 1980s. These devel­
opments will be competing for the resources available.^
Both will place demands on human resources, water, and 
energy. Rycroft and Monaghan (1981: 1-2) contend that these
programs are being pursued independently by different federal 
agencies with no regard for the cumulative impacts of the 
projects.
Energy development, the proposed MX deployment, 
and the growth of existing industries will be competing head- 
on for limited manpower, capital, and construction materials 
(Salisbury, 1981: 10). Salisbury cites a Western governor's
office study that projects the growth due to energy projects 
to increase from 147,000 to 247,000 people in five years, 
with MX adding an additional 28,000 workers by 1986. The
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study projects a demand of 128,000 new jobs by 1986, growing 
to 2.4 million by 1990.
Rycroft and Monaghan (p. 35) indicate an inflow 
of 80,000 people for the construction period, with an addi­
tional 60,000 during the operational period. The total in­
flux is projected to peak at about 103,000 people between 
1986 and 1989.
The Air Force Environmental Impact Statement 
(December 1980: Summary, 30) estimates 31,000 would be
directly employed during the peak of project activity from 
1986 to 1988 with a long-term employment level of 13,200 
starting in 1991. The EIS includes the totals for competing 
developments and indicates that the cumulative impacts of MX 
and other large developments could produce as many as 77,000 
jobs during the period.
Each of three projections of the numbers required 
is different. An errata sheet published after the EIS was 
distributed shows different personnel requirements from those 
shown above. The estimates are shown to illustrate the point 
that the influx of people cannot be precisely predicted 
except to say that it will be large in comparison to the 
present number.
The debate concerning availability of the neces­
sary skills and crafts to deploy the MX is pertinent. Compe­
tition will exist in construction skills for laborers or 
craftsmen, such as carpenters or electricians. The competition
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argument for an already acute shortage of engineers and 
management capabilities may not be as valid. The construc­
tion program will be managed by the people already employed 
within the Department of Defense (Graham and Nitze, 1979: 
135). The Army Corps of Engineers will manage the construc­
tion phase, while the overall mechanical management and de­
ployment will be managed by the U.S. Air Force from Norton 
Air Base.
Water
Water availability and the total demands and needs 
are potentially the most controversial public policy ques­
tions facing the West today (Devine, Ballard, and White, 
1980: 231). The Air Force (Environmental Impact Statement,
December, 1980: volume 1, 1-40) depicts the water require­
ment for the eight-year construction period to be 78,000 
to 130,000 acre feet. The state of Utah projected about 
the same requirement for the construction period (Rycroft 
and Monaghan, 1981: 43).
The existing surface water allocations in the 
Great Basin area are complete (Ballard, 1981) . Boslough 
(1981: 26-37) indicates that the Colorado River will not
have capacity to provide additional water for deployment 
purposes. These water allocations can be purchased from 
the farmers who own them. The problems caused by withdrawal 
of water from agricultural uses will require political 
resolution (Ballard, 1981) .
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The greatest problem in the West is what 
hydrologists call water mining (Boslough, 1981: 35).
Water is pumped out of the ground faster than nature can 
replenish it. According to Boslough, the general worry is 
not ^  the water runs out, but when.^
The Air Force (volume IV, part I, 4.23-4.26) 
recognizes that the most significant impact is the effect 
on ground water availability for competing water users. The 
lowering of water levels in existing wells may be long-term 
or short-term, affecting ground water availability through 
increased pumping costs or affecting the requirement for deep­
ening existing wells. Additionally, the changes to the well 
depths could reduce natural spring flows and cause a general 
deterioration of water quality.
In both Nevada and Utah, approval of the state 
engineer is required to pump ground water. Predicated on 
existing data (data source not referenced), the annual 
ground water recharge capacity is fully appropriate, and 
none is expected to be available for MX consumption (Air 
Force Environmental Impact Statement, 1980: Summary, 10-13).
Estimates of consumption during the life span of the program 
go as high as 121 billion gallons (Rycroft and Monaghan,
1981: 14).
The Air Force has considered the following broad 
alternatives to alleviate the water problems;
-Obtain water from outside sources such as the 
Colorado River and the city of Las Vegas.
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-Incorporate water-saving features into base 
and support facility design.
-Use treated waste water for irrigation and other 
nonpotable uses.
-Utilize infiltration basins to return treated 
waste water to ground water reservoirs.
-Purchase water rights from existing sources.
The Air Force does not provide specific details on how to 
implement these alternatives. Boslough (1981: 26-37) indi­
cates that the Colorado River will not have capacity to pro­
vide any water.
Energy Resources
The MX program will require electrical power and 
fuels for the construction period and in the longer thirty- 
year operational period. These demands for energy come at 
a period during which energy supplies are diminishing and 
competition from other anticipated developments is increasing. 
Energy in the form of electrictiy, gasoline, and diesel fuels 
is the primary requirement for MX. The peak construction 
demand for electricity by the MX project is estimated to be 
150 MW annually with a peak operation demand projected-'.at 
180 MX. There is a construction operational period overlap 
in which the demand would be about 275 MW (Rycroft and 
Monaghan, 1981: 50; also see Air Force Impact Statement:
volume IV, part II, 4-569; also see MX Education Bureau,
1981: 7).
The U.S. Air Force (Environmental Impact Statement, 
December 1980: vol. IV, part II, 456) contends that the
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induced effects of MX on the electrical energy situation will 
not place any new demands other than those new generation 
systems which have already been planned. Construction of 
the necessary distribution system will create a temporarily 
disruptive effect with the extensive installation of under­
ground cables to each of the clusters. The requirement for 
electrical energy is to be coordinated with the existing 
utilities and will insure minimum impact. Rycroft and 
Monaghan (1981: 50) take exception to the claim by the Air
Force that electrical energy requirements have been coordi­
nated with the existing utilities. They quote an energy 
requirement study conducted by Fugro National, Inc., which 
states that MX requirements had not been included in the 
local utilities forecasts for the 1980s. The state of Utah 
MX Project Office verified the point that the electrical needs 
of MX had not been included in the state or local power pro­
jections for the 80s (Interview, September 24, 1981).
The requirement for petroleum products, including 
gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil, is 175 million gallons per 
year during construction and 60 million gallons annually 
during operation (Air Force Environmental Impact Statement : 
volume I, part III’, 4-569; also see Gold, 1981: 166). The
Air Force estimates that 42 percent of the projected consump­
tion in 1985 for Nevada-Utah will be the induced requirements 
of MX (also see MX Education Bureau, 1981B: 7). These
demands peak during the construction phase and diminish to
155
about 11 percent during the operational phase. Fuel 
allocations, in addition to the environmental impacts caused 
by the construction of the added facilities, will require 
adjustment in accordance with the Emergency Petroleum Act 
of 1973. These allocations freeze supplier-purchaser rela­
tionships as of some base period; however, they may be ad­
justed on the basis of dramatic population increases.
The authors of the Air Force study contend that 
a favorable impact may occur as a result of these energy 
requirements. Detailed studies are being conducted by the 
Department of Defense to look at possible solar technologies, 
wind, and biomass technologies such as alcohol and methane 
production (MX Education Bureau, 1981B; 7). Perry stated
in his testimony before the Armed Services (May 1, 1980) 
that money was included for research for these solar 
technologies.
The proposed MX deployment in the Nevada and Utah 
Great Basin area will cause impacts in the environment and 
on natural resources. Damage caused by construction of the 
interconnecting roads and launch shelters will require more 
than thirty years to restore them to their present condition; 
however, steps are proposed to assist and accelerate the 
process. Questions regarding surface water allocations and 
ground water availability will require resolution. Energy 
sources for electrictiy, gasoline, and diesel fuels will 
require resolution. Alternate forms of energy sources may
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be developed as a result of the deployment developmental 
programs. The influx of people required to deploy MX will 
necessitate federal funds for impact assitance. These envi­
ronmental problems are significant, but satisfactory solutions 
may be found for them.
Vulnerability
The design characteristics of the mobile concept 
enhance the survivability of the MX. The horizontal basing 
mode provides the least vulnerable deployment because of the 
speed at which it can be moved from one MPS to another (MX 
Education Bureau, 1980A: 5; also see Perry, 1980: 17).
As previously stated, each of the twenty-three horizontally 
based shelters can be visited and the simulated loading- 
unloading operation can be carried out in twelve hours.
The MX is vulnerable while the missile is on it 
transporter, outside its shelter, and in transit between 
shelters. Deployment sites located at greater distances 
from the coast provide additional reaction time to overcome 
this problem. The Air Force Environmental Impact Statement 
(December 1980: volume V, 5-8 and 5-9) includes the idea
that potential Soviet technological advances over the next 
three decades could produce a boost-phase interceptor 
(launched from a submarine) to overtake the MX after it has 
been launched. The boost-phase interceptor's success will 
depend on its location and that of the MX launchers. This 
condition is minimized by placing the MX in the proposed 
Nevada and Utah inland locations.
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Preservation of missile location uncertainty 
demands a new technology for protection of the missile that 
is based on deception and decreases its vulnerability (Office 
of Technology Assessment, 1981; 4). Secrecy of location
of the hot missile is an essential aspect for the surviva­
bility of the MX. The detachable transporter facilitates 
maintenance of this secrecy. An MX simulator can be manu­
factured that produces the identical missile profile and re­
flective image; however, the detachable transporter does not 
have to be simulated and can move freely about the linear 
or loop road.
Shelter spacing also decreases the vulnerability 
of the system. The shelters are spaced about one mile apart 
since the shelter can be destroyed by a direct hit. This 
spacing precludes the destruction of two MXs with one incom­
ing round.
MX vulnerability is directly related to its causing 
the most unstable deterrent situation. It will be the most 
vulnerable during its construction and early phase of deploy­
ment (Rycroft and Monaghan, 1980; 5). The deployment schedule
now has an initial operational capability date of July 1986, 
but this date is totally dependent upon the selection of 
sites for deployment, the legal problems in land acquisition, 
and the public acceptance of the deployment. Ms. Chayes 
(May 1, 1980: 41-42), in the House Committee on Armed Services
Hearings, states that the initial operational capability date
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can be moved up approximately one year with additional money 
if the land acquisition process is fully streamlined and pro­
duction decisions are made without a flight-testing program. 
She is not concerned about court litigation resulting from 
the Air Force Environmental Impact Statement, but she is con­
cerned for the time the congressional committees take to con­
sider the withdrawal of public lands to go'-with the preferred 
deployment sites in Nevada-Utah.^
Vulnerability can be reduced by hardening to the
3,000 psi overblast limit; but, in relation to the deterrent 
capacity, the Air Force may not find this process desirable. 
Hardening to the point that the MX can be destroyed by direct 
hit with a smaller warhead— i.e., a 200 kiloton capacity as 
opposed to a 5 megaton one— may be the factor that halts the 
Soviets' emphasis on the heavy missiles.
Those who contend that MX is as vulnerable as 
Minuteman base their arguments on a similar basis to that 
which was posed in the discussion on stability. MX is vul­
nerable because it invites saturation attack (Gold, 1981:
94). The U.S. will become a vast sponge for Soviet nuclear 
weapons (Defense Monitor, March 1979: 2). The MX is vul­
nerable because it invites mass attack (Collins, 1980; and 
the MX Information Office, Salt Lake City, Utah- September 23,
1981).
The people involved in the Office of Technology 
Assessment (1981: 5) write that the multiple basing cannot
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assure survivability of the MX unless the number of shelters 
is large enough relative to the size of the threat. It is 
the contention of those composing the Office of Technology 
Assessment that none of the mobility concepts significantly 
alter the preservation of location uncertainty.
The vulnerability criterion is assessed to be a low 
level. This assessment is based on the belief that preser­
vation of location uncertainty can be obtained through the 
hide-a-pea concept and the speed with which the hot missile 
can be relocated (see Office of Technology Assessment, 1981:
57) .
Verifiability
The concept of the MX and of the required operational 
support areas has been designed in such a fashion that veri­
fication capability is improved (Air Force Environmental 
Impact Statement, December 1980: Program Overview, 1-42 and
1-43). The operations area is divided into two general areas 
consisting of an assembly section and the deployment space 
where the clusters are located.
The missile and launcher components are delivered 
to the assembly facility where teams will take approximately 
one week to assemble and check out the missile, canister, 
and launcher. Once assembled, the missile launcher is trans­
ported over designated transportation networks to the cluster 
area. Assurance of verification and compliance with a stra­
tegic arms limitation agreement is provided by MX by following
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certain procedures at both the assembly and the cluster 
areas. These procedures are;
-Observable shipment of stage 1 boosters from the 
factory to the missile assembly area.
-Observable assembly of the missile and launcher 
at a designated assembly area adjacent to, but 
separate from, other military facilities and all 
roads except one.
-Movement of the missile and launcher to the 
cluster area only on the designated roads with 
a special observable and identifiable vehicle.
-Blocking missile exits from the cluster area by 
barriers constructed across the access roads. 
Removal and replacement of these barriers is 
observable.
-Periodic opening of observation ports in all 
structures and vehicles capable of concealing 
a missile and launcher in the cluster to verify 
that the proper number of missiles is present.
When the observation ports are closed, the transporter vehicle
visits the remaining shelters and leaves the hot round in one
of them. The remaining twenty-two shelters will contain
simulators.
The utilization of simulators that give the same 
observable missile profiles enhances the survivability but 
further complicates verification by national technical means. 
This intrusiveness of the monitoring procedures and the 
amount of U.S.-Soviet cooperation required to monitor the 
mobile concept are without precedent in arms control (Meyer, 
1979: 47-62). Meyer writes that the simulator verification
can be overcome through a sampling procedure that requires 
a certain number of portholes, located in the tops of the 
shelters, to be opened periodically for satellite
161
observation. Given enough data, he thinks that the simulators 
can be distinguished from the hot round.
Meyer expresses a legitimate concern relative to 
the covert manufacture and concealment of assembled missiles.
The mobile concept is conducive to this concern because of 
the missile-canister-launcher design relationship. These 
assembled units could be concealed in widely dispersed areas 
and deployed with almost any kind of mobile launcher (Gold,
1981; 99). This notion is supported by Perry's testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee (May 1, 1980) 
wherein he states that the idea of deploying the MX tractor 
trailers on U.S. highways was rejected only on the basis of 
security problems involved with large amounts of nuclear 
material being moved on public highways. The technological 
advancement in the MX guidance and control section that per­
mits a constant reprogramming of the location of the missile, 
in reference to some fixed point, further enhances the ability 
to conceal these missiles over wide areas.
Verification of MX is assessed to be a high degree 
or 90 percent probability that verification can be accomplished. 
The procedures and methods of MX movement and the opening of 
the portholes on a periodic basis lend themselves to verifi­
cation by national technical means.
Social and Political Impacts
Political Impacts
Social and political debate abounds on both sides 
of the MX deployment issue. The governors of Utah and Nevada
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have jointly agreed to oppose the deployment while some of 
their state and U.S. representatives support the issue (Utah 
MX Coordination Office, September 14, 1981). Local public 
interest groups oppose for environmental reasons, while local 
merchants are looking for all the business they can get. 
Congressional support or opposition lists concerning the
Q
MX deployment were not available as of September 1981.
A newspaper editor in Delta, Utah, opposed, not 
because "she is nasty or unpatriotic," but because she is 
of the opinion that somebody in Washington found a Nevada 
and Utah road map and decided that this area would be a good 
place to put MX (Stevens, 1980: 13). The editor concluded
that there was not very much going on in that area, but that 
was the way the local people preferred it. Utah State Repre­
sentative Garth Jones stated that his primary concern was 
the fact that people, like the editor, did not seem to real­
ize that the thing that gives them a chance to be free is 
a strong defense (Stevens, 1980: 13).
Utah's Governor Mattheson opposes the MX deployment 
in Nevada and Utah, but will support quick-fix solutions to 
existing systems or an MX type deployment at some other 
location (Christian Science Monitor, June 18, 1980). He 
agrees with the current assessment of the growing Soviet 
threat, but he thinks that the MX deployment is fatally 
flawed because it cannot be deployed until 1986. Addition­
ally, he contends that Utah's greatest contribution to
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national security lies not only in the possible deployment 
of a missile system there, but in its efforts to develop 
independent energy and mineral resources. He concludes that 
his state has a finite capacity to bear the demands of both.
The U.S. Senators from Utah (Garns) and Nevada 
(Cannon) both support the MX deployment with reservations 
(Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearings, June 5, 1980: 
2630-3632). Senator Garns stated during the Senate Committee 
on Armed Services Hearings that he very strongly believes that
something must be done to protect Minuteman III, but the issue
is a two-part problem. The country is in great danger with­
out MX; how and where the basing should occur are two parts 
of the issue. Garns stated:
We have both newspaper and TV stations irresponsibly
opposed . . . with statements that there will be
nuclear tipped missiles in every valley west of 
Tooele, Utah, to California. That is ridiculous. 
There are tens of thousands of valleys . . . this 
deployment will require 35. This is the politi­
cal climate we are dealing with.
Senator Garns attributed the greatest part of the political 
opposition to the fact that Nevada is 80 percent owned and 
Utah, 67 percent owned, by the federal government.
In the June 5, 1980, Senate Hearings, Senator 
Cannon somewhat indicated an approval of the concept but 
wanted the MX to be deployed using the split-basing concept 
(also see the Huntsville Times, August 9, 1980). He amended 
the appropriations bill to the point that the total procure­
ment of 200 missiles and construction of 4,600 shelters
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could be made, but only 2,300 shelters could be planned for 
actual construction in the Nevada and Utah area. He stated 
that his justification for this amendment was that he was 
only trying to keep the entire program from being killed.
Senators Garns and Cannon are attempting to ascer­
tain that the socio-economic and environmental problems of 
deployment are thoroughly evaluated. They state that a mis­
sile base of 8,000 people is not very large unless it is 
placed in an area that contains fewer than one person per 
square mile and then it becomes extremely crowded.
The Mormon Church issued a negative formal position 
on the MX deployment (Anderson, 1981: A8). The position
reads in part:
Mormon pioneers went west to establish a base from 
which to carry the gospel of peace to the peoples 
of the earth. It is ironic and a denial of the 
very essence of that gospel, that in this same 
general area there should be constructed a mam­
moth weapons system capable of destroying much 
of civilization.
The statement requested that an alternative to the MX be 
found that would not make the nation an automatic target 
for enemy nuclear missiles. Gerard Smith, the former chief 
negotiator for SALT I, indicated that this was the most sig­
nificant opposition movement to date that could stop the MX 
deployment (May 8, 1981).
An administration poll (San Diego California Sun, 
July 18, 1981) indicated that both the Republican-controlled 
Senate and the Democrat-dominated House would approve the
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land-basing of the MX in Utah and Nevada if President 
Reagan desired. The poll showed a clear majority in the 
House with approximately 50 to 60 members leaning toward 
support and a two to one margin in the Senate.
Public Opinion
Nationwide public opinion polls have been conducted 
for the general attitudes about national defense but have 
not been conducted specifically about the MX ICBM system.
The majority of these polls indicate the desire for a strong 
national defense posture and express a willingness to spend 
the money to acquire the same (CBS, New York Times, July 1, 
1981; Time, June 1, 1981; Gallup Poll, May 7, 1981; and Harris, 
March 2, 1981).
Public opinion polls taken in Nevada and Utah have 
swung from opposition to support for the MX.^^ The most sig­
nificant data were published in the Desert News, September 14 
and 15, 1981. This survey shows that 65 percent oppose the 
system, but 69 percent will support the Nevada and Utah de­
ployment if President Reagan makes that decision.
Social and political impacts are considered to be 
high concerning the MX deployment. This is based on the pre­
mise that it is a large-scale, widely dispersed deployment 
whose need has been publicly questioned. Political support 
indicates that the missile is required and should be deployed, 
but the deployment should occur some place else. Localized 
public opinion data indicate that the MX system would be
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supported in the Great Basin area if that is where President 
Reagan's decision places it.
MX Program Cost
Cost considerations for these alternatives have 
not been included as a part of this analysis. Cost data for 
some of the alternatives are simply not available. Cost 
data for the proposed MX are influenced by the unit making 
the estimate. The U.S. Air Force has estimated that the sys­
tem will cost a total of $33 billion. The Congressional 
Budget Office's estimate is $60 billion and the General 
Accounting Office's estimate is $70 billion (MX Education 
Bureau, March 1981). The differences are attributed to 
utilization of different program baselines. Cost includes 
only baseline and not operating costs. Costs do not include 
site construction nor improperly applied inflation rates. 
Opponents to MX have quoted the program cost to include dev­
elopment, acquisition, and operation costs of $55.6 billion 
(Gold, July 3Û, 1981).
The Congressional Research Service (Medalia, 1981: 
12) indicates acquisition costs to be $40.7 billion in FY 82 
dollars, including development, procurement, and other basing- 
related items such as vehicles and physical security. Colin 
Gray (1981: 856) writes that MX will not be the most expen­
sive weapon system to be built by the United States. Gray 
estimates the total MX program at $33.8 billion, the Minute- 
man at $40 billion. Trident at $39 billion, and the B-52 
program at $54 billion.
167
Antiballistic Missiles
The evaluation of the Low Altitude Air Defense 
System will not follow the ICBM evaluation format. LoAD 
is being considered in conjunction with the proposed MX 
deployment. Data such as accuracy, reliability, and utility 
are classified and not available. Since LoAD will be deployed 
adjacent to MX, environmental repercussion will be oversha­
dowed by the ICBM. Verification procedures for LoAD will 
be similar to those for MX. ABM vulnerability is not an 
issue since it has a very short life expectancy.
The issues important to the LoAD deployment con­
cern the credibility and effectiveness of the concept, sta­
bility, and political impacts. These topics will be discussed 
in the following paragraphs.
Credibility and 
Effectiveness
The deployment of LoAD is an alternative to in­
creasing the number of shelters in the MX deployment. A 
LoAD unit would be hidden in one of the twenty-three shelters 
in each MX cluster and programmed to intercept the first 
reentry vehicle approaching the shelter containing MX. Since 
the exact location of MX or the LoAD is not known, two re­
entry vehicles must be targeted at each shelter rather than 
one (Office of Technology Assessment, 1981; 112; Davis,
1979: 57; Gray, 1980: 42). Congressman Jack Kemp writes
that the addition of two interceptors to each MX cluster
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increase the leverage factor to 3:1 (1980: 17). Kemp
states that this factor may be high, but the level of uncer­
tainty faced by the attacker would also be high. This un­
certainty, according to Kemp, is desirable to maintain de­
terrence (also see Medalia, 1981A: 5). The LoAD can be
considered to be effective if it achieves an intercept pro­
bability of 50 percent or greater (Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1981: 117).
In terms of credibility, the LoAD's concept is 
highly credible (Medalia, 1981A: 1). The technical capa­
bility to hit bullets with bullets was demonstrated in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s at both high and low altitudes 
in the Sentinel ABM Program and its successor program, the 
Safeguard. Credibility of these initial concepts was ques­
tioned because they relied on a centralized computer system 
that controlled each site. Each site had to be capable of 
defending itself and defending the targets it was deployed 
to cover. Since no system can ever be considered 100 per­
cent reliable, leakage occurs (some incoming missiles would 
get through).
The criticism of LoAD credibility has been over­
come through use of modular design radars and computers with 
each deployed missile’s being capable of firing independently 
or through the integrated command networks. Since the pri­
mary function of this concept is to defend hard targets 
rather than countervalue targets, leakage is expected.
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Supporting this notion of credibility is the fact that LoAD 
is the result of about ten additional years of research 
knowledge added to that gained in the earlier ABM programs. 
The hardware and electronic components being utilized are 
not new developments, but are off-the-shelf technologies.
Stability
The opposing argument is that ABM defense is de­
stabilizing or provocative. It is destabilizing in the 
sense that it threatens to fuel the arms race between the 
superpowers. The acquisition of an effective ABM system 
might give one side more of an incentive to launch a nuclear 
strike in a period of severe crisis (Lord, 1980: 12). Sup­
porting this notion is the view that stable nuclear deter­
rence requires each side to possess an assured second strike 
capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the counter- 
value targets. Acquisition of an ABM may generate the per­
ceived need for a preemptive first strike. By contrast, 
complete mutual vulnerability may be the most effective 
deterrent to nuclear war.
The conclusions drawn by an arms control symposium 
(Barnaby/Boserup, 196 9: 212-15) were that ABM deployments
would serve only to accelerate the rate of technological 
development in strategic weaponry. The ABMs are only mea­
sures of temporary importance, while the improved methods 
of attack that they would generate would be of greater 
importance.
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The ABM promotes stability when the defense 
capability is unambiguous or clearly there (Scoville, 1979: 
104). Further, as offensive forces are drawn down or limited 
by negotiation, the ballistic missile defense assets become 
more stabilizing (Davis, 1979: 55-63). ACDA views the bal­
listic missile defense activity as having no perceptible 
effects on crisis stability, escalation, or aftermath 
effects (Fiscal Year 1982 Arms Control Impact Statement,
1981: 197).
Political Impacts
The LoAD system, in conjunction with MX, is clearly 
forbidden by the ABM Treaty since it would use launchers and 
radars that are not of the permanently fixed type (Medalia, 
1981A: 6). The treaty and protocol limit deployment to one
site with no more than 100 launchers and 100 missiles. The 
treaty permits that site to be only in an area containing 
ICBM silo launchers. The ABM Treaty will be up for consid­
eration of extension or abrogation in 1982.
An amendment or abrogation would represent no 
obstacle to the hawks who disliked the treaty from the begin­
ning. Senator Jesse Helms is prepared to scrap the treaty 
in 1982 in favor of deployment. The Reagan Administration 
has not committed itself on the treaty but has taken steps 
to intensify research and development in ABM techniques 
(Pond, 1980: 1 2 ).
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Arms controllers generally do not oppose defense 
of the MX on the premise that whatever maintains invulnera­
bility of weapons is regarded as stabilizing. There is a 
concern in the arms control community that abrogation of 
the ABM Treaty, when it no longer suits our purposes, will 
make the process of reaching negotiated agreements much more
difficult (Pond, 1980: 12).
Some authorities argue that the Soviets have kept 
their ABM research and development effort at higher levels 
than the U.S. and are ready to field a new ABM system (Hunts­
ville Times, March 8, 1981; also see Graybeal and Goure, 1979: 
76). Intelligence estimates indicate that the Soviets are 
spending about one billion dollars a year on ABM development. 
The U.S. has spent considerably less. The FY 81 estimate 
was $265 billion (New York Times, March 11, 1981).
Congressman Kemp (1980: 16) writes that if a
credible BMD system were available for deployment now, it 
would provide the Soviet Union with an incentive not to 
continue its buildup in offensive weaponry. Kemp does not 
advocate a unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty but wants 
an ABM system developed to the point of deployment. He con­
cludes that this action would be an incentive to get the 
Soviets back to the negotiating table.
From a military point of view, the role of the 
ABM is essentially the same now as it was in SALT II— the 
protection of the ICBM strategic forces. From an arms
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control point of view, maintaining the ABM Treaty in its 
present form would seem unacceptable. The Soviets should 
be contacted for clarification of the permissibility of 
site defense within terms of the present treaty (Lord,
1980; 38). Gerard Smith (interview 1980) believes that
the subject should be discussed in the Standing Consulta­
tive Commission. Smith believes that the deployment site 
selected for the ABM Treaty can be changed by an amendment 
rather than treaty abrogation.
Senator Peter Domenici (New Mexico) requested a 
study from the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory on the assess­
ment of ABM capabilities (Cooley, 198OA: 10). As a result
of this study, Domenici concludes that because of the stra­
tegic Soviet offensive advances, the possibility of an Amer­
ican ABM can no longer be ignored. He advocates very serious 
consideration of whether or not to continue the treaty in 1982.
Politically, consideration must be given to the 
possibility that deployment of an ABM will start a reaction, 
resulting in an escalation of the arms race. The impact of 
an ABM escalation requires a comparison to the threat posed 
by the continued Soviet buildup in offensive weaponry. The 
trade-offs become nightmares for defense planners and the 
resolution of this concern must be in conjunction with that 
of the MX question.
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Weapon System 
Evaluation Summary
Table 9 is a summary of the evaluation criteria 
measures. The table depicts the influence each criterion 
has on the weapon system evaluation. Specific emphasis has 
not been placed on any of the criteria that would lead to 
one best solution because policy and decision makers may 
place more emphasis on one criterion than on another.
Alternative Courses of Action
Do Nothing
Policy analysis provides for the consideration of 
a number of courses of action, one of which may be doing 
nothing. In the case of the ICBM strategic force, this 
option has severe impacts. The increasing threat from the 
improved accuracy and the continued Soviet buildup in accu­
racies and numbers of strategic missiles, in effect, elimi­
nates the U.S. ICBM family as a deterrent. This elimination 
of the ICBMs reduces the triad to a dyad that permits the 
Soviets to concentrate on the remaining forces which have 
the potential to become vulnerable with the passage of time.
Retaining the fifty-four Titans in an active de­
ployment status is paramount to a "do nothing" course of 
action. The construction technologies are obsolete even 
though they are still undergoing modernization programs.
They are not considered as bargaining chips in negotiations, 
and the propulsion systems are hazardous. One alternative
TABLE 9
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for these launchers would be to renovate the silos to 
accommodate fifty-four of the new MX systems that are under 
development. Because of Titan's single warhead, another 
option for its replacement could be to use fifty Minuteman II 
systems that also have single warheads and are already in 
inventory. This option would have no significant restraints 
to implementation.
Alternative courses of action in relation to the 
dispositioning of Minuteman II and III are not in order. 
Presently, they constitute the heart of the land-based ICBM 
family; and, because of the nature of their construction 
technologies and propulsion system characteristics, they 
can be kept in the inventory for an indefinite period. 
Modernization programs for implementation of approved tech­
nological innovations can be incorporated as the systems are 
removed from the silos for routine maintenance and inspection.
Implementation of this option occurs by default 
since they are already in place and meet the intent of the 
proposed SALT II Treaty. The constraint to the continuation 
of this option without a companion deployment of some type 
is the vulnerability issue.
Deploy Additional 
Fixed-Based Systems
Additional fixed-based Minuteman III systems could 
be deployed in the existing Minuteman fields. This option 
would require restarts in all associated production facilities
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since they have been closed down. The start-up of production 
lines and delivery of the first systems would require three 
to four years. This option would produce a relatively low 
risk production and deployment because of previous 
experience.
Barriers and constraints to the implementation of 
this alternative would come more from DOD than from social 
or political standpoints. Because of its basing mode, DOD 
maintains that additions of this nature are not cost effec­
tive in terms of relieving the vulnerability problem.
Convert Minuteman 
to Mobile Mode
This option, in conjunction with construction of 
additional silos to house the increased Minuteman missiles, 
could be accomplished in the existing deployment areas.
The conversion could add the preservation of location uncer­
tainty capability to Minuteman, which would reduce the vul­
nerability of the system.
By basic engineering design, the Minuteman was not 
intended to be deployed in the mobile mode; thus, portions 
of the structure and the fourth stage would require redesign 
if deployed in this mode. The time required to deploy this 
alternative would not permit operational capability during 
the peak of the vulnerability threat because of the redesign 
time and production start-up. Barriers and constraints to 
implementation of this option would be similar to those for 
increasing the numbers of this system in the fixed-base mode.
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Deploy MX
This alternative retains the credibility of the 
ICBM strategic force and maintains the triad. The prefer­
red option of the deployment in Nevada and Utah meets the 
desired site location parameters specified by the Air Force. 
System acquisition costs are minimized because the land re­
quired is primarily publicly owned and only thirty-five 
valleys out of the thousands available will be required.
The expansion of the number of shelters, if required, can 
be accommodated within the existing clusters or additional 
real estate can be purchased. The deployment will contribute 
to the economic development of the area through an increase 
in the number of jobs available in both the construction and 
operational periods. The deployment is expected to cause 
development of renewable sources of energy that will also be 
available for commercial application. The current supply 
and allocation of existing water rights may not leave any 
available for consumption by the MX program.
Opposition to the implementation of this alterna­
tive appears to be regional and exists from the view that 
the system is required, the concept is good, but deployment 
should be made someplace else. Public interest groups and 
influential religious organizations are taking an active 
role in trying to prevent the MX deployment in Nevada and 
Utah. Public opinion polls indicate opposition to the sys­
tem's being located in the preferred deployment area, but it
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would be accepted if the president makes the decision to put 
it there. Congressional opinion polls indicate that the 
president's choice of deployment will be passed when it is 
brought up to vote.
The nature of the mobile concept will further com­
plicate the already difficult task of negotiating verifica­
tion of weapons systems. Cooperative attitudes between the 
superpowers will need to be intensified. The deployment 
schedule does not meet the required operational date to 
counter the threat at the proper time. The earliest anti­
cipated deployment will occur in 1986 or 1987.
MX in Minuteman Fields
The primary advantage of this alternative is that 
the deployment would take place in a region that is accus­
tomed to having these missiles as neighbors. Social and 
political disturbance would be minimal. Existing connect­
ing roadways could be utilized with placement of the clus­
ters among the fixed-base silos that are approximately five 
miles apart (Graham and Nitze, 1979: 135). Additional
environmental changes would result in a minimum impact 
since much of the construction would have been already com­
pleted. The same degree of system utility exists that 
accrues from the deployment of the mobile mode in some 
other location.
There are two major concerns associated with 
implementation of this alternative that virtually eliminate
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this option. One is the problem caused by concentration. 
Concentrated deployment of the mobile concept in the same 
geographical area as Minuteman effectively places all the 
strategic land-based systems in one basket. Because of the 
concentration of targets, the accuracy factor of incoming 
rounds becomes less critical because there would be only 
one central targeting area. This would require the MX and 
Minuteman to fly through atmospheric disturbances more 
severe than planned for dispersed deployment areas.
The second concern is the arrangement of the 
existing silo patterns and spacing to utilize efficiently 
the potential of a fully mobile concept. The existing silo 
arrangement does not provide sufficient space to preclude 
the destruction of more than one ICBM with one incoming 
round.
MX with Lo a d
LoAD, when deployed with MX in either basing mode, 
raises the ratio of incoming missiles to cause destruction 
of an MX to an estimated level of approximately 2:1 to 3:1. 
The LoAD in this defense of MX capacity would be a low pro­
file deployment with a minimal social or political impact. 
The deployment can be accomplished by utilizing the shel­
ters constructed for MX and by shuttling them around as 
required to preserve the location uncertainty. Systems 
acquisition cost would subsequently be restricted to that 
of the hardware costs. LoAD would present a relatively low
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risk deployment because its design utilizes generic or 
off-the-shelf technologies. The deployment can be scheduled 
to coincide with the operational capability of MX.
Deployment of LoAD will raise the technical issue 
concerning its ability to defend a hard site target. This 
argument can be expected to center around a comparison of 
the capabilities of LoAD versus that of its forebears, the 
Sprint and Spartan. The LoAD concept is dependent upon the 
efficiency of the early warning networks to bring it to an 
alert status. Targets, when passed on to the LoAD radars, 
are within a ten-mile range of the LoAD launchers. The 
defensive nature of the system and its short range will re­
quire a different strategic firing doctrine from that of 
the MX. The LoAD firing doctrine could be a launch on ac­
quisition mode because of this short range.
Resolution of the question regarding compliance 
with the ABM Treaty will be required. This issue may be 
brought up in a scheduled standing consultative commission 
meeting with the Soviets and raised to higher echelons of 
government if required. Gerard Smith, the U.S. chief nego­
tiator for SALT I, contends that the treaty will not require 
amending to deploy up to 100 of the LoAD launchers but will 
need to be amended to change its location. Since the LoAD 
launcher is configured in pods or canisters of three mis­
siles, a problem might be anticipated relative to the inter­
pretation of the number of launchers (100 or 33) that can 
be deployed and remain within treaty limitations.
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Summary
This analysis has considered the existing land- 
based missile systems of the U.S. defensive triad and the 
proposed mobile system in conjunction with a low altitude 
air defense system. All possible alternatives have not been 
considered in this analysis (see chapter I). There are other 
alternatives available such as the air-borne cruise missile 
and the split-basing approach to MX that may also be utilized. 
These are topics on which additional research may be required.
The final choice is made by the political decision 
maker and is based on personal priorities. If a decision 
maker perceives the increasing vulnerability as a threat to 
survivability of Minuteman but places more emphasis on pre­
servation of the natural environment, then the conclusion 
might be reached that increased emphasis should be placed 
on the deployment of additional systems in existing Minute- 
man fields without an MX deployment. On the other hand, 
the decision may be reached to deploy MX to enhance Minute- 
man. This decision emphasizes the need to retain the triad 
and places secondary emphasis on the environmental and social 
impacts. The decision to deploy MX with LoAD places prior­
ity on the notion that the ABM Treaty has outlived its use­
fulness and changes are in order. Chapter VII contains the 
conclusions and courses of action recommended by the 
researcher.
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Chapter VI Endnotes
^It is recognized that newspapers are generally 
not accepted as credible sources for research; however, 
two have been used. The Huntsville Times in Alabama has 
been used because there are four separate Army agencies 
located in Huntsville. Often the news releases originate 
with public information offices from these agencies and 
are credible. A series of articles appeared in the Daily 
Oklahoman in September and October 1980 that was written 
by Jack Taylor about the status of the U.S. defense readi­
ness posture. I talked with Mr. Taylor several times about 
his sources of information. The readiness data that he 
published about missile systems about which I am personally 
knowledgeable was accurate. Any other newspaper references 
contained in this research have also been checked for 
credibility.
2
The arguments contained in these paragraphs are 
typical of the debate about the vulnerability issue. Other 
sources for each side of the argument are Gen. Maxwell 
Taylor (R)— "There is no threat to out ICBMs because of 
the uncertain performance of their. . ." (Christian Science 
Monitor, September 8, 1981); Arthur Metcalf, military editor 
of Strategic Review— "Missile inertial guidance accuracies 
are greatly exaggerated. . ." (Christian Science Monitor, 
September 8, 1981); and "The Soviets inherit the same relia­
bility problems in advanced technological systems as the 
U.S." (Panofsky, 1981: 49). "Soviet technological advanced
have contributed to the growing doubt of survivability of 
the land-based leg. . ." (Congressional Digest, November 
1980: 259); "Minuteman and Titan will soon lose their
ability to survive. This danger results from improved 
accuracy of Soviet ICBMS. . ." (ICBM Basing Options,
December 1980: 2); "Titan and Minuteman missiles will soon
be vulnerable because of Soviet advances in accuracy and 
payload. . (MX Education Bureau, 1981: 1-2).
^The latest test firings were two unarmed Air 
Force Minuteman II ICBMs that were fired from Vandenberg 
Air Force Base in January 1981 (Huntsville Times, January 21, 
1981; and personal interview). They were selected at random 
from those in an alert status on operational bases. The 
missiles landed about 5,000 nautical miles south of Hawaii, 
near Kwajalein Atoll. The Air Force Environmental Impact 
Analysis, December 1980: volume III, 111-5, states that
twenty test flights were conducted in 1977. Numbers for 
subsequent years were not included.
^During the research process, back issues (78, 79, 
and 80) of Aviation Week, Space Technology and Air Force 
Digest were reviewed for ICBM data and no articles were
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located that pertained to Minuteman accidents. Subsequent 
conversations were held with Air Force personnel associated 
with Titan and Minuteman that confirmed the Minuteman safety 
record. A third conversation (September 16, 1981) was held 
with an ACDA representative from the MX Program Office, who 
also confirmed the Minuteman record.
^ABC News program Nightline interviewed Admiral 
baroque (R) (director of the Center for Defense Information 
and the Defense Monitor) and Paul Warnke (one of the SALT II 
chief negotiators) on October 1, 1981. Admiral baroque's 
position is that credibility is maintained by the U.S. 
nuclear submarine fleet. Warnke said that the credibility 
of the ICBM was established by former Secretary of Defense 
Schlesinger in the mid-1970s. The Minuteman in the mid- 
1970s was established as being a non-vulnerable system.
®A comprehensive review of the concurrent develop­
ment of the synfuels industry and the MX deployment was pre­
sented by Robert W. Rycroft (University of Denver) and James I 
Monaghan (Office of the Governor, State of Colorado) to the 
Western Political Science Association meeting March 26-28, 
1981. The presentation covered a range of policy issues 
surrounding the development of synthetic fuel projects and 
deployment of the MX.
7
Interviews with personnel from the State of Utah 
MX Coordination Office and a public interest group represen­
tative from the Utah MX Information Office on September 14, 
1981 revealed that data relevant to the amounts of surface 
and ground water available for MX are not known. Studies 
have been initiated to make this determination. These indi­
viduals indicated that the Air Force does not have these data 
either. This accounts for the generalities contained in the 
Air Force Environmental Impact Statement. The Office of 
Technology (1981: 67) supports the argument that the use of
deep water reserves poses several problems, primarily that 
the relationship between the source of supply to the deep 
water aquifer and the existing surface waters cannot be pre­
cisely determined.
Q
Under-Secretary of the Air Force, Antonia Chayes 
(House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, May 1, 
1980) stated that the Air Force was well experienced in pre­
paration of environmental impact statements. She said that 
the Air Force had been challenged in court four or five times 
and in each case the Air Force had prevailed. She fully 
expects court challenges in the MX statements.
q
'A request for this information was made to the 
Offices of U.S. Senator Heflin and U.S. Representative Flippo. 
Both advised that such information did not exist as of
184
September 1981 because the issue had not been brought up 
for a vote. See Congressional Digest, November 1980 for a 
review of some congressional leaders' opinions.
^^Telephone calls were made to the Harris and Gallup 
polls, and Roper organization on September 4, 1981 to determine 
if public opinion surveys on MX might be available. None 
of these three organizations had made any surveys specifi­
cally on the MX.
^^U.S. Senator Heflin's office provided a summary 
of public opinion polls that were provided by the Congres­
sional Research Service. A New York Times/CBS News poll,
July 1, 1981, indicates that 42 percent perceive the U.S. 
to be inferior to the Soviet Union in military strength 
(sample size 1,433 with a plus or minus 3 percentage point 
error factor). A Times magazine survey (June 1, 1981) indi­
cates that 73 percent of those questioned were of the opinion 
that the U.S must build up military strength (1,221 sample 
size with a plus or minus 3.5 percent sampling error), while 
22 percent were opposed. The Congressional Research Service 
also provided a number of statewide polls conducted by the 
Los Vegas, Nevada Sun and Salt Lake City, Utah Desert News 
from October 28, 1979 to September 14 and 15, 1981.
12The Reagan administration issued a position on 
May 22, 1981 (Huntsville Times) that there is no legal obli­
gation to abide by either of the two agreements with the 
Soviet Union that limit strategic weapons. ACDA Chief 
Counsel Tom Graham and State Department Legal Adviser 
Arthur W. Rovine disagreed with the position but were over­
ruled on this issue.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
Introduction 
The task of forecasting future U.S. defensive 
systems has been hampered by a long history of failures. 
General Grayson Tate, U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Defense 
Program Manager (1980: 1-5) writes that as late as 1937 a
technology assessment published by the government failed to 
predict the development of the jet engine, radar, inertial 
guidance, rocket propelled missiles, satellites, and nuclear 
weapons. The ability to effectively manage or control these 
emerging technologies has been no better than the capability 
to forecast them. Dr. Vannevar Bush, the first Director of 
the Office of Scientific Research and Development in the 
1940s, wrote (1949: 8) that there is no need to fear the
intercontinental missiles since they are not as effective 
as the airplane with a crew.
Strategic arms limitation treaties between the 
United States and the Soviet Union have only limited spe­
cific weapon systems and have not impacted the development
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and deployment of the Soviet heavy missiles during the last 
ten years. The U.S. now finds itself with a potentially 
vulnerable ICBM strategic force due to the modernization 
of the Soviet strategic forces. Hopefully, the decision 
regarding the MX deployment will be made with greater vision 
and acumen than those described in the preceding paragraphs.
Research Questions
The focus of this dissertation was to evaluate 
several internal factors affecting progress in arms control 
and to analyze the proposed deployment of a mobile land- 
based ICBM in conjunction with a low altitude air defense 
system. The impact of three major factors— theories of 
deterrence, technology creep, and models of the decision­
making and negotiations processes on the arms control pro­
cess and the selection of weapons— were assessed. Much of 
the available literature is written about these factors 
separately; their collective impacts on weapon system selec­
tion for the arms control process is lacking.
Methodology
This research has taken an applied policy analysis 
approach to the problems of arms control and weapons system 
selection processes. Applied policy analysis is intended 
to inform decision makers about the consequences of taking 
various courses of action to solve a problem or issue. Five 
steps of analysis have been conducted:
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-Problem definition 
-Policy context description 
-Identification of alternative 
-Evaluation and comparison of alternatives 
-Recommendations 
The general model for applied policy analysis developed by 
White et al. was modified for use in the development of an 
integrated response to these research questions. Arms con­
trol and weapon system selection decisions require both tech­
nical and policy evaluation before final choices can be made. 
This model provided the general structure to review the 
existing institutional arrangements that exist for address­
ing national security issues and for interpreting the results 
of the technical evaluation in terms of the suggested factors 
that impact progress in arms control and weapon system selec­
tion.
Findings
The results of this research has added new perspectives to 
the internal strategic arms control and weapons system selec­
tion processes. First the application of applied policy 
analysis as a means of providing policy and decision makers 
a set of alternatives with the consequences of the courses 
of action that may be taken is new. Other types of analysis 
have been used such as highly complex mathematical models, 
but they have not included the political and social impacts 
as contained in this research.
188
The second perspective is that strategic arms 
control and weapon system selection are typically considered 
as separate issues. It is the researcher's contention that 
they are not. These are both national security issues that 
are resolved in the national security environment where the 
decision processes are the same and the suggested factors 
(decision making and negotiation, theories of deterrence, 
and technological advancement) impact both.
Decision Making and Negotiations
Arms control and strategic weapon system selection 
decisions are made by the president with advice from the 
National Security Council and from advisors who may occupy 
various positions in what may be referred to as circles of 
power. The president resides at the nucleus of the deci­
sion structure with assistance from advisors. Dependent 
upon the situation, the president may draw a particular 
individual for a specific situation or rely on the bureau­
cratic process for advice on long-term issues.
Two conceptual decision models— rational actor 
and bureaucratic— have been applied to arms control and 
weapon system selection choices. The rational actor con­
cept is characterized by a small number of participants 
and an issue or problem which has overtones of being a 
crisis or requiring quick resolution. The bureaucratic con­
cept is focused on the internal politics of government; the 
characteristics include many participants and an emphasis 
on compromise.
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The national security decision process is 
unstructured with no fixed rules that apply from one situa­
tion to another. There is no requirement for the president 
to utilize the National Security Council and each of the 
presidents since the Johnson administration have used the 
system differently.
Johnson used the bureaucratic model concept for 
decision making. Johnson did not require alternatives from 
which to select; he wanted consensus or choices that had 
been agreed upon by the bureaucracy. His lack of direction 
or guidance for the preparation of SALT I caused a delay in 
the start of the first strategic negotiations with the Soviets. 
The impact of this delay was that the MIRV technology was 
deployed by the Soviets.
The sources of valid advice received by the presi­
dent are not critical to the arms control of weapon system 
selection process. While Johnson's inner circle of advisors 
were trying to reach agreement on what should be contained 
in SALT I , a small group made up of members from the second 
and third circles of power prepared and obtained concurrences 
for an approach.
The ingoing SALT I negotiation recommendations 
derived by the Johnson administration were given to the 
Nixon administration. Nixon did not accept these recommenda­
tions but chose to have Kissinger study the issues. Nixon's 
choices were made from alternatives prepared by Kissinger.
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There were very few people involved, but the review by 
Kissinger required approximately nine months (see chapter 
III). The review by Kissinger resulted in an almost iden­
tical pre-negotiation position that Johnson had given to 
the new administration. The choice had been made by a dif­
ferent conceptual decision model based on advice from a key 
member of the inner circle but the results were almost the 
same.
The Nixon and Kissinger method of dealing directly 
with the Soviets through secret meetings and direct back 
channel contacts during the SALT I negotiations established 
the precedent for later arms control negotiations. Secret 
discussions involving only a few people provides the oppor­
tunity for "give and take" discussions without loss of inter­
national prestige. Arms control negotiations were impacted 
by the fact that Nixon and Kissinger did not keep the nego­
tiation team advised relative to changes or new proposals 
that they were considering. This practice undermines the 
credibility of the chief negotiator since he will be stead­
fastly defending the last position given him by the president,
The Carter administration attempted to change the 
process established by Nixon through conducting open meet­
ings that were external to the negotiations. They found out 
quickly that this technique was not going to work. Vance's 
preparations for their administration's first Moscow contact 
were made public and were linked to the Soviet stance on
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human rights. According to Talbot, within one week after 
Vance's return from this meeting, the Carter administration 
reversed their position and implemented the secret back 
channel approach. Information was not kept from the nego­
tiation principals as had been done in the previous admin­
istration.
Initially in this research, decision making and 
negotiations were considered as two different processes.
They cannot be separated because the negotiation process is 
an extension of the president and his inner circle of power. 
The relationship is directly impacted by the degree of con­
trol’ the president wishes to place on the chief negotiator. 
Gerard Smith stated that he had absolutely no leeway or 
personal discretion in the SALT I negotiations (May 1981). 
These tight controls are justified in arms control negotia­
tions. Decisions of this magnitude should not be left to 
the discretion of one individual, not even the president.
The most significant impact of the decision making 
and the negotiation process is the U.S. approach to the 
negotiations themselves. There is a lack of understanding 
of the differences in the two cultures and their different 
approaches to negotiations (see chapter IV). The Soviets 
know that the U.S. negotiating teams are under pressure to 
produce results quickly, which causes impatience. The im­
patience creates an incentive for alternatives to be offered 
until the Soviets get one they prefer. This point is
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supported by the numbers of options and proposals offered 
in SALT I and by the first proposal initiated by the Carter 
administration to drastically reduce the limits on the num­
bers of weapons to be retained by both sides. Secretary 
Vance prepared a position and at the same time prepared a 
fall back position which he discussed with the Soviet Ambas­
sador prior to its being presented to Moscow.
The notion of linking arms control negotiations 
with Soviet behavior elsewhere in the international environ­
ment is invalid. It gives the appearance that a superpower 
is being rewarded for behaving in accordance with external 
wishes by being allowed to participate in an arms control 
treaty. The notion that the Soviets do not accept linkage 
in arms control issues is supported by international events 
prior to and during strategic negotiations and by statements 
made during negotiations (see chapter IV). After the John­
son administration had scheduled the first preparatory meet­
ings for SALT I, the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia. Also, 
after the SALT II Treaty had been signed by the presidents 
of both countries, the Soviets placed a number of troops in 
Cuba and refused to remove them. This incident was followed 
shortly thereafter by a Soviet invasion or incursion into 
Afghanistan and the U.S. refused to ratify the treaty. The 
U.S. Chief Negotiator Bernard Smith was informed by the 
Soviets during the SALT I negotiations that this was a no­
linkage agreement.
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Weapon system selection is an internal part of 
the arms control process. The decision-making environment 
is the same for both. Many of the same people have been 
involved in the preparation of the alternatives and choices 
for these strategic weapons and arms control (see chapter IV) 
Nixon was not aware of how many principals involved in the 
Johnson administration were in SALT I (Smith, 1980: 39).
Many of the Nixon people were involved in the strategic arms 
environment during the Carter administration (Spanier and 
Ulsamer, 1978: 4). Over half of the appointments made by
Reagan had previous government experience (Havemann, 1980: 
675). Each of these presidents were given recommended pro­
grams (Nixon, the SALT I position; Carter, the ongoing 
SALT II; and Reagan, the proposed MX deployment) that were
delayed for further study and yet the end results are not
substantially different. The utilization of additional time 
to study these issues is questionable. Choices made are not 
substantially different whether there are few or many people 
involved in the decision nor does the sources of advice 
impact the outcome.
The implication for the MX-LoAD decision is that
based on past performance the deployment decision will be
long and drawn out. The precedent has been set by the con­
tinuity of the personnel involved in national security. The 
process will not be improved in the next two decades because 
those decision makers have been indoctrinated by the current 
ones (Nixon, 1980: 8).^
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Deterrence
The third perspective is that it is accepted that 
arms control does not contribute to stability of deterrence 
(see chapter IV). It is the researcher's contention that the 
concept of deterrence impacts arms control.
Deterrence has a negative impact on the arms con­
trol process (see chapter IV). When a weapon system loses 
its value as a deterrent, pertubations occur in the arms con­
trol environment as weapon systems are selected to restore 
deterrence.
The overall concept of deterrence depends on credi­
bility, stability, and vulnerability of the weapon system. 
Credibility of a weapon system includes the operational char­
acteristics of the system with a consideration of the missile 
performing as anticipated and as an adequate response to the 
threat which it is intended to counter. Stability and vulner­
ability are related. Vulnerable systems create unstable 
deterrent environments. The issue of the increasing vulner­
ability of the U.S. fixed-based ICBMs is the primary reason 
for considering MX. Minuteman has been made vulnerable by 
the MIRVed warhead system that was not included in the SALT I 
Treaty and by technological improvements in accuracy that 
were permitted by the treaty.
There are several unknown factors to be considered 
in the vulnerability issue. First is the capability to 
launch a massive attack with such precise timing as to prevent
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the fratricide effect from occurring (see chapter V).
Second, there have been no tests to date to deal with the 
effectiveness of the ICBM systems when the combat environ­
ment is encountered. The third is the factor described as 
"bias" or the difference in distance from the intended tar­
get to the actual impact area. Since these missiles have 
never been fired under combat conditions and over the pro­
posed flight paths, this error is unknown.
A new weapon system must have the ability to re­
store a perception of deterrence. For example, the MX has 
been determined to be the right kind of system to maintain 
strategic balance (see chapters V and VI). The missile 
has approximately a 7,500 nautical mile range and a capa­
bility of delivering twelve independently targeted warheads, 
with an accuracy of approximately 300 feet. Given these 
operational characteristics and a basing-mode that reduces 
its vulnerability, it can be used to maintain the strategic 
balance.
The overall impacts of a particular weapon are 
often not considered when it is initially selected. This is 
supported by the point that the Soviets did not consider 
the impact of the deployment of multitudes of heavy MIRVed 
systems. The Soviet stragegy that nuclear war is winnable 
is the prominent issue in their weapon system selection 
process. It may account for their preference for the larger 
warheads. On the other hand, the argument that the Soviets
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do not accept the concept of deterrence may not be valid.
They are being constrained from launching a preemptive 
strike for some reason. As some argue, this constraint 
is probably the credibility, to date, of the weapon sys­
tems they face. In summary, the concept of deterrence can 
remain in existence while being pressured from changes in 
the status of the attributes that contribute to the whole 
of deterrence.
Technology Creep
Technology creep can have a continual effect on 
arms control since very little control exists over research 
directions in hard science and technology; the world of aca­
demia desires funding through grants and studies while demand­
ing freedom of research direction; the military-industrial 
complex is dedicated to the continual improvements of exist­
ing systems or applications for new concepts; and finally, 
there is the effort of individuals and small businesses who 
are constantly striving to strike it rich with a new concept. 
The tendency is to continually improve existing weapon sys­
tems and deply new systems which require development of a 
counter measure to restore stability. These improvements 
can contribute to stability through improved safety and 
communications techniques or, for example, make verification 
for arms control more difficult. Because of the loose con­
trol over developments and application of technological 
improvements perhaps the control emphasis should be shifted
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to weapons systems testing programs of the end 
products.
The MIRV system is a prime example of how these 
innovations and improvements in technologies can come to­
gether to produce one of the most destabilizing weapon con­
cepts that has emerged to date. It was a low profile pro­
gram that came through the funding channels of government 
under the guise of improvements to existing systems. After 
it emerged, its importance to arms control was greatly under­
estimated by the arms control community.
Additional Research
Emphasis on long-range offensive weaponry is caus­
ing a revival in the interest in antiballistic missile defen­
sive systems. SALT I permitted the continuation of research 
and development of the technology. The environment for sur­
vival of ICBM missiles for a second strike and protection of 
command and control functions associated with these long- 
range systems is supporting this thrust. Published data 
on the LoAD system indicates that it has a short intercept 
range (see chapter V). The implication for arms control 
and weapon system selection is why the emphasis on a defen­
sive system to defeat the Soviets over U.S. territory. The 
question may be asked, Why is emphasis not placed on long- 
range defensive systems that move the combat environment 
away from the U.S. territory?
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Research in the realm of development of a strategic 
nuclear policy to establish the national security goals is 
appropriate. Once the goals are established, the strategic 
weapons to meet these goals will need to be defined. The 
benefit of this additional research is that it may stop the 
cyclic shifts from long-range offensive weapons to short- 
range defensive weapons. Further research would be appro­
priate on the impacts of beam technology, the hunter-killer 
satellite concept, and the deployment of cruise missiles 
launched from stand-off long-range aircraft.
Recommendations
Based on the results of this research, the fol­
lowing recommendations are suggested:
1. The U.S. defensive triad posture should be 
retained. There is merit in the argument that diversity 
of weapons systems complicates the adversaries attack plan­
ning. Retaining redundant systems insures that there will 
be surviving weapons capable of accomplishing the deterrent 
mission.
Allowing the ICBM component of the U.S. defensive 
triad to be neutralized by an adversary's threat will in­
crease the possiblity of nuclear war rather than decrease 
it. Reducing the defensive posture to a dyad permits the 
Soviets to concentrate research and developmental efforts 
toward countermeasures for defeating the remaining two de­
fensive components.
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2. Minuteman II and Minuteman III constitute the 
nucleus of the land-based leg of the defensive component 
and must be retained as is until they can be supplemented. 
Measures can be taken to enhance credibility and alleviate 
the vulnerability issue. Modification and technological 
improvements should continue on these systems for accuracy 
and extension of remaining useful life. Programs to convert 
Minuteman to a mobile concept should not be considered. The 
basic design is intended to be a fixed-base deployment and 
the conversion effort would be extensive. Production restart 
programs are needed that would require three to four years
to reach production capability. Silo hardening modification 
can be made that will increase the survivability factors of 
the system.
3. It is recommended that 2,300 horizontal launchers 
be built in the Great Basin area and 200 of the MX missiles
be placed on production contracts at the earliest possible 
time. This recommendation is based on the belief that the 
perceived threat is real, that the multiple protective shel­
ter with its deceptive location of the hot missile capability 
is the least vulnerable, and that verification could be 
accommodated.
o It is suggested that 100 of the missiles be placed 
in the 2,300 horizontal launchers with 25 retained 
as logistics support. The remainder should be 
used to replace the operational Titans and to 
start replacement of the Minuteman II system.
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o The horizontal shelter utilizing the linear 
grid maximizes the impact of the land-based MX.
It is mobile to the extent that it can be trans­
ported between shelters within the grid.
o The deployment of the MX may produce a deterrent 
effect on the international environment that is 
not dependent upon the numbers deployed. Deploy­
ment of the MX with its long range, accuracy, 
and multiple warheads gives the U.S. the same 
counter-silo capability as the Soviets. Given 
that the stability perception of the mobile MX 
is controversial, the deployment with the terminal 
ballistic missile defense would make the number 
of incoming rounds to destroy MX large enough 
that it would not be a profitable target.
o This phased deployment has a number of advantages :
- MX development coexists with the development 
of the synfuel industries through decreased 
competiton for the resources required.
- It reestablishes the triad concept and partially 
alleviates the perception that the superpowers 
are not strategically equivalent.
- The remaining 2,300 shelters could be used as 
a bargaining chip in the next negotiations to 
reduce the growing numbers of Soviet ICBMs.
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- The social, economic, environmental, and 
natural resources requirements are minimized.
o Public opinion polls taken in the proposed de­
ployment area on September 4, 1981 indicate that 
the decision to deploy MX in the Great Basin area 
would be supported if the president elected to 
put it there.
o Constraints to implementing this course of action 
are :
- Additional requirements for water and energy will 
be required with peak requirements occurring 
during the construction period. The additional 
requirements for these resources have not been 
coordinated with the states of Nevada and Utah. 
The amounts of these resources available during 
the construction period are unknown.
- The proposed deployment must compete with the 
pending development of the synthetic fuel and 
other industries for skilled labor. The syn­
thetic fuel development program is proposed to 
be at its peak during the time of MX construc­
tion. This will also cause large influxes of 
people into areas that currently do not have 
adequate facilities to accommodate them.
- Implementation of this recommendation will re­
quire the resolution of the amounts of water and
with MX.
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and energy available than can be purchased or 
allocated for MX allocation. Federal impact 
assistance programs to alleviate the impact 
of the influx of people must be initiated.
- It is recognized that the peak of the estimated 
Soviet threat will occur in the 1985-1986 per­
iod before MX could reach an initial operation­
al capability; however, it appears to be the 
system that can most quickly be deployed.
4. The Lo a d should be deployed in conjunction
o MX deployed in the horizontal multiple protective 
shelter mode with LoAD increases the leverage of 
the incoming kill ratio by a factor of 2:1 or 
3:1.
o Deployment of the LoAD with the MX grid system 
effectively reduces the cost of a LoAD deploy­
ment to that of the hardware costs. The LoAD 
canisters may be placed in the MX shelters. The 
LoAD deployment will not cause the social upheaval 
that its predecessor. Safeguard, did. Because 
of its short range, the system is not intended 
to defend countervalue targets.
o Constraints to implementing this course of 
action are:
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The ABM Treaty expired in 1982 and a political 
decision must be made concerning its renewal 
for an additional five years. Article III(b) 
of the original ABM Treaty permitted the de­
ployment of an ABM system with a radius of 150 
kilometers within a silo complex with no more 
than 100 launchers and 100 interceptors.
Article XV 2 states that the parties shall have 
the right to withdraw if either decides that 
extraordinary events related to the subject mat­
ter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme 
interests. Either party can withdraw after giv­
ing a six-month notice.
The ABM Treaty should not be abrogated in 1982. 
The assumption is made that the LoAD cannot be 
deployed prior to the MX operational capability 
date of July 1986. The ABM issues should be 
addressed now through the Standing Consultative 
Commission (SCC) channel. Since the Soviets 
have continued their ABM efforts, there may 
well be an interest in reviving the original 
article III(b) provision that permitted ABM 
deployment around the fixed-based silo fields. 
Using the SCC channel will further clarify and 
communicate the concern with the expanding 
Soviet offensive capability. If the threat
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continues to intensify, the treaty can be 
abrogated with the six-month notice.
The development of nuclear weapons and inter­
continental delivery systems has transformed the security 
status of the United States. These technologies have made 
preemptive attack and rapid retaliation possible. The 
attack-retaliate capabilities have increased the dependence 
on deterrence and the credibility of strategic nuclear forces 
as a means of preserving national security.
It is not sufficient for the United States to main­
tain a strategic triad if that triad does not pose a credible 
response. The MX and its multiple protective sheltering con­
cept provides that perception. To this end it may be advan­
tageous to the United States that MX can be perceived as a 
first-strike system.
Given that strategic nuclear forces provide the 
foundation for U.S. foreign policy in peace and war, they 
in themselves are not sufficient. Sufficient conventional 
weaponry and strategic planning for their use must be in­
cluded in the debate about nuclear war avoidance. Mainten­
ance of a balanced defense posture not only provides for 
national security but it also provides a basis for the nego­
tiation of equitable arms limitations agreements. This bal­
anced force must be of such a size and character that pro­
duces the perception that the United States cannot be coerced 
or intimidated.
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Recognition must be given to the fact that the 
international environment is no longer a two-superpower 
relationship with the United States recognized as the nation 
at the top. Since the end of World War II, the Soviets have 
been steadily increasing their military strength to reach 
a point of parity with the United States. The United States, 
at the same time, was assisting the Western European allies, 
Japan, Korea, and the Republic of Taiwan, and others, in 
their efforts to regain their military strength. Preserving 
the democratic way of life in this changing environment re­
quires large expenditures of funds and occasionally some 
inconvenience of having a weapon system located in the 
neighborhood. We, as Americans, must realize that if we 
continue to go to the dance— the fiddler must be paid.
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Chapter VII Endnotes
^Personal interviews were held with some of the 
nation's leading arms control experts during the research 
and preparation of this dissertation. Some of these indi­
viduals are not listed in the personal interview section of 
the bibliography. Those not listed preferred not to be 
because of their present positions and roles in the national 
security program. Several attempts to interview former 
Presidents Nixon and Carter were made to no avail. Response 
from the Nixon offices indicated that his appointment calendar 
was full for the entire year of 1981; however, the request 
was placed on file for future consideration. Carter's 
appointment secretary stated that he was dedicated to the 
writing of his memoirs and could not be disturbed.
The inclusion of those interviewed in the biblio­
graphy does not constitute their endorsement of this disser­
tation. The conclusions reached are the researcher's own.
The thrust of the dissertation and the conclusions were 
discussed with each of them. All agreed that the approach 
was sound and most of the conclusions valid. The disagree­
ments were in the area of the MX site selection. One disa­
greed with the stated magnitude of the impact of technology 
creep.
A series of questions was prepared for these 
interviews. The basic questions were:
- In your opinion is the MX program required?
- How should it be deployed?
- Should the ABM be deployed with MX?
- How should the ABM Treaty changes be handled to 
accommodate the deployment?
- What are the most significant factors that 
impact progress in arms control?
- How could the arms control process be improved?
The responses given were highly opinionated; each person 
was convinced that his approach was the optimum. The inter­
views were from fifteen to ninety minutes in length. Some 
of these individuals are very skilled in the art of evading 
questions which they really do not wish to answer. The 
cooperation of all has been appreciated. Their responses 
have contributed to the contents of this research.
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For an excellent discussion on the history of 
ABM, see chapter 3 of the dissertation prepared by Dr. 
William C. Wall, University of Oklahoma, 1978, entitled 
"An Analysis of Management Control in a Complex Large-Scale 
Endeavor: The Safeguard Ballistic Defense System Program."
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APPENDIX 1
SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROVISIONS 
OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
Antartic— Internationalizes and demilitarizes the Antartic 
continent.
Hot Line Agreement— Provides direct communication between
heads of government to reduce danger of accidental 
war, miscalculation, or surprise attack which might 
trigger a nuclear war.
Limited Test Ban— Prohibits nuclear weapons tests or explo­
sions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under 
water.
Outer Space— Governs activities of nation states in the
exploration and use of outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies.
Prohibit Nuclear Weapons in South America— Limits spread of 
nuclear weapons by preventing their introduction 
into areas hitherto free of them.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation— Prohibits diversion of nuclear 
materials from peaceful purposes by an interna­
tional system of safeguards.
Seabed Arms Control— Prohibits placement of nuclear weapons
or other weapons of mass destruction of the seabed.
Improved Hotline— Improves communications links of previous 
agreement.
Nuclear Accidents--Provides for improvement and maintenance 
of technical safeguards against accidental launch, 
immediate notification of accidental launch, and 
advance notification of launches beyond territory 
of launching party.
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Biological Weapons Convention— Prohibits development,
production, and stockpiling of bacteriological 
and toxin weapons and provides for their 
destruction.
ABM— Places limitations on antiballistic missile systems.
Interim Agreement on Offensive Strategic Arms— A holding
action to complement the ABM by limiting competi­
tion in offensive arms.
Standing Consultative Commission— Provides for discussion of 
treaty violations or any subject pertaining to 
strategic arms limitation.
Basic Principles of Negotiations on Further Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms— Establishes ground rules 
for initiation of SALT II negotiations.
Threshold Test Ban Treaty with Protocol— Prohibits testing 
of underground nuclear weapons having a yield 
exceeding 150 kilotons of TNT.
Protocol to the ABM— Permits each side to reserve its deci­
sion relative to the original choice of ABM sites.
Limitation of Underground Explosions for Peaceful Purposes—  
Governs underground nuclear explosions carried out 
at locations outside specified weapons test site 
contained in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
Environmental Modification Convention— Prohibits military 
or any other hostile use of environmental modi­
fication techniques.
SALT II— Provides for limitations of certain strategic offen­
sive weapons systems.
APPENDIX 2
ORGANIZATION FOR SALT
The organization put together by Nixon was shaped 
so that it was fully responsive to the centralized White 
House direction within the National Security Council (NSC) 
system. The organizations primarily involved in the SALT 
process NSC system were the ACDA, Department of Defense (DOD), 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Department of State. 
Figure 2-1 depicts the organization chart which reflects the 
working relationships established by President Nixon. The 
organization under the National Security Council were estab­
lished as a result of National Security Study 28 (Newhouse, 
1973; 162) (see figure 2-2).
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
On January 20, 1969, the reorganization of the NSC 
was started and was necessary since Nixon intended to block 
the bureaucracy's tendency to dilute his options by present­
ing firm positions on foreign policy issues. Kissinger estab­
lished six new functions within the NSC and set himself up 
as chairman of five of them (Platt, 1978: 10-11; also see
Cronin, 1979: 239). The need for cooperation and consensus
225
226
FIGURE 2-1 
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FIGURE 2-2 
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remained, but Nixon and Kissinger intended to acquire 
concurrence through other than traditional means.
VERIFICATION PANEL 
The Verification Panel was established in July 1969 
by suggestion of Kissinger, with himself as its chairman.
The primary function of the panel was to review all stra­
tegic, political, and verification implications of SALT.
It was comprised of Kissinger, ACDA Director Smith, Secretary 
of State Richardson, Secretary of Defense Laird, Chairman of 
the JCS, CIA Director, and the U.S. Attorney General Mitchell 
(Wolfe, 1979: 26-29). Creation of the Verification Panel
did several things relative to the shaping of the SALT pro­
cess. It moved the center of SALT planning from the ACDA to 
the White House. It served as a pacifier to the JCS, who had 
been concerned about the verification process. It provided 
a structured concept for soliciting analytical work on SALT 
policy alternatives from the National Security Bureaucracy, 
while giving the relevant agencies access to the analytical 
process, even if not to the ultimate decision process (Platt, 
1978: 10-11). The new panel further indicated that politi­
cal direction and decisions would be made from the top down, 
eliminating the lengthy bureaucratic process. Kissinger's 
public statement regarding establishment of this panel was 
that it virtually eliminated the narrow adversary approach 
that had previously dominated the SALT process (Platt, 1973: 
10). What it did not say was the formulation of this working
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group was the first step completed by Kissinger to dominate 
the strategic arms limitation process.
VERIFICATION PANEL WORKING GROUP 
This working group was the support group to the 
Verification Panel that was also chaired by Henry Kissinger.
It was comprised of, or at least had access to, hundreds of 
specialists from within the DOD organization. The work group 
produced exhaustive studies on the SALT options and possible 
negotiation positions. The group produced nine options that 
could be used by the negotiating team on the premise that it 
left the negotiating options open, and the front team would 
not have to return to Washington for instructions so fre­
quently. William Van Cleave, a negotiating team member, 
described the Verification Panel decision process as follows. 
"Dr. Kissinger and his staff decided the work to be done, the 
issues to be addressed, the agendas of inter-agency meetings 
and usually the wording of directives. . ." (Platt, 1978: 11;
also see Newhouse, 1973: 162).
THE UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE 
This committee, chaired by the deputy secretary 
of state, had membership paralleled by that of the Verifi­
cation Panel, and consequently it never got particularly 
active in the SALT process. The function that it did serve 
to some degree was to monitor the United States' compliance 
with the negotiated SALT I treaty.
230
THE SALT BACK STOPPING COMMITTEE 
This committee functioned as the direct support 
group to the U.S. SALT delegation. It was chaired by the 
deputy director of ACDA, and was composed of representatives 
of the Verification Panel. Primarily, it directed requests 
to and from the negotiating team to the proper organization 
for staffing. Critical issues, such as decisions on dead­
locked negotiating points, were directed to the Verification 
Panel (Platt, 1978; 30).
THE SALT DELEGATION (ON SITE)
The SALT delegation was the on site negotiator for 
Salt I. The principals were: Gerard Smith, chief negotiator;
Phillip Farley, alternate chairman; Ambassador Llewellyn 
Thompson; Harold Brown; Paul Nitze; and General Royall 
Allison. According to Gerard Smith (1980: 39) these indi­
viduals were all seasoned arms control men who had been in­
volved in the pre-negotiation efforts during the Johnson 
administration. Smith further states that he doubts if the 
Nixon people were aware of how deeply the principals were 
involved during the previous administration.
Each one of these people was picked because of a 
special attribute or background. Smith (1980: 14) had
worked in the arms control arena under Presidents Truman, 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. During this time he had 
developed good working relationships with the major depart­
ments involved in national security and had been appointed 
ACDA Director.
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The appointment of an ACDA Director was a 
controversial matter. Many of the military people had the 
idea that Smith would be a dis-armer rather than a controller. 
Newhouse (1973; 43) writes that Smith was a competent nego­
tiator with a good grasp of the issues but to direct both 
ACDA and SALT is a compromise in the event that ACDA had 
differing views from the White House on some issue. When 
these views clashed. Smith knew that the White House would 
prevail (see Kissinger, 1979: 539). The Hon. John J. McCloy
stated in the hearings before the House of Representatives 
(p. 10) that the ACDA should not always be the chief nego­
tiator due to the requirement of being away from his duty 
station for extended periods. An interesting point in Smith's 
behalf is that he was the only member of the negotiation 
contingency that spoke the Russian language.
Smith (1980: 38-44) writes that Farley was chosen
because he was the Deputy ACDA Director; Thompson because of 
his expertise in Soviet relations; Brown for his knowledge 
of science and technology, international politics, and manage­
ment experience; Nitze because of his experience in national 
security affairs; and General Allison due to experience in 
long range strategic planning and politico-military affairs. 
These principals were supported by a contingency that ranged 
from twenty-five to one hundred people on site (Wolfe, 1979: 
33.
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U.S. COMPONENT STANDING 
CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) was 
not part of the decision-making process and may be con­
sidered a result of SALT I. Its function was to consider 
questions of compliance with obligations of the SALT Treaty.
It was officially constituted in December 1972, and was made 
up of equal numbers of U.S. and Soviet delegates. Beginning 
in May 1973, its function was separated from the SALT nego­
tiating process (Rhinelander, 1974: 153-54).
The meetings of this commission are classified secret 
and their minutes are not published. Either side can raise 
any question that it sees fit relative to compliance or to 
interference with the national technical means. Rhinelander 
writes that the most important function of the commission 
would be the agreement relevant to when missile systems must 
be dismantled in accordance with negotiated treaties (1974: 
153-54).
CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT
Congressional involvement is best viewed from an 
overview, since there were countless incursions, conflicts, 
and controversies during the formative period of SALT covered 
by this paper. The Senate did not play a very meaningful 
role in the formulation of foreign policy during the period 
of November 1969 to 1972. The Senate, as an institution, 
and very few Senators, as individuals, expressed much more
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than lip service in keeping informed on current status of 
SALT. They did not request details, question or debate the 
policy goals, or attempt to offer any alternatives to those 
that were presented (Platt, 1978: 30).
The Administration initiated action in May 1972 to 
ensure ratification of SALT I by increasing contacts with 
Congress through presentations. It agreed to link the Treaty 
to a modernization program on offensive weapons systems to 
appease conservatives in Congress, and to satisfy the pri­
mary gadfly of the period. Senator Henry Jackson, by attach­
ing his Interim Offensive Weapons Agreement (Platt, 1978: 31).
Congressional activity during the 1972-1974 period 
was very similar to that of the prior three-year period. 
Senators Case, Cranston, Humphrey, Jackson, Kennedy, Mathias, 
Mondale, and Muskie were the primary individual actors of 
the time. The overall attitude toward foreign policy formu­
lation in this period seems to bear out the philosophy that 
it is the realm and primary responsibility of the president. 
Congressional activity did become more active beginning in 
1972 with the ratification of SALT I.
Kissinger in the period 1959 to 1973 was not re­
quired to brief Congress due to his executive privilege status. 
Briefings given to Congress were one sided (Platt, 1978: 45).
Kissinger had pursued the necessary congressional members 
and committee heads to insure his confirmation as secretary 
of state in 1973. Platt (1978: 46-48) writes that Congress
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thought the days of executive privilege were over and after 
being assued that a new era of cooperation, between the 
strategic arms limitation process and Kissinger, would be 
forthcoming were surprised at the first briefing. When 
Kissinger was asked for SALT II specifics, his response 
was words to the effect that not much is new, not much 
progress has been made, but expressed hope for great success 
in the next meetings.
STATE DEPARTMENT
In the case of the Nixon administration, the 
department did not play a significant role in the arms con­
trol process because of his inherent distrust of the depart­
ment. Nixon selected Rogers as his Secretary of State know­
ing that Kissinger would be the dominant one in the 
relationship which met his requirement for handling foreign 
policy from the White House.
It is significant to reiterate the fact that ACDA 
is an element of the Department of State and the point that 
Kissinger was made Secretary of State in 1973. At this 
point in the SALT process, the congressional intent was to 
confirm Kissinger as Secretary of State, which would remove 
his executive privilege when testifying before Congress in 
order that they might be more informed. Nixon had placed 
Kissinger in the position that now gave the president almost 
complete control of SALT. He had placed Kissinger on the 
NSC, Kissinger had made himself chairman of all NSC
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subcommittees, and he was now Secretary of State, which 
automatically placed the ACDA under Kissinger's direction.
The complete domination of the National Security Council 
is illustrated in figure 2-2. This illustration has been 
included to delineate the number of areas chaired by 
Kissinger.
MILITARY SALT GROUPS
The DOD was represented by two groups, one chaired 
by the Chairman, JCS, and the other by the Office of Secre­
tary of Defense (OSD). See figure 2-3. These two organi­
zations remained virtually intact during the 1968-1974 period, 
The JCS, in keeping with their statutory role, retained a 
relatively independent voice throughout the SALT arena.
There was not always a solid front presented from the Penta­
gon side. They were at odds many times with OSD, reflecting 
the mood of the current Secretary of Defense (Wolfe, 1978: 
40-43).
The National Security Council structure utilized 
by the Carter administration is shown in figure 2-4. The 
major change is that he abolished the Verification Panel 
and replaced it with a similar group called the Special 
Coordinating Committee.
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FIGURE 2-4 
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APPENDIX 3
SALT I TREATY SUMMARY 
The SALT I negotiations lasted for two and a 
half years, with seven rounds of meetings, each lasting four 
to seven months. The rounds involved a total of one hundred 
sessions between the delegates. The location of the seven 
rounds alternated between Helsinki and Vienna, with meeting 
sites alternating between the American and Soviet embassies 
(Nash, 1973: 167). See table 3-1.
SALT I produced four agreements. Two of these, the 
ABM Treaty and the Interim Offensive Strategic Weapons Agree­
ment, deal with arms control. The other two are executive 
type agreements that were entered into without congressional 
debate or ratification. These were the Accident Measures 
and the revised Hot Line Agreements.
The ABM Treaty 
The ABM Treaty was ratified by a Senate vote of 
88-2. Prior to 1972, Congress had played a minimal role in 
the SALT process. After May 1972, it became directly involved 
through its formal role in ratifying any treaties produced 
as a result of negotiations by the Executive Branch and 
through the provisions of the Arms Control and Disarmament
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TABLE 3-1 
SALT I NEGOTIATION SESSIONS
SALT I: NOVEMBER 1969-M A Y 1972
SALT
SESSION
1. HELSINKI
2. VIENNA
3. HELSINKI
4. VIENNA
5. HELSINKI
6. VIENNA
7. HELSINKI
SUMMIT
MOSCOW
OTHER
MEETING
WASHINGTON
MOSCOW
CHIEF
PARTICIPANTS
DELEGATIONS
DELEGATIONS
DELEGATIONS
KISSINGE R/DOBR VNIN
DELEGATIONS
DELEGATIONS
DELEGATIONS
DELEGATIONS
KISSINGER/BREZHNEV
NIXON/BREZHNEV
DATES
NO V-D EC  1969 
APR-AUG 1970 
NO V-D EC  1970 
JAN 1971 
M A R -M A V  1971 
JUL-SEP 1971 
NOV 71-FE B  72 
M A R -M A V  1972 
APR 1972 
MAY 1972
SOURCE: WOLFE, THE SALT EXPERIENCE. BALLINGER: 
CAMBRIDGE. 1979, P. 277.
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Act of 1951, calling for congressional cognizance of arms 
control understandings. The ratified treaty was of unlimited 
duration and stipulated that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were 
both limited to two ABM complexes, one for the nation's capi­
tals of Washington and Moscow, and the second to protect one 
field of intercontinental ballistics missiles. Each site 
would be limited to 100 ABMs, or a total of 200 ABMs for each 
country. The U.S. protection site was determined to be Grand 
Forks, North Dakota, while the Soviet site, unidentified, 
would be at least 800 miles from Moscow. This separation 
was to match the U.S. separation pattern and it would preclude 
the Soviets from utilizing the two allowed sites in conjunc­
tion to protect two-thirds of their population and industry 
that was concentrated in European Russia (Nash, 1973; 173).
At the time of ratification, the U.S. had started 
construction on two sites, the Grand Forks site and Malstrom 
Air Force Base in Montana. The capital site construction 
had not started. The Soviets had almost completed their 
capital site, but had not started the distant site. Malstrom 
dismantling and destruction started in October 1972. A July 
1974 Protocol Document to the ABM Treaty reduced the ABM 
site limits to one for each country. Russia obviously selected 
the capital site, and the U.S. kept the Grand Forks installa­
tion which was subsequently turned into a radar test and 
listening post.
The Interim Offensive Strategic Weapons Agreement 
was an executive agreement that did not require a two-thirds
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Senate approval, although it <, is required to have a majority 
of congressional support in accordance with the establish­
ment of ACDA in 1961. It was passed by an 88-2 vote. The 
Agreement, with an expiration date of 1977, limited all 
ICBMs to those under construction or deployed at the time.
The U.S.S.R. was permitted to retain 1,618 operational ICBMs 
including a total of 313 heavy (SS-9) missiles to the U.S. 
total of 1,054 including 54 Titan missiles. SLBMs were fro­
zen to the 1972 levels allowing the U.S.S.R. to have 62 nuclear 
powered submarines containing 710 launchers (Russett, 1978: 
28-32).
These two agreements did not place qualitative 
improvement restrictions; thus, each nation could proceed 
with any improvements, including MIRV and technological 
changes, that it saw fit. To improve and increase offensive 
strengths, each nation could continue to produce more power­
ful ICBMs to put in existing silos.
Each nation could discontinue the treaty with a 
six-month prior notification if it felt that its national 
security was threatened. Open on-site inspection was not 
permitted, but each nation was allowed to verify compliance 
without intentional interference by the other country.
The Accident Measures, or the "agreement on mea­
sures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war," con­
sisted of three pledges. These were:
1. To take measures that each county considers 
necessary to safeguard against accidental or 
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.
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2. To notify each other immediately should a risk 
of nuclear war arise from detection by early 
warning systems of unidentified objects or 
from accidental, unauthorized, or other unex­
plained incidents involving a possible detona­
tion of a nuclear weapon.
3. To give advance notice of planned missile launches 
beyond the territory of the launching party and
in the direction of the other party.
The Hot Line Agreement was an extension of the 1963 
agreement which established a wire telegraph circuit routed 
from Washington-London-Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow.
The 1971 agreement provided for establishment of a satellite 
communication link between Moscow and Washington.
SALT I Negotiation Tradeoffs
Tha negotiation process must contain an element 
of compromise and the granting of concessions. The U.S. con­
cessions (Russett, 1978: 32) have been depicted as follows:
1. Accepted a "Soviet numerical superiority in 
landbased ICBM launchers.
2. Agreed to postpone a discussion of MIRV.
3. Agreed not to include the U.S.S.R.'s IRBMs.
The Soviet concessions were:
1. Agreed not to discuss any U.S. tactical offen­
sive units located near the U.S.S.R.
2. Agreed to impose a numerical ceiling on the 
SS-9 (heavy missiles).
3. Agreed to shift from concentrating exclusively 
on defensive weapons to a discussion of defen­
sive and offensive weapons.
4. Accepted, under certain conditions, a ceiling 
on submarine based missile launchers.
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5. Agreed not to limit strategic bombers (B52s) 
in initial discussions.
SALT I Assessment 
The first phase of SALT was concluded on May 26, 
1972, when President Nixon and General Brezhnev signed the 
ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. The treaty preamble 
stated each side's intention to end the nuclear arms race 
at the earliest possible date, and to reduce strategic arms. 
While the talks were in progress, the U.S. added about 2,000 
nuclear warheads and the U.S.S.R. added approximately 1,000 
to their respective arsenals (Wolfe, 1979: 94-113).
From a political perspective, even though the U.S. 
and U.S.S.R. are political, military, and ideological 
adversaries, the spirit of detente had been invoked through 
the SALT process. While most of the more controversial sub­
jects had been deferred, both sides had recognized the in­
herent dangers of nuclear war.
U.S. Assessment 
Some opinions, both congressional and public, were 
that the U.S. had come away with having given up too much 
in quantitative numbers to the Soviets to compensate for the 
U.S. advantages in technological capability and geographic 
asymmetries. The agreements did not promise to eliminate 
Soviet-American strategic competition, but they did entail 
a considerable political investment by both sides, creating
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what might have been called a "SALT imperative"— the 
requirement for both sides to avoid steps or actions that 
would derail further negotiations. The political investment 
by the U.S. is considered to be greater than the U.S.S.R., 
because ratification of SALT I verified or put a stamp of 
validation on the U.S.S.R. as an equal superpower. The Treaty 
had also given up the capability to defend the ICBM line of 
defense. Senator Jackson said that "the present agreement 
is likely to lead to a technological arms race, with great 
uncertainties, profound instability, and considerable costs." 
Henry Kissinger countered this criticism by pointing out that 
the U.S. had maintained superiority in numbers of strategic 
bombers. President Nixon said, "Phase 1 is the breakthrough 
and Phase 2 is the culmination" (Nixon, 1978: 81).
APPENDIX 4
SALT II TREATY SUMMARY 
The SALT II negotiations initiated in 1972 lasted 
approximately six and one half years. See table 4-1 for 
meetings that occurred. During the negotiation period, 
both participants continued to modernize and increase nu­
clear weapons stockpiles. The base line finally presented 
for verification purposes is shown on page 80. The U.S. 
inventory grew to over 9,000 warheads and the U.S.S.R. ac­
quired in excess of 4,000. Of the U.S. weapons, 3,600 have 
one-megaton warhead capability, which represents ten times 
the power required to destroy the major cities of the Soviet 
Union. Secretary of Defense Brown, in his fiscal year 1979 
report, stated that the U.S. must have the capability to 
destroy a minimum of 200 Soviet cities which contain 34 per­
cent of the population and 62 percent of its industrial 
capacity. (Wolfe, 1979; 94-113). It is expected that the
Soviets could accomplish the same destruction to the United 
States.
SALT II Interim Period 
There were three sets of issues remaining or 
carried over from SALT I that had to be cleared prior to
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TABLE 4 -1  
SALT II NEGOTIATION SESSIONS
S A LT  II: SEPTEMBER 1972-JA N U A R Y  1979
SALT OTHER CHIEF
SESSION SUM M IT M EETING PARTICIPANTS DATES
MOSCOW KISSINGER/BREZHNEV/GROM YKO SEP 1972
1. GENEVA DELEGATIONS N D V -O E C  1972
2. GENEVA DELEGATIONS M A R -A P R  1973
3. GENEVA DELEGATIONS M A Y -J U N  1973
MOSCOW KISSINGER/BREZHNEV/GROMYKO M A Y  1973
WASHINGTON NIXON/BREZHNEV JUN 1973
4. GENEVA DELEGATIONS S EP-N O V 1973
5. GENEVA DELEGATIONS FE B -A P R  1974
WASHINGTON NIXON/KISSINGER/GROM YKO FEB 1974
MOSCOW KISSINGER/BREZHNEV/GROMYKO M AR 1974
WASHINGTON NIXON/KISSINGER/GROM YKO APR 1974
GENEVA KISSINGER/GROMYKO APR 1974
MOSCOW NIXON/BREZHNEV JU N -J U L  1974
6. GENEVA DELEGATIONS S E P -N O V  1974
WASHINGTON FOHD/KIC-TiNGER/GROMVÿ-VO. SEP 1974
MOSCOW KISSINGE R/BREZHNE W/GROM YKO OCT 1974
V LA D IV O S TO K FORD/BREZHNEV " NOV 1974
7. GENEVA DELEGATIONS J A N -M A Y  1975
GENEVA KISSINGER/GROMYKO FEB 1975
V IE N N A KISSINGER/GROMYKO M A Y  1975
8. GENEVA DELEGATIONS J U L -N O V  1975
GENEVA KISSINGER/GROMYKO JUL 1975
HELSINK I FORD/BREZHNEV J U L -A U G  1975
WASHINGTON FORD/KISSINGER/GROMYKO SEP 1975
9. G ENEVA DELEGATIONS DEC 1975
10. G ENEVA DELEGATIONS J A N -M A Y  1976
MOSCOW KISSINGER/BREZHNEV/GROM YKO JAN 1976
11. G ENEVA DELEGATIONS JU N -J U L  1976
12. G ENEVA DELEGATIONS SE P -N O V  1976
NEW YORK KISSINGER/GROMYKO SEP 1976
WASHINGTON FORO/GROMYKO OCT 1976
MOSCOW VANCE/BREZHNEV/GROM YKO M AR 1977
13. G ENEVA DELEGATIONS M A Y -D E C  1977
GENEVA VANCE/GROMYKO M A Y  1977
WASHINGTON CARTER/VANCE/GROM YKO SEP 1977
14. GENEVA DELEGATIONS JAN 1978
MOSCOW VANCE/BREZHNEV/GROM YKO APR 1978
WASHINGTON CARTER/VANCE/GROM YKO M AY 1978
NEW YORK VANCE/GROMYKO JUNE 1978
GENEVA VANCE/GROM YKO JUL 1978
MOSCOW W ARNKE/GROMYKO SEP 1978
NEW YORK VANCE/GROMYKO SEP 1978
WASHINGTON CARTER/VANCE/GROM YKO SEP-OCT 1978
MOSCOW VANCE/BREZHNEV/GROM YKO OCT 1978
GENEVA VANCE/GROMYKO DEC 1978
SOURCE: WOLFE, THE SALT EXPERIENCE. BALLINGER: 
CAMBRIDGE, 1979, PP. 277-278.
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initiation of the primary issues in SALT II (Wolfe, 1979; 
94-113). These were:
1. How to convert the Interim Agreement, which 
was to expire in October 1977, into a com­
prehensive agreement that would satisfy the 
Soviet requirement of "equal security and
no unilateral advantage" and the U.S. require­
ment for "essential equivalence."
2. How to apply qualitative and quantitative con­
trols to MIRV systems on an equitable basis.
3. What provisions to adopt with regard to 
nuclear-capable U.S. forward-based systems 
(FBS) which were intended for NATO defense 
but considered by the U.S.S.R. to be a stra­
tegic threat to their homeland.
The problem of converting the Interim Agreement 
was not resolved since there seemed to be no common point
of departure for negotiation. The back channel and summitry
could not solve the issue, and in July 1974 it was dropped 
with a weak resolution that it would be considered again 
under a set of provisional limitations running from 1977 to 
1985. It is to be noted that it was extended in 1977 to 
last at least until SALT II is dispositioned by the U.S. 
government.
The MIRV issue had been previously set aside, partly 
because the Soviets had not completed development and test­
ing of the technology. The U.S. offered to limit planned 
MIRV deployment, tied to an approximate equality in throw- 
weight in deployed MIRVs, while at the same time proposing 
no payload restrictions on missiles without MIRV. This was 
rejected and countered by a proposal to limit MIRVs by
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numbers, not throw-weight, which was rejected by the U.S. 
After a series of offer-counter-offers, Kissinger stated 
that it might be solved if Brezhnev and his colleagues took 
matters of strategic policy into their own hands (removing 
the issue from Soviet military affairs to a political 
decision). The solution will be discussed later in the 
Vladivostok meeting.
The FBS issue was critical to the U.S. because it 
involved the credibility of standing commitments to NATO 
defense. It was equally important politically to the Soviets 
because of its aim to keep the NATO alliance fragmented and 
strategically important from the aspect of keeping limited 
potential damage to the Soviet Union in case of war fror.- 
the NATO source. This issue also was resolved at the 
Vladivostok conference.
There were other areas of divergence in the stra­
tegic philosophic approaches. The U.S. concept of deterrence- 
the capability to survive an incoming attack and still have 
the capability to annihilate the attacker with the knowledge 
that the other side could do the same thing— was not accept­
able to the U.S.S.R. They were of the opinion that deter­
rence was a desirable characteristic, but could not hold on 
to the mutually assured destruction concept that it annotated. 
The U.S. concept implied that a nuclear war was unwinnable, 
and the Soviet strategy was that it could be won.
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The Vladivostok Summit
This summit meeting took place on November 24, 1974 
with the arrangements being made through back channel means. 
The participants of this summit were President Ford, Secre­
tary of State Kissinger, Secretary Brezhnev, and Foreign 
Minister Gromyko. After two days of negotiations, a declar­
ation of intent stating what the feature of SALT II would 
resemble was made. It would require more than four addi­
tional years to complete this negotiation. The essential 
features (Wolfe, 1979; 212-17) of the proposed accord were:
1. Establishment of an overall ceiling of 2,400 
strategic delivery vehicles, including ICBMs, 
SLBMs, and bombers.
2. An equal number of MIRVed launchers for each 
side, with any missile tested with MIRV to 
be counted as having MIRV capability.
3. Freedom to mix and match within the 2,400 
limit.
4. A sublimit of 313 heavy missiles with no new 
silo construction.
5. Deployment of land-mobile missiles and some 
types of bomber-launched missiles, but num­
bers to be included in the overall limit.
6. No constraint on modernization that would pre­
clude improvements in accuracy of deployment 
of new systems.
7. The new agreement would be in effect until 
1985, with the SALT I Interim Agreement being 
in effect until 1977.
8. Following conclusion of the new agreement, 
further negotiations for possible reductions 
in strategic arms would begin no later than 
1982.
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It is to be noted that the requirement for a 
comprehensive offensive agreement was dropped. The forward 
based systems issue was also deleted. It is also interest­
ing to note how closely these basic accords resemble the 
treaty signed in 1979.
These Vladivostok basic ground rules received a 
mixed reaction within the United States. Commentary ran the 
gauntlet from being too high in allowed numbers to the fact 
that the modernization clause left the door open for continued 
expenditures of large sums of money. On the positive side, 
the inclusion of MIRV for the first time and numbers of 
strategic bombers permitted were supported.
Vladivostok Implications
The Vladivostok summit had produced what was seem­
ingly a blueprint or grid which would only require a plugging 
in of numbers and the preparation of boiler-plate statements. 
However, the FBS issue was continued from the aspect that 
the Soviets should be compensated through larger numbers.
The issue, after a period of time, disappeared. It is sus­
pected that a reassessment by the Soviets occurred in which 
two conclusions might have been reached. First, the FBS was 
not as great a threat as originally thought. Second, and 
probably the most plausible, the determination was made that 
they had gotten maximum mileage from the issue during nego­
tiation, and it was not actually worth pursuit.
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The Cruise Missile question was linked to the 
Backfire bomber when satisfactory solutions could not be 
reached on individual systems. The Cruise point was the 
question relative to whether they should be counted at all, 
and the U.S. position on Backfire was that it had the poten­
tial to be used as a long-range bomber. The Soviets countered 
the Backfire inclusion with tying it to the U.S. FB-111 fighter 
plane, which was not being counted.
The U.S. proposed in 1976 that the Soviets be per­
mitted to have up to 250 Backfires, which would not be in­
cluded in the totals, and that Cruise missile categories 
(ALCM-SLCM-GLCM) be considered individually. The Soviets 
countered this with an offer to reduce the total of 2,400 
to 2,200 launchers, no limit on Backfires, and bombers carry­
ing greater than 10 ACLMs be included with range limited to 
1,000 miles, and all other forms not counted but limited to 
a maximum of 372 miles (Jones, 1979). These issues, being 
fairly close, were still not resolved. This was the last 
major proposal offered by the Ford-Kissinger era. Negotia­
tion continued on a low profile until the Carter administra­
tion.
In March 1977, President Carter issued two counter 
proposals, one which followed the Vladivostok basic guide, 
and one which took these basic guides and further reduced 
the maximum allowable quantities. Neither proposal included 
Backfire, but banned Cruise with greater than 1,500 miles
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range. The Soviets, being strategically oriented to the 
long range heavy ICBM technology, considered this as an 
effort to curtail their mainline of defense and rejected 
the proposal.
It is a matter of conjecture, but it is thought 
that the Soviets might have been reacting to the Carter 
style of diplomacy. He had come down hard on human rights 
issues and had pointed a finger directly at the Soviet Union 
on the subject. In addition. President Carter had made the 
content of the alternatives available to the American public 
prior to its formal presentation to the Soviet SALT team, 
which violated their tenet for secrecy during negotiation.
The SALT II Framework 
In May 1977, Secretary Vance made an additional 
proposal that separated the substance of SALT II into three 
categories: a treaty to run through 1985, based on the major
issues of the Vladivostok accords that could be agreed on; 
a Protocol Document to be attached to the treaty that would 
last for approximately three years that would contain the 
controversial issues such as Cruise and Backfire, mobile ICBM 
limitations, qualitative ICBM constraints, and limits con­
tained in the Protocol Document would be temporary; and a 
Joint Statement of Principles that would establish guidelines 
for follow on negotation for substantial reduction in numbers.
While the proposal was generally acceptable, the 
Soviets could not accept the proposal in its entirety. The
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U.S. proposed a 2,160 total; the Soviets wanted 2,250-— the 
figure finally agreed to. The U.S. proposed to be down to 
the agreed maximums by December 1981, while the Soviets held 
out for a longer period. The December 1981 date was agreed 
to. The Backfire was agreed not to be counted, deployment 
of Cruise was permitted after the end of the Protocol Docu­
ment, during which time the U.S. could deploy a land-based 
mobile ICBM. The Soviets agreed that the U.S. could continue 
to transfer its technology to its allies.
The SALT II Treaty
The Treaty signed on June 18, 1978, established
the following quantitative sublimits:
ICBM MIRV 820 MIRV warheads 10
SLBM MIRV 1,200 MIRV warheads 12
Bombers with Cruise 1,320 MIRV warheads 20
Combined strategic 
nuclear delivery 
vehicles of all 
types 2,250
The treaty limits both sides to building no more 
heavy missiles— i.e.. SS-18. This impacts the Soviets be­
cause they already had 313 in inventory. The rapid reload 
capability technology was suspended. Mobile land-based 
ICBMs will not be deployed until after 1981. The Soviets 
agreed not to build any more SS-16s to be mated with the 
SS-20 to produce a heavy ICBM. Treaty duration is through 
1985.
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The Protocol Document expires in 1981. The U.S. 
agreed not to build SLBM with a range greater than 360 
miles. Both sides will develop one ASBM.
Constraints to Ratification 
In an address to the Committee on Foreign Rela­
tions, General David Jones (1979), chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, summarized the position of the treaty sup­
porters when he said;
Despite differing degrees of concern on specific 
aspects of SALT II, all of us judge that the 
agreement which the President signed in Vienna 
is in the national interest and merits your 
support.
The opposition (Senator Baker) to the treaty is 
attacking the document content. The general consensus here 
is that the "as is" treaty, if implemented, will leave the 
U.S. in a weaker strategic position than that of the Soviets. 
The Russians will have more large systems and greater numbers 
of warheads. Part of the opposition's concern is that the 
war may be fought in stages, with the country having the 
most "shots" winning.
The opposition (Senator Glenn) also questions the 
capability of verification. The view on this point is that 
the more tightly controlled society of Russia will make ade­
quate verification by any means virtually impossible. One 
expert on Russia, Lev Navrozov (1979: 1287-94) has stated
that the Soviets have underground development, test, and pro­
duction facilities that are located under existing factories 
and cities.
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The opposition has many concerns relating to the 
concept of ratification by linkage— i.e., Russia is causing 
trouble all over the world, make them straighten up before 
ratification; Russia has placed troops in Cuba, make them 
remove the troops before ratification; increase U.S. defense 
spending by three percent this year, and by five percent 
next year prior to ratification.
Public interest groups of many sectors have taken 
an interest in SALT. The Association of United States Army, 
a lobby group (1979), has taken the position that the treat 
now being considered does not establish strategic weapons 
equality— it obscures the real weaknesses in our defense 
posture; AUSA cannot support ratification without a binding 
commitment from Congress and the executive branch to provide 
legislation and funding required to substantially recoup to 
growing imbalance in military capability.
A group made up of 150 religious leaders compris­
ing 30 denominations and about 65 religious organizations 
started a drive during the week of September 19, 1979, to 
support ratification. The president of the National Council 
of Churches issued a statement:
Never before has the leadership of so great a 
diversity of American religious organizations 
come together to say with one voice that arms 
limitations— through SALT II and SALT III— -must 
be a priority of this nation.
The external situation in Russia, relative to the 
ratification of SALT II by the U.S., is one of belief that
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the inclination of world events is right now in their favor, 
and that with the Carter administration in obvious disarray 
in Washington, they see no reason to refrain from cashing in 
wherever the change occurs (Dallas News, 1979). There were 
three major events that have occurred since the ratification 
procedures started in the U.S. to reinforce this attitude.
These were :
1. The announcement by the United States that 
there are approximately 3,000 Soviet troops stationed in Cuba, 
whose mission cannot be identified. The statements were 
issued as if the troop placement had just occurred? however, 
further investigation revealed that they had been there since 
the early to mid-seventies. Russian reaction to demands to 
withdraw the troops was negative, stating that they were not 
combat troops and would not be removed. The Dallas Morning 
News editor thought that the presence of those troops was 
symbolic— just one more symbol of the determination of the 
Communists to pursue their destructive aims.
2. The Soviets established a base off Japan's 
northern island of Hokkaido, which was detected by satellite 
observation. Since Japan is not a superpower, it cannot react 
as one when an increased military threat is realized in stra­
tegically located areas. Japan is interested in increased 
trade with both China and Russia, and does not want to be 
accused of attempting to play one against the other (Huntsville 
Times, 1979). This planned action is also a furtherance of 
Russia's goals.
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3. In view of the rearmament effort in the NATO 
alliance, Soviet party leader Brezhnev announced on October 6, 
1979, that Russia would be willing to withdraw 20,000 men 
and 1,000 tanks from East Germany. This offer contained 
the proviso that NATO should not permit any additional 
nuclear weapons to be placed in Western Europe and, in general 
terms, Breshnev alluded that he would reduce the number of 
strategic weapons aimed at Europe. Some Western analysts 
see this as the Soviets having three main objectives: to
try to prevent the emplacement in Western Germany and other 
NATO countries of hundreds of Pershing II and other ground- 
launched Cruise missiles targeted on the Soviet Union; to 
try to use the missile issue to divide Washington and its 
NATO allies— just as the Kremlin attempted some time ago 
with a similar propaganda campaign aimed against deployment 
of the neutron bomb; to reinforce at home, in Eastern Europe, 
and in the Third World, the Soviet Communist Party's self- 
perceived role as the major peacemaking force in the world 
(Huntsville Times, 1979).
GLOSSERY
Acronyms and Definitions
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM): Interceptor missile systems
to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements 
in flight.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
Arms Control: The process of regulating the numbers of
weapons systems to mutually agreed limits between two or 
more nations.
Circular Error Probable (CEP): Radius of a circle in nautical
miles within which half of any given number of warheads are 
expected to fall.
Counterforce: Policy of targeting attacks against the opponent's
nuclear strike force, thus presumably depriving him of the 
capability to retaliate.
Cruise Missiles: Un-manned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-
delivery vehicles which sustain flight through use of aero­
dynamic lift over most of their flight path and which may 
be flight-tested from or deployed on aircraft, ground or 
submarine.
Deterrence: The ability of a nation to persuade an adversary
that costs and risks accompanying an attack are greater than 
benefits to be obtained from the strike.
Essential Equivalence: Concept that requires U.S.-Soviet
strategic capabilities to be effectively equal but not 
necessarily identical in numbers.
Finite Deterrence: Sufficient force, after the absorption of
a first strike, to inflict an arbitrarily determined level 
of unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union. Term is some­
times referred to as "assured destruction."
Fratracide: Destruction of one or more incoming warheads by
the premature detonation of another.
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Heavy ICBM's: Defined in SALT I as those ICBM's having a
volume of 7 0 cubic meters (SS-11). Redefined in SALT II 
as having a volume equal to the SS-19, assumed to be 
greater than 100 cubic meters.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM); Land-based 
launchers of ballistic missiles capable of a range in 
excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern 
border of the Continental United States and the northwestern 
border of the continental territory of the U.S.S.R. (in 
excess of 3,400 miles).
Low Altitude Defense System (LoADS); ABM concept announced 
by the Army Ballistic Missile Defense Agency in early 1980.
Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MARV): Launch concept similar
to MIRV except re-entry vehicle possesses terminal guidance 
to evade defenses or correct targeting.
Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV):
Re-entry system launched from a fourth stage bus that carries 
a digital computer which permits positioning of the bus to 
separate a re-entry vehicle then fly to the next position, 
orient, and separate another vehicle. The re-entry vehicle 
with warhead does not possess a terminal guidance system.
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD): Concept of strategic
stability under which adversaries know that each retains 
capability to inflict massive levels of damage even after 
a first strike.
Missile Experimental (MX): Land-based mobile ICBM launcher
concept being considered as a supplement/replacement for 
Minuteman. These ICBM's are to be deployed under a "hide 
the pea" concept wherein more launch sites than launchers 
exist. Configuration of the mobile launcher is such that 
it is impossible, by aerial means, to determine whether 
or not a missile has been deposited on a site.
Strategic Weapons; Weapons having nuclear capability and 
sufficient range to strike within the continental limits 
of an adversary.
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM): Launchers of
ballistic missiles installed on any nuclear-powered sub­
marine or launchers of modern ballistic missiles installed 
on any submarine regardless of type.
Tactical Weapon: Weapons having relatively short range,
nuclear or non-nuclear capability, but not generally con­
sidered as being applicable to strategic use.
